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Multisensory integration is a fundamental component of perceptual decision making 
and an excellent example of how the brain deals with the abundance of sensory 
uncertainty in order to create a coherent understanding of its environment. In this thesis 
I evaluate the two most popular computational models for describing multisensory 
integrative processes: maximum likelihood estimation (MLE) and Bayesian causal 
inference (BCI). Both models predict statistically-optimal sensory integration, but in so 
doing MLE makes the critical assumption that the brain always fuses sensory signals 
under certain experimental circumstances, whereas BCI allows for flexibility by assessing 
whether integration is appropriate for a particular set of stimuli. In two empirical studies 
on audiovisual spatial integration I expose considerable limitations of MLE in explaining 
human behavioral results and advocate the use of BCI to evaluate multisensory 
integration, even under conditions that were previously thought of as optimized for 
MLE. In a final empirical chapter I test an important prediction that both models make: 
that sensory uncertainty is reduced for integrated multisensory signals. I present 
behavioral evidence that confirms this prediction by showing that observers’ confidence 
levels increase as a result of audiovisual integration, thereby further validating the use 
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CHAPTER 1:  PREFACE 
 
The experimental focus of my PhD throughout the years can perhaps best be described 
as turbulent. I started off by studying the effects of visual blinding on audiovisual 
integration by means of the attentional blink with electroencephalography (EEG). 
Although my entire first year and more was spent on that project, it did not make it into 
the current thesis. Instead, my interests shifted from visual awareness ratings to 
metacognition in general and its intricate interplay with multisensory integration in 
particular. More importantly, they drifted away from EEG and towards Bayesian 
inference.  
It all began as ‘a little project on the side helping out an undergrad student’. However, 
the seemingly simple research objective of testing whether multisensory integration 
leads to a boost in confidence, turned out to be a rocky road full of obstacles. First, I had 
to ensure empirically that multisensory integration in our experiment did indeed result 
in increased precision, as is often claimed, for that was the assumption which the 
confidence hypothesis relied upon. But my initial attempts at replicating this 
fundamental characteristic of multisensory integration were unsuccessful.  
Over time, I began to better understand the limitations of the so-called maximum 
likelihood estimation (MLE) ‘model’ that was used to describe multisensory integration 
(see chapter 3). Moreover, by studying assumptions that the MLE model makes, I was 
able to explain why the behavioral data sets that I acquired consistently deviated from 
MLE predictions (chapter 4). Finally, with a renewed understanding of multisensory 
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integration and an improved psychophysics skills-set I was able to adequately address 
the ‘simple’ metacognitive research question. As expected, multisensory integration 
raised participants’ confidence levels, but I had to develop a novel methodological 
approach to unambiguously demonstrate that (chapter 5).  
The first and last chapter of this thesis bind the empirical work together by providing a 
literature review of the current computational models of multisensory integration 
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Various sensory organs continuously provide our brains with uncertain information 
about our environment. Critically, every sensor has its specific limitations. For example, 
the sensitivity of our eyes’ photoreceptors is optimized for use during daylight (e.g. 
photoreceptor sensitivity of nocturnal insects is much higher; Honkanen, Immonen, 
Salmela, Heimonen & Weckstrom, 2017). Our ears are specialized for detecting 
differences in sound pitch, but they provide only imprecise estimates for the location of 
a sound’s source.  
Imagine you are in a dimly lit bedroom at night and you hear the sound of a mosquito. 
To obtain the most precise estimate of the mosquito’s location the brain should 
combine uncertain spatial information furnished by the auditory and visual senses. 
Critically, the brain should integrate sensory signals only when they pertain to the same 
event, but process them independently when they come from different events. For 
example, we are all familiar with those vague black spots on the wall that look 
annoyingly like mosquitos in the dark. These immobile black spots should not be 
integrated with the mosquito’s buzzing sound around the head. In short, in order to 
generate a coherent percept of the environment, the brain needs to infer whether or 
not sensory signals are caused by common or independent sources. This process has 
been termed multisensory causal inference (Shams & Beierholm, 2010).  
In this chapter we will explore the computational operations that the brain may use to 
solve these two challenges involved in multisensory perception, i.e. (i) how to weight 
and integrate signals that come from a common source into a unified percept and (ii) 
how to infer whether signals come from common or independent sources. 
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In the first section, we will introduce the normative Bayesian framework focusing on 
perception based on input from a single sensory channel and prior expectations. In the 
second section, we will describe how the brain integrates signals from multiple sensory 
channels pertaining to the same event into a unified percept (i.e. so-called forced fusion 
model). In the third section, we will explore the more general case of multisensory 
perception in the face of uncertainty about the world’s causal structure, i.e. uncertainty 
about whether signals are caused by common or independent sources. Hence, this final 
case combines the two challenges facing the brain in a multisensory world: causal 
inference and weighted sensory integration. Each section first describes the normative 
Bayesian model and then briefly reviews the empirical evidence that shows the extent to 
which data from human or non-human primates are in accordance with those 
computational principles. 
 
2. Combining information from a single sensory channel with prior knowledge 
Any sensory signal that reaches the cerebral cortex is inevitably contaminated with 
various sources of noise. Let us consider how an observer can estimate the location of 
an event for spatial orienting from visual inputs. An observer’s eyes are bombarded with 
photons, and each eye’s lens refracts the photons such that a ray of focused light hits 
the retina. There, photoreceptors and ganglion cells transform the electromagnetic 
radiation into action potentials. This eventually, via several synapses, results in an 
activity pattern in the visual cortex. Importantly, noise may be introduced at each of 
those processing stages. The eye’s view can be partially obscured by a dirty window, and 
its lens is unlikely to be perfectly in focus; the transformation from photons to action 
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potentials functions in bulk (Barlow, 1956); and synaptic transmission is a probabilistic 
process (Stevens, 2003). In short, the sensory organs and systems provide the brain only 
with an uncertain or noisy estimate of a particular property (e.g. spatial location) of 
events and objects in the outside world.  
To constrain perceptual inference the observer can combine the noisy sensory evidence 
with prior knowledge or expectations. For example, in our natural environment it is very 
unlikely to observe a concave human face, where the tip of the nose faces away from 
the observer. When an observer is shown the inside of a mask, the brain often falsely 
interprets the image such that the nose is perceived to be facing the observer. The visual 
hollow-face illusion, as this effect was dubbed, is only one of many examples where 
prior knowledge affects our perception (Gregory, 1997).  
The normative Bayesian framework in neuroscience posits that the brain forms a 
probabilistic generative model of the sensory inputs that is inverted during perceptual 
inference (= recognition model). Bayesian probability theory offers a precise formulation 
of how observers should combine uncertain information such as different sorts of noisy 
sensory evidence and prior knowledge to form the most reliable representation of the 
world. It thus sets a benchmark of a so-called ‘ideal observer’ or optimal performance 
given a particular loss function against which an organism’s neural and behavioral 




Fig 1 - Generative models corresponding to the three different cases. Fig. 1 a. Single 
sensory signal: A hidden source generates a sensory signal that is corrupted by noise. 
Fig. 1 b. Forced Fusion: A hidden source generates two sensory signals (e.g. auditory 
and visual) that are independently corrupted by noise. Fig. 1 c. Causal inference model 
explicitly models the potential causal structures that could have generated the two 
sensory signals (e.g. auditory and visual). In the full segregation model component 
(left) two independent hidden sources generate the auditory and visual signals. In the 
forced fusion model component, a common source generates two sensory signals (e.g. 
auditory and visual). A Bayesian causal inference estimate combines the estimates 
obtained from those two model components using a specific decision function (e.g. 




Figure 1A shows the graphical model that illustrates the generative process for the 
spatial localization example above based on a single sensory channel and prior 
knowledge. A hidden source at the true location 𝑆 generates a noisy sensory signal 
representation 𝑋. The true location 𝑆 is sampled from a prior distribution, which is often 
assumed to be a Gaussian with mean μ: 𝑆 ~ N(𝜇𝑝𝑟𝑖𝑜𝑟, 𝜎
2
𝑝𝑟𝑖𝑜𝑟). The sensory signal is 
corrupted by noise, i.e. sampled from a Gaussian centred on the true source location: 
𝑥 ~ N(𝑆, 𝜎2𝑠𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑜𝑟𝑦). The generative model defines the probability of each sensory input 
given a particular source location 𝑃(𝑥|𝑆). During perception the observer needs to 
invert this generative model to compute the posterior probability 𝑃(𝑆|𝑥), i.e. the 
probability of a spatial location given the sensory input 𝑥, by combining sensory 
evidence and prior knowledge. According to Bayes’ rule, the posterior probability of a 
spatial location given a particular sensory input, 𝑃(𝑆|𝑥), is proportional to the product 
of the likelihood 𝑃(𝑥|𝑆) and the prior 𝑃(𝑆): 
(1)  𝑃(𝑆|𝑥) =
𝑃(𝑥|𝑆)∗𝑃(𝑆)
𝑃(𝑥)
∝ 𝑃(𝑥|𝑆) ∗ 𝑃(𝑆)          
The normalization constant 𝑃(𝑥) can be obtained from the product of the likelihood 
function and the prior by marginalizing (i.e. integrating) over all possible locations 𝑆: 
(2)  𝑃(𝑥) = ∫ 𝑃(𝑥|𝑆) ∗ 𝑃(𝑆) ∗ 𝑑𝑆          
The observer then needs to minimize a particular loss function that specifies the cost of 
selecting the estimate ?̂? given the true location 𝑆 in order to report a final point 
estimate. For instance, using the squared error loss function the observer would report 
the mean of the posterior distribution as the final spatial estimate. By contrast, using a 
zero-one loss function the observer would report the maximum a posteriori estimate 
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(MAP), i.e. the mode of the posterior distribution. Critically, under Gaussian assumptions 
of both prior and likelihood the posterior mean and mode are identical, i.e. both loss 
functions yield the same final estimate. However, asymmetric posterior distributions 
lead to different estimates for the posterior mean and MAP (Körding, Beierholm, Ma et 
al., 2007; Yuille & Bulthoff, 1996).  
Priors can emerge at multiple timescales potentially ranging from seconds to 
evolutionary times. For instance, during evolution certain hardwired neural priors may 
have emerged as a result of selection pressures (Geisler & Diehl, 2002). Likewise, other 
hardwired priors may be fine-tuned during neurodevelopment when the immature brain 
is exposed to the statistics of the sensory inputs (Gopnik & Tenenbaum, 2007). Finally, 
the brain is thought to rapidly adjust priors to changes in the input statistics across and 
perhaps even within trials where the posterior of the current trial or time point forms 
the prior for the next trial or time point (Di Luca & Rhodes, 2016; Roach, McGraw, 
Whitaker & Heron, 2017). Priors are critical to constrain perceptual inference in the face 
of uncertainty resulting from noise, occlusion etc. As we will derive in greater detail in 
the next ‘forced fusion’ section, the influence of the prior on the final posterior estimate 
should be greatest if the sensory input is noisy and uncertain. This is because different 
sorts of evidence (e.g. prior vs. sensory evidence or different sensory evidences) should 
be combined in a manner weighted by their relative reliabilities (see Section 3 for 
details). 
Priors can be formed about all sorts of properties such as spatial location, shape, speed 
etc. Indeed, numerous studies have demonstrated how prior knowledge or expectations 
shape and bias perceptual inference in our natural environment or designed 
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experimental settings: the light-from-above prior (objects with ambiguous depth seem 
to face forward if the shadow is below them; Mamassian & Landy, 2001), the circularity 
assumption (we tend to think that an object’s depth is equal to its width; Jacobs, 1999), 
the foveal bias (relevant objects are more likely to appear in the centre of our field of 
view; Kerzel, 2002; Odegaard, Wozny & Shams, 2015), the slow speed preference (most 
objects do not move or tend to move slowly; Stocker & Simoncelli, 2006; Weiss, 
Simoncelli & Adelson, 2002), and the cardinal orientation prior (vertical and horizontal 
orientations can be more frequently found (Girshick, Landy & Simoncelli, 2011). In the 
latter example the experimentally determined probabilities of the human prior 
distribution for orientations were shown to match the environmental statistics for 
orientations that were found in a large set of photographs. In addition to the long-term 
priors, the brain can also rapidly adapt priors to the dynamics of statistical regularities. 
In laboratory experiments participants may learn the distribution from which the stimuli 
are sampled (e.g. the range of stimulus durations in a time-interval estimation task; 
Jazayeri & Shadlen, 2010). In the real world they can adopt prior distributions that apply 
to a particular situation (e.g. the typical velocities for a ball in a game of tennis; Kording 
& Wolpert, 2004). Multiple studies have also shown that the biasing influence of the 
prior is - as expected (see above) - inversely related to the reliability of the sensory 
stimuli (Girshick et al., 2011; Jazayeri & Shadlen, 2010; Kording & Wolpert, 2004; Stocker 
& Simoncelli, 2006; Weiss et al., 2002).  
At the neural level, a recent functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) study has 
shown that the brain estimates the reliability or precision of sensory representations in 
primary visual cortex (V1) on a trial-by-trial basis (van Bergen, Ma, Pratte & Jehee, 
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2015). Participants were presented with visual gratings that varied in their orientation 
across trials. On each trial they indicated the perceived orientation using a rotating bar. 
Critically, even though no external noise was added to the stimuli, the precision of 
sensory representations in V1 may vary across trials because of internal neural noise. 
Indeed, the uncertainty estimated from the activity patterns in the visual cortex varied 
across trials. Moreover, it correlated positively with the variance of participants’ 
responses, and negatively with their orientation errors. The results of this study suggest 
that sensory cortices represent stimulus uncertainty on a trial-by-trial basis and that this 
uncertainty affects behavioral performance, as predicted by probabilistic models of 
Bayesian inference.  
 
3. Forced fusion: Integrating sensory signals that come from a common source 
Many events and objects in the natural environment can be perceived concurrently by 
multiple senses that are each specialized for specific features of the outside world. 
Signals from different senses can provide complementary information. For instance, 
honey can be perceived as yellow by vision, but tastes sweet. Alternatively, multiple 
senses can provide redundant information about the same physical property such as 
spatial location. Thus, we can locate a puncture in a bicycle’s inner tube by vision, 
audition or touch (i.e. seeing, hearing or feeling where the air flows out of the tube). In 
the case of redundant information across the senses, multisensory perception enables 
the observer to form a more precise or reliable (reliability being the inverse of variance) 




Figure 1B shows the generative model for spatial localization based on redundant 
auditory and visual information. The generative model assumes one single source at the 
true location 𝑆𝐴𝑉 that emits two internal sensory signals; in this case a visual and an 
auditory signal: 𝑥𝐴 and 𝑥𝑉. As we do not allow for the two signals to be generated by 
two independent sources, we refer to this generative model as the forced fusion 
scenario, where optimal performance can be obtained by mandatory sensory 
integration. Again, as in the unisensory case, we assume that the auditory and visual 
signals, 𝑥𝐴 and 𝑥𝑉 are corrupted by independent Gaussian noise. Hence, we sample 𝑥𝐴 
and 𝑥𝑉 independently according to 𝑥𝐴 ~ N(𝑆𝐴𝑉, 𝜎
2
𝐴) and 𝑥𝑉 ~ N(𝑆𝐴𝑉, 𝜎
2
𝑉).  
During perceptual inference, the observer needs to compute the posterior probability of 
the spatial location given auditory and visual inputs according to Bayes’ theorem: 
(3)  𝑃(𝑆𝐴𝑉|𝑥𝐴, 𝑥𝑉) =
𝑃(𝑥𝐴,𝑥𝑉|𝑆𝐴𝑉)∗𝑃(𝑆𝐴𝑉)
𝑃(𝑥𝐴,𝑥𝑉)
∝ 𝑃(𝑥𝐴, 𝑥𝑉|𝑆𝐴𝑉) ∗ 𝑃(𝑆𝐴𝑉)   
Further, as auditory and visual inputs are assumed to be conditionally independent (i.e. 
independent noise assumption across sensory channels), we can factorize the likelihood 
(Oruç, Maloney & Landy, 2003):  
(4)   𝑃(𝑆𝐴𝑉|𝑥𝐴, 𝑥𝑉) ∝ 𝑃(𝑥𝐴|𝑆𝐴𝑉) ∗ 𝑃(𝑥𝑉|𝑆𝐴𝑉) ∗ 𝑃(𝑆𝐴𝑉) 
Further, most studies in multisensory integration assume an uninformative or flat prior 
𝑃(𝑆𝐴𝑉), where we can ignore the influence of the prior. As a result, the maximum a 
posteriori estimate turns into a maximum likelihood estimate: 
(5)  𝑃(𝑆𝐴𝑉|𝑥𝐴, 𝑥𝑉) ∝ 𝑃(𝑥𝐴|𝑆𝐴𝑉) ∗ 𝑃(𝑥𝑉|𝑆𝐴𝑉) 
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Assuming independent Gaussian noise and uninformative priors, the optimal, most 
precise (i.e. most reliable or with minimum variance) audiovisual estimate ?̂?𝐴𝑉 can be 
computed as a reliability-weighted linear average of the two unisensory estimates (Ernst 
& Banks, 2002; Oruç et al., 2003):  
(6)   ?̂?𝐴𝑉 = 𝑤𝐴?̂?𝐴 + 𝑤𝑉?̂?𝑉     with    𝑤𝐴 =
𝑟𝐴
𝑟𝐴+𝑟𝑉
      and  𝑤𝑉 =
𝑟𝑉
𝑟𝐴+𝑟𝑉
= 1 − 𝑤𝐴   




Moreover, the reliability of this audiovisual estimate can be expressed as the sum of the 
two unisensory reliabilities: 







     
Hence, the reliability of the audiovisual estimate is greater than (or equal to) the 
maximal reliabilities of the unisensory estimates. Equation (7) shows formally that 
multisensory integration increases the precision of the percept. The maximal 
multisensory variance reduction by a factor of 2 can be obtained when the variances of 
the two sensory signals are equal.  
In summary, the maximum likelihood estimation (MLE) model under forced-fusion 
assumptions makes two critical predictions for human multisensory perception 
performance. First, the variance associated with the multisensory percept is smaller 
than (or equal to) the minimal variance of the unisensory percepts (Eq. 7). Second, the 
multisensory percept is obtained by integrating sensory inputs weighted by their relative 




Fig 2 - Forced fusion model, maximum likelihood estimation and psychometric 
perturbation analysis. 
Fig 2 a. Signal detection theoretic analysis of a 2IFC spatial discrimination task. For 
each true probe stimulus location 𝑺𝒑𝒓 (and standard stimulus location 𝑺𝒔𝒕 at 0°), the 
observer computes a spatial estimate of the probe signal (𝒙𝒑𝒓) relative to the standard 
signal (𝒙𝒔𝒕): i.e. the spatial signal difference 𝒙𝒑𝒓 − 𝒙𝒔𝒕. Because of trial-specific external 
and internal noise affecting both standard and probe stimuli, the signal difference is 
assumed to vary from trial to trial for identical true stimuli locations, 𝑺𝒑𝒓 and 𝑺𝒔𝒕, 
according to a Gaussian probability distribution with a standard deviation of 
√𝟐 ∗ 𝝈𝒔𝒆𝒏𝒔𝒐𝒓𝒚 that defines the summed sensory noise of the standard and probe 
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stimuli. The observer provides a “probe right” discrimination response when the 
spatial signal difference is greater than zero degrees visual angle (i.e. 𝒙𝒑𝒓 − 𝒙𝒔𝒕 > 𝟎°). 
Fig 2 b. Psychometric function. For the data of panel A, a cumulative Gaussian shows 
the probability (or fraction of trials; grey circles, including measurement noise) of 
“probe right” responses as a function of the true probe location 𝑺𝒑𝒓. The probability 
“probe right” (in B) corresponds directly to the integral (i.e. dark shaded area in A) of 
the Gaussian probability distribution (in A) where 𝒙𝒑𝒓 − 𝒙𝒔𝒕 > 𝟎°. The point of 
subjective equality (PSE) refers to the probe location associated with 
𝑷("𝒑𝒓𝒐𝒃𝒆 𝒓𝒊𝒈𝒉𝒕") = 𝟎. 𝟓. The just noticeable difference (JND) refers to the difference 
in probe stimulus locations at the two thresholds: 𝑷("𝒑𝒓𝒐𝒃𝒆 𝒓𝒊𝒈𝒉𝒕") = 𝟎. 𝟓 and 
𝑷("𝒑𝒓𝒐𝒃𝒆 𝒓𝒊𝒈𝒉𝒕") ≈ 𝟎. 𝟖𝟒. In a 2IFC task the JND (in B) is equal to the standard 
deviation of the Gaussian probability distribution of signal differences (in A): 
𝒊. 𝒆. 𝑱𝑵𝑫 = √𝟐 ∗ 𝝈𝒔𝒆𝒏𝒔𝒐𝒓𝒚. 
Fig 2 c-d. Maximum likelihood estimation (MLE) under forced fusion assumptions: The 
observer is presented with an audiovisual conflict stimulus (∆𝑨𝑽) , i.e. the visual signal 
is presented at −𝟏
𝟐
∆𝑨𝑽 and the auditory signal is presented at +
𝟏
𝟐
∆𝑨𝑽, as the standard in 
the first interval, and an audiovisual congruent stimulus as the probe in the second 
interval. The Gaussians (top) show the likelihood functions and unbiased spatial 
estimates (i.e. maximum likelihood estimates; vertical lines) from the standard 
stimulus separately for the visual signal (𝒙𝑽 = 𝑺𝑽,𝒔𝒕 = −
𝟏
𝟐
∆𝑨𝑽, dashed), the auditory 
signal (𝒙𝑨 = 𝑺𝑨,𝒔𝒕 = +
𝟏
𝟐
∆𝑨𝑽, dotted), and the combined audiovisual signal as obtained 
from MLE-based integration (Eqs. (6-7), solid). The means of the Gaussian likelihood 
functions for the audiovisual conflict stimuli (top) can be estimated as the PSEs of the 
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cumulative Gaussians (bottom) obtained from auditory, visual and audiovisual 2IFC 
trials where the audiovisual spatial conflict stimulus is presented as the standard 
stimulus (i.e. see above 𝑺𝒔𝒕 = ±
𝟏
𝟐
∆𝑨𝑽) and the probe stimulus is presented at variable 
degrees of visual angle.  
Fig 2 c. For equal visual and auditory reliabilities, the means of the Gaussian likelihood 
functions and the PSEs of the corresponding cumulative Gaussian psychometric 
functions are equal to the average of the auditory and visual means or PSEs.  
Fig 2 d. If the visual reliability is greater (i.e. visual variance is smaller) than the 
auditory one, the visual signal is assigned a greater weight. As a result, the mean of 
the audiovisual estimate is closer to the visual than the auditory estimate. As shown in 
the figure, we can estimate the sensory weights from the PSEs of the psychometric 
functions of the unisensory visual, unisensory auditory and audiovisual conflict 
conditions in a 2IFC task. Adapted from Ernst and Banks (2002). 
 
In the following we will describe the standard psychophysical approach (Ernst & Banks, 
2002; Rohde, van Dam & Ernst, 2016) that allows us to test whether human behavior is 
in accordance with these two MLE predictions. The main steps for testing each of the 
two MLE predictions involve (i) estimating the unisensory variances from perceptual 
performance on unisensory trials, (ii) using Eqs. (6) & (7) to make parameter-free MLE 
predictions about the multisensory variance and the sensory weights applied during 
multisensory integration and (iii) comparing these predictions with the multisensory 
variances and weights empirically measured during multisensory perceptual 
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performance. We will use an audiovisual spatial discrimination task as an example (Alais 
& Burr, 2004).  
To investigate whether audiovisual integration of spatial inputs leads to the MLE-
predicted variance reduction, we need to measure the variances associated with 
auditory, visual and audiovisual percepts. The empirical variances for these percepts 
(e.g. spatial estimates) can be estimated from participants’ responses in a two-interval 
forced choice (2IFC) paradigm. On each trial, the observer is presented with a standard 
stimulus in the first interval at zero degrees (𝑆𝑠𝑡 = 0°) and a probe stimulus in the 
second interval at variable degrees of visual angle along the azimuth (𝑆𝑝𝑟). Standard and 
probe stimuli are both presented in the visual, auditory or audiovisual modalities. The 
observer discriminates whether the probe stimulus is on the left or right side of the 
standard. Next, we fit psychometric functions, i.e. a cumulative Gaussian (𝜓), to the 
percentage ‘perceived right’ responses as a function of the visual angle of the presented 
probe separately for the visual, auditory and audiovisual conditions (e.g. using maximum 
likelihood estimation for fitting (Kingdom & Prins, 2016); see Figure 2A-B).   










     
where 𝛼 is the point of subjective equality (PSE), i.e. the probe location where the 
psychometric function equals 0.5 and it is equally likely for the observer to perceive the 
probe left or right of the standard. Further, the just noticeable difference (JND), i.e. the 
difference in probe locations between the PSE and the point where the psychometric 
function equals ~0.84, is given by 
1
𝛽
. Importantly, as shown in Figure 2A-B, the PSE and 
JND obtained from the psychometric function as a cumulative Gaussian correspond 
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directly to the mean (𝜇) and standard deviation (𝜎) of the Gaussian distribution that 
describes the perceptual noise for the auditory, visual or audiovisual spatial estimates 
(Acuna, Berniker, Fernandes & Kording, 2015). More specifically, as we used a 2IFC 
paradigm in which sensory noise of both standard and probe contribute equally to the 
signal differences (𝑥𝑝𝑟 − 𝑥𝑠𝑡), we can compute the perceptual variance for the auditory, 
visual and audiovisual conditions from the JNDs of their psychometric functions 
according to 𝐽𝑁𝐷2 = 2𝜎2. Using Eq. (7) we can then assess whether the empirically 
measured AV variance is in accordance with the MLE-predicted AV variance computed 
from the unisensory auditory and visual variances. 
To investigate whether observers integrate sensory signals weighted by their relative 
reliabilities as predicted by MLE we use a so-called perturbation analysis (Young, Landy 
& Maloney, 1993). For the perturbation analysis we need to introduce a small non-
noticeable conflict between the auditory and visual signals of the audiovisual standard 
stimulus (n.b. no audiovisual conflict is introduced for the probe stimulus). For instance, 
we can shift the auditory signal by +
1
2
∆𝐴𝑉 and the visual signal by −
1
2
∆𝐴𝑉 relative to 
𝑆𝐴𝑉,𝑠𝑡 congruent (= 0°). If the auditory and visual signals are equally reliable and hence 
equally weighted in the AV spatial estimate, the perceived AV location of the conflict AV 
stimulus is equal to the perceived location of the corresponding congruent AV stimulus 
(see Figure 2C, top panel). Yet, if the visual reliability is greater than the auditory 
reliability, the perceived location (i.e. spatial estimate) for the AV conflict stimulus 
should be biased towards the true location of the visual signal (i.e. in the above case 
shifted towards the left; see Figure 2D, top panel) and vice versa for greater auditory 
reliability. The more frequently reported visual bias on the perceived sound location has 
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been coined the ventriloquist effect, a perceptual illusion known since ancient times. 
Yet, the opposite bias from audition to vision can also emerge if the visual signal is 
rendered less reliable (Alais & Burr, 2004). To summarize, the cross-modal bias 
operating from vision to audition and vice versa provides us with information about the 
relative sensory weights applied during multisensory integration. Formally, we can 
quantify the weights applied to the auditory and visual signals from the PSEs of the 
psychometric functions obtained from the AV conflict conditions by rewriting Eq. (6) (see 
Figure 2C-D, lower panels) (Ernst & Banks, 2002):   
(9)   𝑤𝐴,𝑒𝑚𝑝 =
𝑃𝑆𝐸∆𝐴𝑉−𝑆𝑉,𝑠𝑡
𝑆𝐴,𝑠𝑡−𝑆𝑉,𝑠𝑡
     with           𝑤𝑉 = 1 − 𝑤𝐴  
Note that this equation implicitly assumes that unisensory auditory and visual 
perception are unbiased (i.e. the PSEs of the unisensory psychometric functions are 
equal to zero). These empirical sensory weights can then be statistically compared with 
the MLE-predicted weights computed from the JNDs of the unisensory psychometric 
functions according to Eq. (6). 
Critically, measuring the sensory weight requires a difference in the location of 
unisensory component signals, i.e. the presentation of incongruent audiovisual signals. 
While a greater inter-sensory conflict may enable a more reliable estimation of sensory 
weights, it progressively violates the forced fusion assumption and makes it less likely 
that observers assume a common source for the sensory signals. As a rule of thumb, a 
∆𝐴𝑉 equal to the JND of the more reliable sensory signal has been proposed to be 
adequate (Rohde et al., 2016).  
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Numerous psychophysical studies have suggested that human observers integrate two 
sensory signals near-optimally, i.e. as predicted by the forced fusion model outlined 
above. For instance, near-optimal integration has been shown for visual-tactile size 
estimates in a seminal study by Ernst and Banks (2002). Four participants judged, by 
looking and/or feeling, whether the height of a raised ridge stimulus was taller than a 
standard comparison height. The true height of the ridge varied with small deviations 
from the standard height on a trial-by-trial basis. The used apparatus allowed the 
researchers to independently decrease the visual reliability by addition of visual noise at 
four different levels. Psychometric functions were fit to the unisensory and bisensory 
responses such that MLE-predicted and empirical weights and variances could be 
compared (as described above). Results indicated that the visual variance increased and 
visual weights decreased with increasing visual noise levels (as predicted by Eq. 6). 
Importantly, the empirical visual weights and visual-haptic variances were similar to the 
MLE-predicted weights and variances for all four noise levels (with a notably clear 
bisensory variance reduction when the visual and haptic perceptual reliability were 
similar; Eq. 7); thus suggesting that visual and haptic sensory signals were integrated in 
(near-) optimal fashion (Ernst & Banks, 2002). A follow-up experiment by the same 
group, using similar stimuli and apparatus, replicated the finding of an optimal variance 
reduction for visual-tactile size estimates (in conditions with negligible spatial disparity 
between the two sensory-specific cues; Gepshtein, Burge, Ernst, & Banks, 2005). Other 
examples of multisensory integration for which human behavior was shown to be in line 
with maximum likelihood estimation include audiovisual location estimates (Alais & 
Burr, 2004), audiovisual frequency discrimination (Raposo, Sheppard, Schrater & 
Churchland, 2012; Sheppard, Raposo & Churchland, 2013), visual-tactile object-shape 
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judgments (Helbig & Ernst, 2007), audiovisual duration estimates (Hartcher-O'Brien, Di 
Luca & Ernst, 2014), and audiovisual motion-speed discrimination (Mendonça, Santos & 
Lopez-Moliner, 2011).  
At the neural level, neurophysiological studies in non-human primates have shown that 
neural populations (Fetsch, Pouget, DeAngelis & Angelaki, 2011) and single neurons (Gu, 
Angelaki & Deangelis, 2008; Morgan, Deangelis & Angelaki, 2008) integrate sensory 
signals weighted by their reliabilities in line with MLE predictions in visual-vestibular 
motion discrimination tasks. Further, Fetsch, Pouget, DeAngelis and Angelaki (2011) 
showed that the variances and sensory weights obtained from decoding spiking rates in 
a population of multisensory neurons were qualitatively comparable to the variances 
and weights observed at the behavioral level. At a more implementational level, these 
authors have proposed the divisive normalization model (Ohshiro, Angelaki & DeAngelis, 
2011, 2017). This normalization model mediates reliability-weighted sensory integration, 
because the activity of each neuron is normalized by the activity of the entire pool of 
neurons. 
Additional evidence in support of reliability-weighted multisensory integration at the 
neural level comes from several human fMRI studies showing that the connectivity 
between unisensory regions and association regions such as the superior temporal 
sulcus depends on the relative audiovisual reliabilities in speech recognition tasks 
(Beauchamp, Pasalar & Ro, 2010; Nath & Beauchamp, 2011). Likewise, the blood 
oxygenation level-dependent (BOLD) response induced by somatosensory inputs in 
parietal areas was modulated by the reliability of concurrent visual input during a 
visuohaptic size discrimination task (Helbig et al., 2012).  
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Despite considerable evidence in support of MLE-optimal integration in human and non-
human primates, accumulating research has also revealed situations where the sensory 
weights and reduction in multisensory variance are not fully consistent with the 
predictions of maximum likelihood estimation. These findings highlight assumptions and 
limitations of the standard MLE forced fusion model for multisensory perception. 
Focusing on the sensory weights, numerous studies have shown that human observers 
overweight a particular sensory modality in a range of tasks. Most prominently, in 
contrast to the classical study by Alais and Burr (2004) showing MLE-optimal auditory 
and visual weights in spatial localization, Battaglia, Jacobs and Aslin (2003) reported that 
observers rely more strongly on visual than auditory signals for spatial localization. 
Likewise, a series of studies have shown auditory overweighting in audiovisual temporal 
judgment tasks (Burr, Banks & Morrone, 2009; Maiworm & Röder, 2011), vestibular 
overweighting in visual-vestibular self-motion tasks (Butler, Smith, Campos & Bülthoff, 
2010; Fetsch, Turner, DeAngelis & Angelaki, 2009), visual overweighting in a visual-
vestibular self-rotation task (Prsa, Gale & Blanke, 2012), and haptic overweighting in a 
visual-haptic slant discrimination task (Rosas, Wagemans, Ernst & Wichmann, 2005). In 
all of those studies the sensory modality that is overweighted was the modality that is 
usually more reliable for this particular task in everyday experiences. One may therefore 
argue that the brain adjusts the weights of the sensory inputs not only based on the 
input’s current reliability but also imposes a modality-specific reliability prior that 
reflects the modality’s reliability for a particular property or task in everyday life 
(Battaglia et al., 2003; Maiworm & Röder, 2011).  
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With respect to the second MLE prediction of multisensory variance reduction, 
numerous studies, covering a variety of sensory modalities and tasks, have also shown a 
decrease in multisensory variance that is smaller than predicted by the forced fusion 
model (Eq. 7). For example, this was shown for audiovisual interval duration judgments 
(Burr et al., 2009), audiovisual speed discrimination (Bentvelzen, Leung & Alais, 2009), 
visual-haptic slant discrimination (Rosas et al., 2005), and visual-haptic size and depth 
estimation tasks (Battaglia, Kersten & Schrater, 2011; Gepshtein & Banks, 2003). This 
‘sub-optimal’ integration performance can be explained by several key assumptions of 
the forced fusion model that may not hold in our natural environment. First, the forced 
fusion model assumes that two signals are necessarily generated by one single source. 
However, in the real world sensory signals can be generated by common or independent 
sources, leading to uncertainty about the world’s causal structure (see next section). 
Likewise, in some experimental settings the observer may take into account this causal 
uncertainty, in particular if conflict trials are included or artificial stimuli are used that do 
not enhance the observer’s forced fusion or common source assumptions (Bentvelzen et 
al., 2009; Gepshtein & Banks, 2003). Second, the MLE model assumes that the sensory 
noise is independent between sensory modalities (Oruç et al., 2003). This assumption 
may be violated in some multisensory estimation tasks where dependencies exist 
between sensory modalities as a result of cross-modal adaptive calibration (e.g. auditory 
spatial estimates can be recalibrated by synchronous visual signals through a process 
that is different from multisensory integration; Ernst, 2012; Gepshtein & Banks, 2003; 
Gori, Sciutti, Burr & Sandini, 2011; Jacobs, 2002; Wozny & Shams, 2011). Third, the MLE 
model does not include additional sources of noise that may be added after integration, 
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e.g. during decision making and response selection (Battaglia et al., 2011; Burr et al., 
2009).  
 
4. Causal Inference: Accounting for observers’ uncertainty about the world’s 
causal structure  
The forced fusion model presented in the previous section accommodates only the 
special case of where two signals come from a common source. As a result, it can only 
model that two signals are integrated in a mandatory fashion. Yet, in our natural 
environment our senses are bombarded with many different signals. In this more 
naturalistic scenario an observer should bind signals into one coherent and unified 
percept only when they come from a common source, but he needs to treat them 
separately when they come from independent sources. Critically, the observer does not 
know the causal structure underlying the sensory signals. Instead, he needs to infer 
whether signals come from common or independent sources from the signals 
themselves. A range of correspondence cues such as temporal coincidence and 
correlations, spatial co-location and higher-order cues such as semantic, phonological, 
metaphoric, etc. correspondences (Adam & Noppeney, 2010; Bishop & Miller, 2011; 
Kanaya & Yokosawa, 2011; Lee & Noppeney, 2011, 2014; Maier, Di Luca & Noppeney, 
2011; Noppeney, Josephs, Hocking, Price & Friston, 2008; Parise & Spence, 2009; Parise, 
Spence & Ernst, 2012; Soto-Faraco & Alsius, 2009; Stevenson, Fister, Barnett, Nidiffer & 
Wallace, 2012; van Wassenhove, Grant & Poeppel, 2007; Warren, Welch & McCarthy, 
1981) are critical cues informing observers about whether signals come from a common 
source and should thus be integrated. Hence, multisensory perception in our natural 
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environment relies on solving the so-called causal inference problem (Shams & 
Beierholm, 2010). It requires observers not only to deal with uncertainty about 
perceptual estimates, but also with causal uncertainty, i.e. their uncertainty about the 
world’s causal structure.  
Spatial ventriloquism is a prominent audiovisual perceptual illusion that illustrates not 
only reliability-weighted integration (see Section 3), but also how the brain arbitrates 
between integration and segregation in the face of uncertainty about the causal 
structure of the world. At small spatial disparities, the perceived location of an auditory 
event (e.g. the voice of a puppeteer) shifts towards the location of a temporally 
correlated but spatially displaced visual event (e.g. the facial movements of the puppet) 
and vice versa depending on the relative auditory and visual reliabilities as described in 
the forced fusion section (Alais & Burr, 2004). This spatial biasing (i.e. the ventriloquist 
effect) breaks down or is at least attenuated at large spatial disparities and audiovisual 
asynchronies when it is unlikely that auditory and visual signals are caused by a common 
source (Hairston et al., 2003; Lewald & Guski, 2003; Odegaard, Wozny & Shams, 2017; 
Slutsky & Recanzone, 2001; Wallace et al., 2004).  
Initial modelling approaches introduced coupling priors to allow signals from different 
senses to bias each other without being integrated into one single unified percept 
(Bresciani, Dammeier & Ernst, 2006; Roach, Heron & McGraw, 2006). More recently, 
Körding, Beierholm, Ma et al. (2007) (and simultaneously Sato, Toyoizumi and Aihara, 
2007) proposed a Bayesian causal inference model that explicitly models the potential 
causal structures (i.e. common source or independent sources) that could have 
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generated the sensory signals. Figure 1C shows the generative model for Bayesian causal 
inference in an audiovisual spatial ventriloquist paradigm and localization task.  
The generative model of Bayesian causal inference assumes that common (𝐶 =  1) or 
independent (𝐶 =  2) sources are determined by sampling from a binomial distribution 
with 𝑃(𝐶 =  1) equal to the common-source prior 𝑃𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑚𝑜𝑛. The common source prior 
thus quantifies the observers’ ‘unity assumption’ (Chen & Spence, 2017) or prior 
tendency to integrate signals from different sensory modalities into one unified percept.  
For a common source, the “true” location 𝑆𝐴𝑉 is drawn from the spatial prior distribution 
N(𝜇𝑝𝑟𝑖𝑜𝑟, 𝜎
2
𝑝𝑟𝑖𝑜𝑟). For two independent causes, the “true” auditory (𝑆𝐴) and visual (𝑆𝑉) 
locations are drawn independently from this spatial prior distribution. The spatial prior 
distribution models an observer’s prior expectations of where events may happen (see 
Section 2). For instance, we can model a central bias or expectation that events happen 
in the centre of the visual field (Kerzel, 2002; Odegaard et al., 2015) by setting 
𝜇𝑝𝑟𝑖𝑜𝑟 = 0° and adjusting its strength in terms of the variance 𝜎
2
𝑝𝑟𝑖𝑜𝑟.  
Finally, exactly as in the unisensory and the forced fusion cases, noise is introduced 
independently for each sensory modality by drawing the sensory inputs 𝑥𝐴 and 𝑥𝑉 
independently from normal distributions centered on the true auditory (or visual) 
locations with parameter 𝜎𝐴 (or 𝜎𝑉). Thus, 𝜎𝐴 and 𝜎𝑉 define the noise (i.e. reliability) of 
the inputs in each sensory modality.  
In total, the generative model includes the following free parameters: the common-
source prior 𝑃𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑚𝑜𝑛, the spatial prior standard deviation 𝜎𝑝𝑟𝑖𝑜𝑟, the auditory standard 
deviation 𝜎𝐴,
 and the visual standard deviation 𝜎𝑉.  
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Given this probabilistic generative model, the observer needs to infer the causal 
structure that has generated the sensory inputs (i.e. common source or causal 
judgment) and the location of the auditory and/or visual inputs (i.e. spatial localization 
task). Critically, as we will see below, an observer’s spatial estimates inherently depend 
on his strategy of how to deal with his uncertainty about the underlying causal structure. 
In other words, the observer’s implicit causal inference co-determines his spatial 
estimate during a localization task. 
The posterior probability of the underlying causal structure can be inferred by combining 
the common-source prior with the sensory evidence according to Bayes’ rule (Körding, 
Beierholm, Ma et al., 2007):  




In explicit causal inference tasks (e.g. common source or congruency judgments), 
observers may thus report common or independent sources by applying a fixed 
threshold (e.g. 𝐶𝐼𝑇ℎ = 0.5) to the posterior probability of a common source:  
(11) ?̂? = {
1   𝑖𝑓    𝑃(𝐶 = 1|𝑥𝐴, 𝑥𝑉) ≥ 𝐶𝐼𝑇ℎ
2   𝑖𝑓    𝑃(𝐶 = 1|𝑥𝐴, 𝑥𝑉) < 𝐶𝐼𝑇ℎ
 
As expected and shown in Figure 3A, the posterior probability for a common source 
decreases with increasing spatial disparity between the auditory and visual signals. 
Indeed, numerous studies have demonstrated that participants are less likely to perceive 
signals as coming from a common source for large inter-sensory conflicts such as 
audiovisual spatial disparity or temporal asynchrony (Bosen et al., 2016; Hairston et al., 
2003; Lewald & Guski, 2003; Rohe & Noppeney, 2015a; Slutsky & Recanzone, 2001; 
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Soto-Faraco & Alsius, 2009; Stevenson et al., 2012; van Wassenhove et al., 2007; 
Wallace et al., 2004). 
 
Fig 3 - Explicit and implicit Bayesian causal inference. 
Fig 3 a. Explicit causal inference. The posterior probability of a common source 
𝑷(𝑪 = 𝟏|𝒙𝑨, 𝒙𝑽) is shown as a function of the internal auditory and visual signals (𝒙𝑨 
and 𝒙𝑽). It decreases for increasing spatial disparities between the internal audiovisual 
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signals. The observer is assumed to report a common source if the posterior 
probability for a common source is greater than a threshold 𝑪𝑰𝒕𝒉 (e.g. if 𝑷(𝑪 =
𝟏|𝒙𝑨, 𝒙𝑽) > 𝟎. 𝟓). Critically, even if the true auditory and visual source locations are 
identical (i.e. 𝑺𝑨 = 𝑺𝑽) the internal visual and auditory signals can differ because of 
internal and external noise (e.g. the area circumscribed by the dashed black circle 
covers 95% of the bivariate Gaussian probability distribution 𝑷(𝒙𝑨, 𝒙𝑽|𝑺𝑨 = 𝟎°, 𝑺𝑽 =
𝟎°). Right panel: Probability of a common source judgment (across trials) as a function 
of spatial disparity ∆𝑨𝑽 between the auditory and visual sources (𝑺𝑨 and 𝑺𝑽) as 
predicted by the Bayesian causal inference model (see text).  
Fig 3 b. Implicit causal inference – Auditory location responses: Simulated auditory 
location responses as a function of audiovisual spatial disparity (∆𝑨𝑽, columns 1 to 5) 
according to Bayesian causal inference for the three decision functions: model 
averaging (top row), model selection (middle row) and probability matching (bottom 
row). The black triangles indicate the true visual source location 𝑺𝑽 and the black disks 
the true auditory source location 𝑺𝑨. For one trial per panel with 𝒙𝑨 = 𝑺𝑨 and 𝒙𝑽 =
𝑺𝑽: The dashed lines show the audiovisual posterior probability distributions 
𝑷(𝑺𝑨𝑽|𝒙𝑨, 𝒙𝑽, 𝑪 = 𝟏) and audiovisual spatial estimates ?̂?𝑨𝑽,𝑪=𝟏 (i.e. maximum a 
posteriori estimates; vertical lines) for the forced fusion model component. The dotted 
lines show the auditory posterior probability distributions 𝑷(𝑺𝑨|𝒙𝑨, 𝑪 = 𝟐) and 
auditory spatial estimates ?̂?𝑨,𝑪=𝟐 for the full segregation model component. Finally, 
the vertical solid lines indicate the Bayesian causal inference estimate ?̂?𝑨,𝑩𝑪𝑰. The solid 
lines delineating the grey shaded area define the probability distributions (i.e. 
normalized histograms) of the Bayesian causal inference estimates across many trials 
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𝑷(?̂?𝑨,𝑩𝑪𝑰|𝑺𝑨, 𝑺𝑽). The distributions were generated from 10,000 randomly sampled 
𝒙𝑨, 𝒙𝑽 for each combination of 𝑺𝑨, 𝑺𝑽, with the parameters for visual noise: 𝝈𝑽 = 𝟏°, 
auditory noise: 𝝈𝑨 = 𝟐. 𝟓°, central spatial prior distribution: 𝝁𝒑𝒓𝒊𝒐𝒓 = 𝟎° and 
𝝈𝒑𝒓𝒊𝒐𝒓 = 𝟏𝟎°, and common source prior: 𝑷𝒄𝒐𝒎𝒎𝒐𝒏 = 𝟎. 𝟓 (n.b. the same parameter 
values were used in panel A). Adapted from Wozny, Beierholm and Shams (2010). 
 
Critically, the estimate of the auditory and visual source location needs to be formed 
depending on the underlying causal structure: In the case of a known common source 
(𝐶 =  1), the optimal estimate of the audiovisual location is a reliability-weighted 
average of the auditory and visual percepts and the spatial prior (i.e. this is the forced 



















In the case of known independent sources (𝐶 =  2), the optimal estimates of the 
auditory and visual signal locations (for the auditory and visual location report, 

























Critically, the observer does not know the underlying causal structure and hence needs 
to provide a final estimate of the auditory and visual locations that accounts for this 
causal uncertainty. More specifically, the observer can combine the estimates under the 
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two causal structures using various decision functions such as “model averaging,” 
“model selection,” or “probability matching” (Wozny, Beierholm & Shams, 2010), as 
described below. 
According to the “model averaging” strategy, the observer accounts for his causal 
uncertainty by combining the integrated, forced fusion spatial estimate with the 
segregated, task-relevant unisensory spatial estimate (i.e., either auditory or visual; 
whichever needs to be reported) weighted in proportion to the posterior probability of 
the underlying causal structures. This strategy minimizes the error about the spatial 
estimates under the assumption of a squared loss function (Körding, Beierholm, Ma et 
al., 2007).  
(14) ?̂?𝐴 = 𝑃(𝐶 = 1|𝑥𝐴, 𝑥𝑉) ∗ ?̂?𝐴𝑉,𝐶=1 + (1 − 𝑃(𝐶 = 1|𝑥𝐴, 𝑥𝑉)) ∗ ?̂?𝐴,𝐶=2 
(15) ?̂?𝑉 = 𝑃(𝐶 = 1|𝑥𝐴, 𝑥𝑉) ∗ ?̂?𝐴𝑉,𝐶=1 + (1 − 𝑃(𝐶 = 1|𝑥𝐴, 𝑥𝑉)) ∗ ?̂?𝑉,𝐶=2 
According to the ‘model selection’ strategy, the observer reports the auditory (?̂?𝐴) or 
visual (?̂?𝑉) spatial estimate selectively from the more likely causal structure. This 
strategy minimizes the error about the inferred causal structures, as well as the error 
about the spatial estimates given the inferred causal structures. 
(16) ?̂?𝐴 = {
?̂?𝐴𝑉,𝐶=1   𝑖𝑓   𝑃(𝐶 = 1|𝑥𝐴, 𝑥𝑉) ≥ 0.5
?̂?𝐴,𝐶=2     𝑖𝑓   𝑃(𝐶 = 1|𝑥𝐴, 𝑥𝑉) < 0.5
 
(17) ?̂?𝑉 = {
?̂?𝐴𝑉,𝐶=1   𝑖𝑓   𝑃(𝐶 = 1|𝑥𝐴, 𝑥𝑉) ≥ 0.5
?̂?𝑉,𝐶=2     𝑖𝑓   𝑃(𝐶 = 1|𝑥𝐴, 𝑥𝑉) < 0.5
 
According to ‘probability matching’, the observer reports the spatial estimate of one 
causal structure stochastically selected in proportion to its posterior probability. 
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(18) ?̂?𝐴 = {
?̂?𝐴𝑉,𝐶=1   𝑖𝑓   𝑃(𝐶 = 1|𝑥𝐴, 𝑥𝑉) ≥ 𝛼
?̂?𝐴,𝐶=2     𝑖𝑓    𝑃(𝐶 = 1|𝑥𝐴, 𝑥𝑉) < 𝛼
  with  𝛼 ~ 𝑈𝑛𝑖𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑚(0,1) 
(19) ?̂?𝑉 = {
?̂?𝐴𝑉,𝐶=1   𝑖𝑓    𝑃(𝐶 = 1|𝑥𝐴, 𝑥𝑉) ≥ 𝛼
?̂?𝑉,𝐶=2     𝑖𝑓    𝑃(𝐶 = 1|𝑥𝐴, 𝑥𝑉) < 𝛼
 with  𝛼 ~ 𝑈𝑛𝑖𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑚(0,1) 
As illustrated in Figure 3B, Bayesian causal inference transitions gracefully between 
sensory integration and segregation as a function of inter-sensory conflict irrespective of 
the specific decision function. In other words, while the forced fusion model allows only 
for a linear combination of the sensory signals (?̂?𝐴𝑉,𝐶=1 in Figure 3B), Bayesian causal 
inference models (?̂?𝐴,𝐵𝐶𝐼) combine sensory signals non-linearly as a function of inter-
sensory conflict. They predominantly integrate sensory signals approximately in line with 
forced fusion models, when the conflict is small, but attenuate integration for large 
conflicts. Numerous studies since the inception of multisensory integration as a research 
field in its own right have provided qualitative evidence for the computational principles 
governing Bayesian causal inference. For instance, several studies have demonstrated an 
inverted U-shape function for % perceived synchronous or the McGurk effect as a 
function of audiovisual synchrony of speech signals (Lee & Noppeney, 2011; Maier et al., 
2011; Soto-Faraco & Alsius, 2009; van Wassenhove et al., 2007). 
Over the past decade, accumulating research has also quantitatively compared human 
behavior with the predictions of Bayesian causal inference in a range of tasks including 
audiovisual spatial localization (Beierholm, Quartz & Shams, 2009; Bosen et al., 2016; 
Körding, Beierholm, Ma et al., 2007; Natarajan, Murray, Shams & Zemel, 2009; Odegaard 
& Shams, 2016; Odegaard et al., 2015, 2017; Rohe & Noppeney, 2015a, 2015b, 2016, 
Sato et al., 2007; Wozny et al., 2010), audiovisual temporal discrimination (Magnotti, Ma 
& Beauchamp, 2013; McGovern, Roudaia, Newell & Roach, 2016; Odegaard & Shams, 
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2016), visual-vestibular heading estimation (de Winkel, Katliar & Bülthoff, 2017), 
audiovisual speech recognition (Magnotti & Beauchamp, 2017), audiovisual distance 
perception (Mendonça, Mandelli & Pulkki, 2016) and audio-visuo-tactile numerosity 
judgments (Wozny, Beierholm & Shams, 2008). In the following, we discuss the role of (i) 
reliability of the sensory inputs, (ii) common source prior and (iii) the decision function in 
Bayesian causal inference.  
To investigate the influence of sensory reliability on how human observers arbitrate 
between sensory integration and segregation, Rohe and Noppeney (2015a) presented 
participants with auditory and visual spatial signals at multiple spatial disparities and 
visual reliabilities. In a dual task, observers performed Bayesian causal inference 
implicitly for auditory spatial localization and explicitly for common source judgment. 
The study showed that visual reliability shapes multisensory integration not only by 
determining the relative sensory weights, but also by defining the spatial integration 
window. As expected by Bayesian causal inference, highly reliable visual signals 
sensitized observers to audiovisual disparity thereby sharpening the spatial integration 
window.  
In addition to bottom-up sensory signals, Bayesian causal inference depends on the so-
called “common source prior”, embodying an observer’s prior expectations that two 
signals are caused by a common source. This raises the question whether these common 
source priors are hardwired in an individual, specifically for a particular task and 
stimulus characteristics. For instance, in a conversational setting with a single speaker, 
we should be more inclined to integrate his/her facial movements with the syllables s/he 
is uttering for improved speech comprehension. By contrast, in a busy pub where we are 
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bombarded with many conflicting auditory and visual speech signals, unconstrained 
information integration would be detrimental. In a first study, Odegaard and Shams 
(2016) showed that common source priors are relatively stable across time (also see 
Beierholm et al., 2009), yet task-specific. More specifically, they did not generalize from 
a spatial ventriloquism task to a double flash illusion task. Yet, in a follow-up study 
where they dynamically manipulated the probability of audiovisual signals being 
synchronous and co-located, in a ventriloquist paradigm, they demonstrated that 
observers dynamically adapt their common source priors to the environmental statistics 
(Odegaard et al., 2017). Indeed, dynamic adjustment of common source priors had also 
previously been shown during audiovisual speech perception (Gau & Noppeney, 2016; 
Nahorna, Berthommier & Schwartz, 2012, 2015).  
Finally, Wozny, Beierholm and Shams (2010) investigated in a large cohort of more than 
100 observers, whether observers are more likely to use model averaging, model 
selection or probability matching as decisional functions in Bayesian causal inference. 
Surprisingly, they demonstrated that human observers predominantly use probability 
matching in audiovisual spatial localization. While probability matching may be thought 
of as being sub-optimal for static environments, humans have been shown to use this 
strategy in a variety of cognitive tasks (e.g., reward learning; Erev & Roth, 2014; Vul, 
Goodman, Griffiths & Tenenbaum, 2014). The authors proposed that probability 
matching may be a useful strategy to explore potential causal structures in a dynamic 
environment. In summary, accumulating psychophysical research has shown that human 
perception is governed qualitatively and to some extent quantitatively by the principles 
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of Bayesian causal inference, raising the question of how the brain may compute 
Bayesian causal inference. 
At the neural level, extensive neurophysiological and neuroimaging evidence has 
demonstrated that multisensory integration, as indexed by multisensory response 
enhancement or suppression relative to the unisensory responses, depends on a 
temporal and spatial window of integration (Meredith, Nemitz & Stein, 1987; Meredith 
& Stein, 1996). Spatial windows of integration may be related to neuronal receptive field 
properties. By contrast, temporal windows of integration may rely on computation of 
temporal correlations (e.g. see recent model using the Hassenstein-Reichardt detector; 
Parise & Ernst, 2016) and have recently been associated with brain oscillations (Cecere, 
Rees & Romei, 2015; Samaha & Postle, 2015; Thakur, Mukherjee, Sen & Banerjee, 2016). 
Models for the neural implementations of Bayesian causal inference have been 
proposed, but their biological plausibility needs to be shown as yet (Cuppini, Shams, 
Magosso & Ursino, 2017; Ma & Rahmati, 2013; Spratling, 2016; Yu, Chen, Dong & Dai, 
2016).  
At the neural systems level, two recent neuroimaging studies by Rohe and Noppeney 
(2015b, 2016) investigated how the brain accomplishes Bayesian causal inference by 
combining psychophysics, fMRI, Bayesian modeling and multivariate decoding. On each 
trial participants localized audiovisual signals that varied in spatial discrepancy and visual 
reliability. The studies demonstrated that the brain computes Bayesian causal inference 
by encoding multiple spatial estimates across the cortical hierarchy. At the bottom of 
the hierarchy, in auditory and visual cortical areas, location is represented on the basis 
that the two signals are generated by independent sources (= segregation). At the next 
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stage, in posterior intraparietal sulcus, location is estimated under the assumption that 
the two signals are from a common source (= forced fusion). It is only at the top of the 
hierarchy, in anterior intraparietal sulcus, that the uncertainty about whether signals are 
generated by common or independent sources is taken into account. As predicted by 
Bayesian causal inference, the final location is computed by combining the segregation 




Bayesian models of perceptual inference define how an observer should integrate 
uncertain sensory signals to provide an accurate and reliable percept of our 
environment. They thus set a benchmark of an ideal observer against which human 
perceptual performance can be compared. Forced fusion models and psychophysical 
studies have highlighted that human observers integrate sensory signals that come from 
a common source weighted approximately in proportion to their relative reliabilities. 
More recent models of Bayesian causal inference account for an observer’s uncertainty 
about the world’s causal structure by explicitly modelling whether sensory signals come 
from common or independent sources. A final Bayesian causal inference estimate is 
then obtained by combining the estimates under the assumptions of common or 
independent sources according to various decision functions. Accumulating 
psychophysical and neuroimaging evidence has recently suggested that human 
observers perform spatial localization and speech recognition tasks in line with the 
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Multisensory perception is regarded as one of the most prominent examples where 
human behaviour conforms to the computational principles of maximum likelihood 
estimation (MLE). In particular, observers are thought to integrate auditory and visual 
spatial cues weighted in proportion to their relative sensory reliabilities into the most 
reliable and unbiased percept consistent with MLE. Yet, evidence to date has been 
inconsistent. The current pre-registered, large-scale (N=36) replication study aimed to 
investigate the extent to which human behavior for audiovisual localization is in line 
with maximum likelihood estimation. The acquired psychophysical data show that while 
observers were able to reduce their multisensory variance relative to the unisensory 
variances in accordance with MLE, they weighed the visual signals significantly stronger 
than was predicted when locating spatially-incongruent audiovisual stimuli. We 
conclude that maximum likelihood estimation does not adequately describe human 
multisensory integration and we discuss three potential extensions of the model for a 
better match with empirical data: (i) Bayesian causal inference, (ii) prior beliefs for 
sensory reliability estimates, and (iii) cross-modal bottom-up salience and/or top-down 
cognitive factors.   
 
1. Introduction 
Sensory organs provide the brain with information about the outside world. Information 
from different senses can be complementary (e.g. an object’s shape viewed from the 
front but haptically explored from the back) or redundant (e.g. the object’s location). For 
example, both visual and auditory modalities provide uncertain information about the 
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spatial position of a mosquito flying in a dimly lit room. In order to obtain the most 
reliable and unbiased estimate (i.e. an estimate that is associated with the least variance 
or uncertainty) an observer should integrate redundant sensory information weighted in 
proportion to their relative reliabilities according to Maximum Likelihood Estimation 
(MLE) (Ernst & Banks, 2002). Reliability weighted integration according to MLE (i.e. the 
‘ideal observer’ model; here simply called ‘MLE model’) thus sets a benchmark of 
statistically optimal performance against which human behaviour can be compared 
(Ernst & Bülthoff, 2004).  
In their seminal study, Alais and Burr (2004) showed that human audiovisual localization 
conforms to the predictions of the MLE model. In a 2-interval forced choice (2IFC) 
localization task, participants were presented a so-called standard stimulus in the middle 
in one interval and a so-called probe stimulus at various locations along the azimuth in 
the other interval. Standard and probe were either both auditory or visual or 
audiovisual. Participants indicated which of the two stimuli (standard or probe) was 
located more on the left. The reliability of the visual stimuli, a low contrast Gaussian 
blob, was manipulated by blurring (i.e. increasing its size), whereas the reliability of the 
auditory stimuli, short click sounds, was kept constant. By introducing a small, 
unnoticeable spatial conflict between the auditory and visual components of some of 
the audiovisual stimuli, Alais and Burr were able to determine the relative weights that 
participants assigned to the auditory and visual signals during audiovisual integration. As 
predicted by the MLE model, observers integrated auditory and visual signals in 
proportion to their relative reliabilities that were computed from the unisensory 
auditory and visual conditions (n.b. the reciprocal of response variance corresponds to 
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the perceived reliability). They assigned a weight to the visual signal that increased with 
the visual reliability. Moreover, the variance (i.e. unreliability) of the audiovisual spatial 
estimates was smaller than the variances of the unisensory auditory and visual spatial 
estimates. Again, the audiovisual variance was closely predicted by the MLE model 
based on the variance of unisensory percepts. 
However, the conclusions of Alais and Burr (2004) are not supported in a related study 
of audiovisual spatial integration by Battaglia, Jacobs and Aslin (2003). In this study, 
participants’ integrated sensory signals weighted by their reliability, yet the visual 
weights were significantly higher than predicted by the MLE model. In our own lab, we 
have recently observed similar visual overweighting during audiovisual spatial 
integration (here described as our pilot data, see Appendix A). Battaglia et al. (2003) 
have argued that visual overweighting may result from human observers imposing a 
prior on the sensory reliabilities based on their everyday experiences: i.e. in most 
situations the visual spatial signal is far more reliable than the auditory spatial signal. 
Such priors are not incorporated in the MLE model. Alais and Burr (2004) briefly mention 
in the discussion that their participants were trained extensively on the auditory 
localization task, which may potentially have taught participants to trust their auditory 
sense more leading to a stronger auditory weight. Yet, a life-long prior on the sensory 
modalities is just one of many possible accounts of why human behavior diverges from 
MLE predictions (for a recent review, see Rahnev & Denison, 2018). Most importantly, in 
the multisensory and wider perception literature the findings by Alais and Burr are 
interpreted and generally cited as evidence that human observers integrate sensory 
signals or cues in line with the MLE predictions. Multisensory integration according to 
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MLE predictions is considered a generic and fundamental mechanism of how human 
observers integrate information from multiple sources.  Therefore, it is important to 
ascertain that naïve human observers indeed integrate sensory signals from vision and 
audition weighted in proportion to their relative sensory reliabilities as predicted by the 
MLE model. 
In line with previous research the current study investigated whether human behaviour 
is consistent with predictions of the MLE model in two steps: First, we investigated 
whether participants integrate the auditory and visual signals in proportion to their 
unisensory reliabilities (i.e. we compared empirical and predicted sensory weights). 
Second, we investigated whether the variance reduction of the audiovisual percept is 
equal to the MLE predicted variance reduction. Since we found the empirical sensory 
weights to be significantly different from the MLE-predicted weights we conclude that 
audiovisual spatial integration for untrained participants is not adequately described by 
the MLE model.  
 
2. Method 
2.1 Maximum Likelihood Estimation model 
The MLE model makes two key quantitative predictions for observers’ integrated 
audiovisual location estimates. First, an observer should integrate the unisensory 































where 𝑤𝑉 and 𝑤𝐴 are the sensory weights and reliability (𝑟) is the inverse of the sensory 
variance (𝜎2).  
Second, the sensory variance of the integrated estimate is predicted to be lower than 
the sensory variance of either of the unisensory estimates: 









This second equation is generally considered the more stringent test for the MLE model, 
as it confirms that the two unisensory signals are truly integrated on a trial-by-trial basis 
(i.e. the forced fusion assumption); whereas the first equation may also hold (on 
average) if ?̂?𝐴𝑉 is fully determined by either ?̂?𝐴 or ?̂?𝑉, but when the choice for either is 
made probabilistically in proportion to the sensory weights (i.e. ‘cue switching’; Ernst & 
Bülthoff, 2004).  
2.2. Experiment overview 
This study aimed to examine whether the MLE model accurately predicts the results of 
untrained participants in an audiovisual localization task that was designed to be nearly 
identical to the study by Alais and Burr (2004). The most striking difference is that we 
use only one visual reliability level (but see Section 2.6.2.2.), which is individually 
adjusted for each participant to match his/her auditory reliability level (see Section 
2.6.1.3). Matching of the unisensory reliabilities is important in order to maximize the 
MLE-predicted variance reduction for audiovisual stimuli relative to the most reliable 
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unisensory stimuli (Eq. 2, Section 2.1). This experimental choice was made to optimize 
the chances of arbitrating between MLE-based integration and ‘cue switching’. 
2.3. Sample characteristics 
The primary outcome measures were two group-level one-sided paired t-tests that 
assessed the two key MLE predictions (Eq. 1 and Eq. 2, Section 2.1) by testing for 
differences between the empirically determined and MLE-predicted sensory weights and 
audiovisual variances (see Section 2.9). The null hypothesis stated that the MLE model 
describes participants’ audiovisual integration adequately (i.e. in line with the findings of 
Alais and Burr (2004) there is no significant difference between MLE predicted and 
empirical weights or AV variances). Any significant (p < 0.05) difference between 
predicted and empirical weights/variances indicated that the data were not consistent 
with the MLE model; as previously reported by Battaglia et al. (2003). For Battaglia et 
al.’s average effect size (Cohen’s d) of 0.58 (estimated across different stimulus 
reliability levels; their figure 7) an a-priori power analysis revealed that 36 participants 
were required to obtain high statistical power (1-β = 0.96, α = 0.05, 𝑑𝑧 ≥ 0.58; as 
computed with G*Power 3.1; Faul, Erdfelder, Buchner & Lang, 2009; 
www.gpower.hhu.de). Based on this power analysis, we decided to include thirty-six 
participants in the final analysis and results (i.e. excluded participants were replaced 
until 36 complete data sets were obtained, see Section 2.11).  
All participants were university students with reportedly normal hearing, (corrected to) 
normal vision and no history of neurological or psychiatric disorder. Participants 
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provided informed consent and were compensated by means of study credits or cash1. 
The study was approved by the human research review committee of the University of 
Birmingham (approval numbers ERN_11-0470AP4 & ERN_15-1458P2). 
2.4. Stimuli 
The visual stimulus was a greyscale circular blob with a bivariate Gaussian amplitude 
envelope. Its size (defined by the 2D Gaussian’s standard deviation, 𝜎𝑏𝑙𝑜𝑏; symmetrical 
in all directions) was adjusted individually for each observer to equate the unisensory 
spatial uncertainties for visual and auditory spatial estimates (Section 2.6.1.3). Visual 
stimuli were presented for a duration of 16.7 milliseconds (ms) in low-contrast (20 
cd/m2 in its centre) on a darker grey background (15 cd/m2)3.   
The auditory stimulus was a 16.7 ms burst of white noise (70 dB SPL)4, which included a 
5 ms on/off ramp. To create virtual spatial sound sources along the azimuth, the 
auditory signal was convolved with standardised head-related transfer functions 
(Gardner & Martin, 1995; http://sound.media.mit.edu/resources/KEMAR.html).   
 
                                                          
1
 The option for compensation by cash was added after stage 1 in-principle-acceptance (IPA) of the 
manuscript in order to recruit from a larger pool of potential participants. 
2
 The second ethics code was approved after IPA and is a replacement of the first ethics code. 
3
 In the stage 1 IPA version of this manuscript low contrast visual stimuli were presented on a black 
background (1.9 cd/m
2
 on 0.12 cd/m
2
). The background was changed to grey after pilot testing in order to 
reduce hurting participants’ eyes because of the many sudden brightness changes.  
4
 Sound pressure level (SPL) was increased from 60 to 70 dB after post-IPA pilot testing to ensure that all 




Fig 1 – Trial structure for the audiovisual localization task (Panel A) and full 
experimental procedure (Panel B). Fig. 1 a. A jittered pre-stimulus time period, in 
which participants fixated a cross in the middle, was followed by two intervals, each of 
which consisted of a stimulus and a subsequent blank period. The stimuli in the two 
intervals were either both auditory or visual or audiovisual (the latter is shown here). 
The first stimulus, the ‘standard’, was always presented in the middle. The second 
stimulus, the ‘probe’, was presented at one of thirteen locations along the azimuth. An 
audiovisual probe could be spatially congruent, or incongruent (with a small spatial 
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conflict between the auditory and visual signals; as shown here). After the second 
interval, two rectangles appeared on the screen to prompt participants to indicate via 
a two choice key press whether the location of the probe was left or right of the 
standard. Fig 1 b. The experiment included three sessions on three separate days 
(vertically numbered in the figure). In session 1 we individually (for each participant) 
adjusted the probe locations and AV spatial disparity (Section 2.6.1.2.) and the spatial 
perceptual reliability of the visual signal to match the spatial perceptual reliability of 
the auditory signal. The visual reliability was adjusted by changing the size of the 
visual stimulus (i.e. 𝝈𝒃𝒍𝒐𝒃; see Section 2.6.1.3.). At the end of session 1, we validated 
that auditory and visual reliabilities were approximately equal (Section 2.6.1.4.). In 
session 2 and 3, the probe locations, AV spatial disparity and visual stimulus size were 
set to the levels defined in session 1 and they were not further adjusted during the 
main experiment (but see Section 2.6.2.2.). All tasks, throughout all three sessions 
made use of the trial structure as described in Panel A. 
 
2.5. Two interval forced choice paradigm  
Unless otherwise stated, all tasks presented auditory, visual or audiovisual stimuli in a 
two-interval-forced choice (2IFC) paradigm. Fig. 1a provides a trial overview.  
Participants were presented on each trial with a standard in the first interval and a 
probe in the second interval to avoid sequential order effects that may have affected the 
estimation of the slope parameters (Dyjas, Bausenhart & Ulrich, 2012). The interstimulus 
interval was 500 ms. Probe and standard within a trial were of the same sensory 
modality, i.e. both auditory (𝐴), visual (𝑉) or audiovisual (𝐴𝑉). The standard was always 
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presented at 0° visual angle along the azimuth, whereas the probe was presented at a 
location that is selected with equal probability from thirteen possible locations that 
were determined individually for each participant based on his/her auditory JND (see 
Section 2.6.1.2.), unless mentioned otherwise (see Sections 2.6.1.1 - 2.6.1.3). Critically, 
while the 𝐴𝑉 standard was always spatially congruent, the 𝐴𝑉 probe was either spatially 
congruent (i.e. 𝐴𝑉∆=0°) or spatially incongruent with a small, so-called non-noticeable 
audiovisual spatial disparity ∆𝐴𝑉 (i.e. 𝐴𝑉∆=+𝑋° or 𝐴𝑉∆=−𝑋°, where the visual stimulus’ 
location was moved by +1
2
∆𝐴𝑉 and the auditory stimulus was moved by −1
2
∆𝐴𝑉; n.b. the 
size of ∆𝐴𝑉 was adjusted individually, see Section 2.6.1.2.). 500 ms after probe offset 
two rectangles were presented to prompt participants to report whether the probe was 
left or right of the standard. Observers indicated their response by pushing a button 
with their left or right index finger (maximum response time = 1 second; the prompt 
disappeared after a response was given). The trial onset asynchrony was jittered 
between 750 – 1250 milliseconds. Prior to standard onset, participants fixated a central 
grey cross (1° diameter) with luminance equal to the centre of the visual stimuli. 
The sensory modality of the trials was blocked (𝐴, 𝑉 or 𝐴𝑉, in pseudorandom order) and 
indicated to participants prior to block begin. In 𝐴𝑉 blocks, the congruent and 
incongruent trials were randomized. 
2.6. Experimental procedure 
The study consists of three 2.5 hour sessions that were performed on three separate 
days. In the following we will briefly describe the series of experimental parts in the first, 
second and third sessions; as shown in Fig. 1b. 
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2.6.1. First session:  
2.6.1.1. (Familiarization). Brief familiarization runs were introduced at the beginning of 
each session to ensure that participants understood and were familiar with the task. 
They also mitigated learning effects and reduced variability of perceptual reliability 
across sessions. Participants were provided with the background story that the 𝐴𝑉 
stimulus was to be considered as the result of somebody hitting the back of the screen 
with a metal stick (the visual blob representing the stick’s imprint during the hit) in order 
to enhance observer’s so-called ‘forced fusion’ assumptions that the 𝐴𝑉’s auditory and 
visual component signals come from a common source (Alais & Burr, 2004)5. Participants 
then completed a short familiarization series that included  𝐴, 𝑉 and 𝐴𝑉∆=0° trials (In 
session one: 5 trials x 3 conditions x 12 locations: ±1°, ±4°, ±7°, ±10°, ±13°, ±15°; with 
highly reliable visual stimuli: 𝜎𝑏𝑙𝑜𝑏 was pseudorandomized between 2° and 8°). After 
every response participants were given immediate corrective feedback, i.e. a green/red 
circle was presented on the screen to indicate a correct/incorrect response (200 ms 
duration).  
2.6.1.2. (Auditory reliability measurement). This experimental part consisted of two 
parts6. 1. Participants first completed a series of 𝐴 trials (20 trials x 13 locations: 0°, ±1°, 
±2°, ±3°, ±5°, ±7°, ±10°). Participants that obtained an accuracy of less than 90% for 
those forty trials on which the probe was presented at ±10° azimuth were excluded at 
this stage (i.e. they did not participate in the main experiment). For each participant we 
fitted a psychometric function to the fractions of ‘perceived right’ across the thirteen 
                                                          
5
 The background story was changed after IPA to better fit the type of sounds that were presented. 
Originally we told participants to think of a ball being thrown at the back of the screen.  
6
 This task was split into two parts after IPA and initial pilot testing. Performing the auditory reliability 
measurement using individualized probe locations (part 2) results in better estimates (see also main text).  
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probe locations (see Section 2.8). The auditory spatial uncertainty, expressed as the just 
noticeable difference (JND), is given by the inverse of the fitted slope parameter 
(𝐽𝑁𝐷 =  
1
𝛽
). These individual auditory JNDs were used at three levels in the experiment: 
(i) probe locations, (ii) visual reliability and (iii) spatial disparity.  
i. Probe locations: We set the probe locations for all subsequent parts of the study in a 
subject-specific fashion according to 𝑙𝑜𝑐𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑠 = (0, ±0.5, ±1, ±1.5, ±2, ±2.5, ±3) ∗
𝐽𝑁𝐷 (rounded to 0.5° under the constraint that the 13 locations were unique). This 
procedure ensures that the psychometric functions of each participant were sampled at 
comparable probabilities of ‘right’ responses thereby providing more reliable estimates 
of slope, PSE and lapse rate parameters (Wichmann & Hill, 2001a). 
ii. Visual reliability: We adjusted the reliability, i.e. size of the visual Gaussian blob 
individually for each participant to match the auditory perceptual reliability (see Section 
2.6.1.3). 
iii. AV spatial disparity: Previous studies have demonstrated that observers’ sensitivity to 
detecting whether or not sensory signals come from a common source and should be 
integrated according to forced fusion assumptions depends on sensory reliability (Rohe 
and Noppeney, 2015a). Based on a power analysis simulation (see Appendix B), we set 
AV disparity equal to one auditory JND individually for each participant (i.e. ∆𝐴𝑉 =
 ±JND; conform recommendations by Rohde, van Dam & Ernst, 2016). The power 
analysis simulation (see Appendix B) suggested that a spatial disparity of one auditory 
JND allows one to reveal with high statistical power (1-β=0.95) that the empirical weight 
deviates from the MLE-predicted weight by approximately 0.06 or more. Yet, this limited 
spatial disparity also ensured that participants integrate sensory signals into one unified 
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audiovisual percept according to forced fusion strategies rather than take into account 
the causal structure of the sensory signals as accommodated by more complex Causal 
Inference models (see Körding, Beierholm, Ma et al., 2007; Shams & Beierholm, 2010; 
Rohe and Noppeney, 2015a, 2015b, 2016; and further discussions in Appendix B). 
2. The second part of the ‘auditory reliability measurement’ is a refinement of the first 
part’s measurement by using the individualized JND-based locations (see point i above), 
thereby ensuring an adequately measured auditory JND. Participants completed a 
second series of 𝐴 trials (20 trials x 13 individualized locations). The new auditory JND 
that was obtained from a second fitted psychometric function replaced the JND from the 
first measurement. This second auditory JND was used in all further tasks (see points i, ii, 
and iii above).  
2.6.1.3. (Visual reliability adjustment). Using adaptive staircases we adjusted the size of 
the Gaussian blobs (defined by 𝜎𝑏𝑙𝑜𝑏, Section 2.4) such that the reliability of the 𝑉 and 𝐴 
spatial perceptual estimates were equated individually for each subject. First, we 
obtained observer’s auditory localization performance for locations at 
(±0.5, ±0.85, ±1.2) ∗ 𝐽𝑁𝐷 from the fitted psychometric function (see Section 2.6.1.2.). 
Using two unisensory visual interleaved adaptive staircases for each of these three 
location pairs we adjusted the size of the Gaussian blob such that the fraction ‘perceived 
right’ in the visual trials matched the target fractions estimated from the psychometric 
function of the auditory condition (𝜎𝑏𝑙𝑜𝑏 starting values: 2° and 40°; 𝜎𝑏𝑙𝑜𝑏 decreased 
after each incorrect response and increased after U consecutive correct responses (U = 
1, 2, 4 for the three location pairs, respectively) with up/down step sizes (∆+/∆−) 





𝑈; Kingdom & Prins, 2016). The 
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adaptive staircases were terminated after 30 reversals. For each staircase 𝜎𝑏𝑙𝑜𝑏 was 
computed pooled over the last 20 reversals. For each participant we identified which of 
the six staircases provided the estimate that was most distant from the pooled 𝜎𝑏𝑙𝑜𝑏 
across all six staircases. To attenuate effects of potential outliers, we discarded this 
estimate and then computed the final pooled 𝜎𝑏𝑙𝑜𝑏 across the remaining five staircases 
(i.e. √1
𝑛
∗ ∑(𝜎𝑏𝑙𝑜𝑏2), with 𝑛 = 5 staircases * 20 reversals)
7. 
2.6.1.4. (Visual reliability confirmation). To validate that 𝑉 and 𝐴 variances were 
successfully equated, participants completed a series of 260 𝑉 trials (20 trials x 13 
individualized locations) with a constant visual stimulus size (𝜎𝑏𝑙𝑜𝑏 as determined in 
Section 2.6.1.3.) and 260 𝑉 trials (20 trials x 13 individualized locations) with variable 
visual stimulus sizes (selected pseudo-randomly between 
1
2
∗ 𝜎𝑏𝑙𝑜𝑏 and 2 ∗ 𝜎𝑏𝑙𝑜𝑏)8. The 
𝑉 trials with constant stimulus size were presented interleaved with the variably sized 𝑉 
trials. Importantly, the variably sized 𝑉 trials were not analysed (i.e. trials of ‘no 
interest’) and only served to ensure similar conditions as in the main experiment (see 
Section 2.6.2.2.). 
For each participant we fitted a psychometric function to the fractions of ‘perceived 
right’ for the 𝑉 trials with constant stimulus size, across the thirteen probe locations, 
and the variance was computed from the fitted psychometric function (see Section 2.8). 
If (i) the difference between the variances obtained from this 𝑉 and the previous 𝐴 
(Section 2.6.1.2.) psychometric functions was too large (i.e. if it led to a MLE-predicted 
                                                          
7
 Exclusion of the most distant staircase result was added to the protocol after post-IPA pilot tests had 
shown that it was fairly common for one of the six 𝜎𝑏𝑙𝑜𝑏  values to be an outlier.  
8
 The number of trials for visual reliability confirmation was reduced from 2x520 to 2x260 after IPA to 
reduce the overall duration of the first session.  
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multisensory variance reduction of less than one third of the smallest unisensory 
variance: 𝜎𝐴𝑉,𝑚𝑙𝑒





2) according to Eq. 2, Section 2.1), or if for either 
of the two psychometric functions (𝐴 or 𝑉) (ii) the lapse rate was greater than 0.06 
(Wichmann & Hill, 2001a) or (iii) the goodness-of-fit was insufficient (see Section 2.10), 
then participants were considered to be unreliable with respect to their localization 
performance and therefore excluded (and replaced) from the study at this stage. 
2.6.2. Second and third session: 
2.6.2.1. (Familiarization repetition). At the beginning of session 2 and 3, participants 
were reminded of the background story (as described in greater detail in Section 2.6.1.1) 
and took part in a short familiarization run (with feedback after every trial, see Section 
2.6.1.1) to minimize variability in perceptual reliability and task performance across 
sessions (5 trials x 3 conditions x 12 locations: (±0.5, ±1, ±1.5, ±2, ±2.5, ±3) ∗ 𝐽𝑁𝐷 




∗ 𝜎𝑏𝑙𝑜𝑏  and 2 ∗ 𝜎𝑏𝑙𝑜𝑏).  
2.6.2.2. (Main experiment). Participants completed 520 trials (40 trials x 13 
individualized locations) for each of the 5 main conditions (𝐴, 𝑉, 𝐴𝑉∆=0°, 𝐴𝑉∆=+𝑋°, 
𝐴𝑉∆=−𝑋°; where X° is the individualized audiovisual disparity ∆𝐴𝑉, see Section 2.6.1.2.; 
i.e. 520 x 5 = 2600 ‘trials of interest’) as well as an additional 520 𝑉 trials and (3 x 520 =) 
1560 𝐴𝑉∆=0° trials (i.e. 2080 trials of ‘no interest’). Critically, in half of the 𝑉 and 𝐴𝑉 trials 
(i.e. ‘trials of interest’) the visual stimulus size (𝜎𝑏𝑙𝑜𝑏, see Section 2.6.1.3.) was constant 
and defined based on the results of session 1, such that visual and auditory reliabilities 
were equated. In the other half of the 𝑉 and 𝐴𝑉 trials (i.e. ‘trials of no interest’) the 
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visual stimulus size was variable and selected pseudo-randomly between 
1
2
∗ 𝜎𝑏𝑙𝑜𝑏 and 
2 ∗ 𝜎𝑏𝑙𝑜𝑏. These latter ‘trials of no interest’ were not analysed. They were included to 
ensure that observers could not rely on a stored set of sensory weights, but needed to 
compute the sensory weights on a trial-by-trial basis. The 𝐴𝑉 trials of no interest were 
all spatially congruent. 
The main experiment (4680 trials spread over two days) was divided into 20 short 𝐴, 𝑉 
and 𝐴𝑉 blocks. The 𝐴 blocks included 26 trials, the 𝑉 blocks 52 trials and the 𝐴𝑉 blocks 
156 trials. The number of trials varied across sensory modalities because the 𝐴 reliability 
level was fixed for auditory stimuli. By contrast, for half of the trials (i.e. trials of interest) 
the visual reliability was fixed, while it was variable for the other half of the visual trials 
(i.e. trials of no interest). Further, 𝐴𝑉 stimuli were presented three times as frequent as 
𝑉 stimuli, because 𝐴𝑉 stimuli were presented without audiovisual conflict (i.e. spatially 
congruent), with a positive audiovisual conflict and with a negative audiovisual conflict. 
The blocks of the different sensory modalities were presented in pseudorandom order 
and equally split across the second and third session (i.e. main experiment part 1 and 
part 2, see Fig. 1b). Importantly, only data from this main experiment was used to assess 
whether participants integrated the 𝐴𝑉 signals as predicted by MLE. Thus, 𝐴, 𝑉 and 𝐴𝑉 
conditions were controlled for stimulus exposure and experimental duration (n.b. the 
unisensory localization performances in session 1 or familiarization tasks were not used 
in the final analysis). 
2.6.2.3. (Post-testing questionnaire). At the end of the third session participants 
completed a short questionnaire. Embedded in general questions about participants’ 
subjective performance (e.g. “Did you get tired during the experiment and do you think 
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this affected your accuracy?” and “Rate the difficulty of the task (scale 1-10) for the 
three different stimuli: auditory only, visual only, and audiovisual”) the following 
important question was asked: “For audiovisual stimuli, did you ever have the 
impression that the auditory and visual signals did not come from the same location?” 
Responses to this question served as subjective reports on whether the audiovisual 
spatial conflict was indeed non-noticeable (i.e. the forced-fusion assumption).  
2.7. Experimental Setup 
Participants were seated behind a table in a dark room with their chin on a chinrest 
placed at a distance of 75 cm from a grey screen (opaque fine PVC fabric; 127.5 cm 
width x 170cm height). The visual stimuli were back-projected onto the screen using a 
60Hz DLP projector (BenQ MW529). The sounds were presented by means of 
headphones (Sennheiser HD 280 Pro) with a playback frequency of 192 kHz. Auditory 
and visual stimulus presentation was controlled using Psychtoolbox 3.0.12 (Brainard, 
1997; Kleiner, Brainard & Pelli, 2007; www.psychtoolbox.org) running on MATLAB 
R2016a (www.mathworks.com) with maximum audiovisual asynchronies < 2 ms (100 
stimulus presentations, 0.03 ms mean, 0.5 ms standard deviation).  
Fixation was monitored using a desktop mount Eyelink 1000 eye tracker (www.sr-
research.com) that was calibrated before the start of each block of trials9. Trials on 
which the participant failed to fixate within a 3° radius during a 1 second period prior to 
probe onset, or in which blinks were recorded during either of the stimuli presentations, 
were excluded from further analysis.  
                                                          
9
 The type of eye tracker was changed after IPA. The low-cost Tobii EyeX gaming eye tracker 




2.8 Fitting psychometric functions 
For each observer, we computed the fraction of ‘perceived right’ for each of the thirteen 
probe locations (on the horizontal axis 𝑥), separately for each condition. These thirteen 
data points per condition can be described by the psychometric function (𝜓), a model 
with three parameters (𝛼, 𝛽, 𝜆): 
(3) 𝜓(𝑥; 𝑎, 𝛽, 𝜆) =  𝜆 + (1 − 2𝜆)𝐹(𝑥; 𝛼, 𝛽)     with       










where 𝐹(𝑥; 𝛼, 𝛽) is the cumulative normal distribution, 𝛼 is the mean of the normal 
distribution (i.e. point of subjective equality, PSE), the so-called slope parameter 𝛽 is the 
reciprocal of the participant’s spatial uncertainty (i.e. just noticeable difference, JND), 
and 𝜆 is the lapse rate (i.e. the probability of an incorrect response independent of 
probe location 𝑥) (Kingdom & Prins, 2016). N.b. The JND (i.e. 
1
𝛽
) in this 2IFC localization 
task is related to the sensory variance of the stimuli (𝜎2) according to: 𝐽𝑁𝐷2 = 2𝜎2 (i.e. 
the sensory noise of standard and probe both contribute to the JND). 
A psychometric function is ‘fit’ to observers’ fraction of ‘perceived right’ responses by 
adjusting its parameter values (𝛼, 𝛽, 𝜆) such that the likelihood of the data is maximized. 
For this we used the Nelder-Mead optimization algorithm, as implemented in Palamedes 
toolbox 1.8.2 (www.palamedestoolbox.org). N.b. Likelihood (𝐿) is computed as the 
following product: 
(4) 𝐿 = ∏ ?̅?𝑖





where ?̅?𝑖 = 𝜓(𝑥𝑖; 𝑎, 𝛽, 𝜆) is the expected probability of observing a ‘right’ response 
given probe location 𝑥𝑖  and parameter values for 𝑎, 𝛽 and 𝜆 (Eq. 3); 𝑘𝑖  is the empirical 
number of ‘right’ responses out of 𝑛𝑖  trials, and 𝑁 is the total number of probe 
locations10. 
For analysis of the main experiment, we simultaneously fitted five psychometric 
functions to the five different conditions: 𝐴, 𝑉, 𝐴𝑉∆=0°, 𝐴𝑉∆=+𝑋° and 𝐴𝑉∆=−𝑋° (i.e. the 
product of the five likelihoods is maximized), individually for each observer. To avoid 
biases in the slope parameters (𝛽) by inaccuracies of the estimated lapse rate 
parameters (𝜆) for the individual conditions, we constrained the lapse rate parameters 
to be equal across all five conditions (Kingdom & Prins, 2016; see specifically their Box 
4.6 and Section 9.2.5). In other words, we assumed that observers’ miss-responses in 
their left and right hemifield for non-specific reasons such as blinking, inattention etc. 
would be comparable across conditions. Furthermore, we assumed one common slope 
parameter for the three (i.e. one congruent, one positive and one negative spatial 
conflict) AV conditions (N.b. the MLE model predicts equality of the slopes across the AV 
conditions; it is therefore standard to compute a single AV variance estimate by 
averaging the variances of the AV conditions; e.g. see Alais & Burr, 2004). Given those 
parameter constraints we obtained 5 Gaussian means (i.e. 𝛼 = PSE), 3 Gaussian 





= 𝜎2), 1 lapse rate parameter (𝜆) for each observer.  
Critically, the results of these psychophysics experiments rely on participants’ 
maintaining attention and being willing to perform this audiovisual location task in a 
                                                          
10
 The in-principle-accepted version of this manuscript contained a different but equivalent equation for 
the likelihood as a product across all trials (instead of the current product across all locations). The change 
enables us to use the same parameters in equation 5 for computation of the likelihood using the 
betabinomial model.  
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reliable fashion. However, it is unrealistic to expect from participants that their 
performance, vigilance and internal criteria remain absolutely constant over the 
duration of five hours of psychophysical testing (divided over session 2 and 3, see 
Section 2.6.2.2). In line with the most recent psychophysics literature we have therefore 
adopted the betabinomial model (Fründ et al., 2011; Schütt et al., 2016). For a full 
rationale of this decision, please see Appendix C.11 The betabinomial model introduces 
one additional parameter η that provides a normalized measure (between 0 and 1) for 
the amount of random deviance away from the psychometric functions’ predicted 
probabilities of ‘right’ responses (i.e. η increases as  ∑ |
𝑘𝑖
𝑛𝑖
− 𝜓(𝑥𝑖; 𝑎, 𝛽, 𝜆)|
𝑁
𝑖=1  gets 
larger). In order to fit the betabinomial model, including parameter η, we have used the 
following equation for the likelihood (i.e. instead of Eq. 4; Schütt et al., 2016): 
(5) 𝐿 = ∏
𝐵( 𝑘𝑖+ 𝜂
′?̅?𝑖,   𝑛𝑖−𝑘𝑖+𝜂
′(1−?̅?𝑖) )
𝐵( 𝜂′?̅?𝑖,   𝜂
′(1−?̅?𝑖) )
𝑁





where B denotes the beta function and the other parameters are the same as in Eq. 4. 
To clarify, only one η parameter is fitted per participant (similar to the shared lapse rate 
parameter λ); i.e. 𝑁 denotes the number of probe locations across all five psychometric 
functions (𝑁 = 5 ∗ 13 = 65). 
To ensure adequate performance and model fits, we excluded (and replaced) 
participants if (i) the lapse rate was greater than 0.06 (Wichmann & Hill, 2001a) or (ii) 
the goodness-of-fit was insufficient (see Section 2.10).  
2.9 Sensory weights and 𝐴𝑉 variances 
                                                          
11
 For transparency reasons we note that the decision to adopt the betabinomial model was taken after all 
thirty-six datasets had been acquired. Please see Appendix C for a full rationale. 
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The normal distributions’ variances of the unisensory conditions (𝐴 and 𝑉) were used to 
compute the MLE predictions for the auditory weight (𝑤𝐴 in Eq. 1, Section 2.1) and for 
the variance of the 𝐴𝑉 percept (𝜎𝐴𝑉
2 in Eq. 2, Section 2.1). The empirical auditory weight 
was computed from the audiovisual conditions with a small spatial cue conflict (i.e., 








where the PSEs serve as the means of the location estimates ?̂? (c.f. Eq. 1, Section 2.1)12. 
Please note that in consistency with previous work Eq. 6 makes the additional 
assumption that 𝑃𝑆𝐸∆𝐴𝑉= 0° = 𝑃𝑆𝐸𝐴 = 𝑃𝑆𝐸𝑉; i.e. that the spatial bias is equal for 𝐴𝑉 
congruent, 𝐴 and 𝑉 conditions (Fetsch, Pouget, DeAngelis & Angelaki, 2011). 
The primary outcome measures of this study were the results of statistical comparisons 
that investigated whether the i. empirical auditory weight and ii. empirical AV variance 
were significantly different from the MLE predictions (i.e. 𝑤𝐴,𝑚𝑙𝑒 vs. 𝑤𝐴,𝑒𝑚𝑝 and 𝜎
2
𝐴𝑉,𝑚𝑙𝑒 
vs. 𝜎2𝐴𝑉,𝑒𝑚𝑝). To allow for generalization to the population level, empirical and MLE-
predictions for each participant were entered into one-sided paired t-tests (or one-sided 
Wilcoxon signed-rank tests if Kolmogorov-Smirnov tests indicated non-normal 
distributions) at the random effects group level. The tests were one-sided because (in 
addition to the fact that Alais and Burr (2004) also reported one-tailed tests) given our 
pilot data (Appendix A) and previously published reports (Battaglia et al., 2003), we 





𝐴𝑉,𝑚𝑙𝑒. Further assessments were made by computing one-
                                                          
12
 The in-principle-accepted version of this manuscript contained an error in the weights equation (Eq. 6). 
The signs of the PSEs of the incongruent conditions have been changed.  
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sided Bayes factors using a Jeffreys prior on variance and a Cauchy prior on positive 
effect sizes for the alternative hypothesis (the prior is zero for negative effect sizes, 
interval 𝑐 = [0, ∞]; scaling factor 𝑟 = √2/2) and a point prior on zero effect size for the 
null hypotheses (Rouder, Speckman, Sun, Morey & Iverson, 2009; Morey and Rouder, 
2011; BayesFactor Package 0.9.12 in R 3.4.1; http://bayesfactorpcl.r-forge.r-
project.org/). Bayes factor BF01 expresses evidence in favor of the null-hypothesis (no 
difference). BF01 > 3 indicates a good fit of the MLE model, whereas BF01 < 
1
3
 indicates a 
significant difference between the empirical and MLE-predicted parameter values. Effect 





where 𝜇𝑥, 𝜇𝑦 and 𝜎𝑥, 𝜎𝑦 are the population means and standard deviations, and 𝜌𝑥𝑦 
denotes the correlation between the two measures.  
2.10 Goodness of Fit 
The validity of the analysis method described above relies on the assumption that the 
data for each condition can be accurately fitted by a cumulative Gaussian function. In 
order to validate this assumption we performed a goodness of fit test. This test 
compares i. the likelihood of participants’ responses given the model that is constrained 
by the cumulative Gaussian function(s) to ii. the likelihood given a so-called ‘saturated’ 
model that models observers’ responses with one parameter for each stimulus location 
in each condition. The likelihood ratio for the original data set is then compared with a 
null-distribution of likelihood ratios that is generated by parametrically bootstrapping 
data (5000x) from the model constrained by the cumulative Gaussian distribution 
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(Kingdom & Prins, 2016; Wichmann & Hill, 2001a) and where additionally the expected 
probabilities of ‘right’ responses (?̅?𝑖) are drawn at random from beta distributions with 
mean 𝜓(𝑥𝑖; 𝑎, 𝛽, 𝜆) and variance 𝜂
2𝜓(𝑥𝑖; 𝑎, 𝛽, 𝜆)(1 − 𝜓(𝑥𝑖; 𝑎, 𝛽, 𝜆)) (Schütt et al., 
2016). If fewer than 5% of the parametrically bootstrapped likelihood ratios were 
smaller than the likelihood ratio for the original data set (i.e. p < 0.05), then insufficient 
goodness of fit was inferred and the data set excluded (i.e. the participant was 
replaced). This exclusion criterion is required as parameters from psychometric 
functions that do not adequately fit observers’ responses cannot be interpreted. 
2.11 Summary of participant exclusion criteria 
To ensure that our results and conclusions were based only on data sets from 
participants that maintain attention and provide reliable responses we have excluded 
participants prior to the final test session if i. their 𝐴 localization performance was not 
adequate (accuracy < 90% for ±10° azimuth; Section 2.6.1.2), ii. the difference between 
unisensory auditory and visual variances was so large that the MLE predicted 
multisensory variance reduction was smaller than a third of smallest unisensory variance 
(Section 2.6.1.4), iii. the lapse rate was greater than 0.06 or the goodness-of-fit was 
insufficient for either of the two unisensory psychometric functions obtained during the 
first session: 𝐴 (Section 2.6.1.2) or 𝑉 (Section 2.6.1.4). It is important to emphasize that 
participants were excluded from the study because of the above criteria prior to the 
main experiment which compares participants’ audiovisual integration with the MLE 
predictions. In addition, we have excluded participants after the main experiment in the 
third session, if the lapse rate was greater than 0.06 or the goodness-of-fit was 
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insufficient for the psychometric functions obtained during the main experiment 
(Section 2.9 - 2.10).   
Excluded participants were replaced such that the final number of included participants 
was thirty-six (Section 2.3).  
2.12 Summary of outcome-neutral conditions 
The following criteria ensured that the data are of good quality, so that they enabled us 
to test the null-hypothesis that observers integrated audiovisual signals in line with MLE 
prediction: i. We included only participants with adequate auditory localization ability 
and performance (accuracy ≥ 90% for ±10° azimuth, Section 2.6.1.2). This will have 
excluded participants that may overweight the visual sense in 𝐴𝑉 trials because auditory 
localization (over an extended period of time) is too demanding. ii. We have only 
included participants where we adjusted 𝑉 reliability individually such that 𝐴 and 𝑉 
perceptual reliability were approximately equated (Section 2.6.1.4). This criterion 
ensured that flooring/ceiling effects were avoided. It rendered our experimental design 
powerful for revealing a robust multisensory variance reduction if participants indeed 
integrated audiovisual signals according to MLE predictions (Eq 2, Section 2.1) and thus 
allowed us to dissociate whether or not human performance is in line with MLE 
predictions. iii. We have only included participants with lapse rates smaller than 0.06 
(Wichmann & Hill, 2001a) and adequate goodness of fit (p > 0.05). This criterion ensured 
that data sets were included only from participants that consistently maintained 




2.13 Post-hoc exploratory analyses 
The fitted parameters for empirical weights and variances (see Section 2.9) are only 
estimates of observer’s true weights and variances, because any psychometric function 
fit is inevitably affected by experimental noise (Kingdom & Prins, 2016). In order to 
visualize the amount of uncertainty that is associated with each estimate we made use 
of the parameter estimates that were fit during the goodness-of-fit parametric 
bootstrap procedure (N = 5000, see Section 2.10). 95% confidence intervals were 
computed as the distance between the 2.5 and 97.5 percentiles of the bootstrapped 
parameter distributions. Furthermore, using the bootstrapped distributions, we could 
also test for significant differences between parameters at the level of the individual 
observer: This was done by comparison of the empirically determined parameter 
difference with a null distribution of differences (i.e. expected differences due to noise 
when the two parameters are actually equal) which was constructed by subtracting the 
empirical difference from all bootstrapped parameter differences (thus ensuring that 
the null distribution is approximately centred at zero). Significance was inferred when 
the empirical difference exceeded 95% of the null-distribution (absolute values were 
used for two-sided tests).  
In the above-described method of computing empirical auditory weights (Eq. 6) we have 
made the assumption that systematic left-right biases (as expressed by the PSE) in the 
unisensory auditory or visual condition do not affect the PSEs of the spatially-
incongruent audiovisual conditions, and any such bias for audiovisual trials is instead 
best captured by the PSE of the spatially congruent condition. N.b. in 2IFC tasks one 
does not generally expect any biases, but because of the intuitive nature of our 
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experimental design, in which the probe is always presented after the standard, 
participants may be more likely to respond to where they perceive the probe 
independent of where they perceive the standard, thus allowing biases to be observed. 
One could argue that a participant with unisensory biases in opposite directions (e.g. 
auditory is perceived more leftward: 𝑃𝑆𝐸𝐴  >  0°, and visual more rightward: 
𝑃𝑆𝐸𝑉  <  0°) could experience a larger audiovisual disparity when audiovisual stimuli are 
presented with a spatial conflict in the same direction (e.g. A on left, V on right). The 
forced fusion assumption in this condition may thus be violated, leading to a reduced 
number of trials in which integration occurs and potentially resulting in differences with 
the MLE-predictions for both audiovisual variance and weights. In order to test whether 
this is the case, we performed a second psychometric function fit to all datasets, using 
the betabinomial model as described above. The only difference was that in this case 
five (instead of three) slope parameters were fitted, one for each condition (i.e. we fit 
𝜎𝐴𝑉,𝑒𝑚𝑝 separately for each of the three audiovisual conditions). Moreover, using the 
parameter estimates of this second fit, we computed the auditory weights separately for 
the two incongruent conditions while taking unisensory biases into account: 

























where the abbreviation ALVR is used for the condition where the audiovisual spatial 
conflict is imposed as Auditory Left, Visual Right; i.e. ∆𝐴𝑉 = +𝑋°. Likewise VLAR is used 






3.1 Participant exclusions 
Five participants were excluded during/after the first session for the following reasons: 
(i) Two participants did not pass the unisensory auditory performance threshold (>90% 
at ±10°; Section 2.6.1.2.). (ii) One participant was excluded because the difference 
between unisensory visual and auditory variances was too large even after they were 
supposedly matched using a staircase procedure (𝜎𝐴𝑉,𝑚𝑙𝑒






2.6.1.4.). (iii) One participant was excluded because the unisensory visual lapse rate was 
too high (𝜆 = 0.11, Section 2.6.1.4.). (iv) One participant was excluded in session 1 
because the eye tracker failed to calibrate successfully even after multiple tries (for 
unknown reasons this participant’s eyes could not be tracked at all). Furthermore, two 
participants chose to withdraw from the study voluntarily after successful completion of 
session 1. All seven participants were replaced such that thirty-six participants (26 
women, 10 men; 21.8 mean age, ±2.6 years SD) completed all three sessions. All of 
these datasets were included for analyses (i.e. no dataset had to be excluded because 
the goodness of fit was inadequate or because the lapse rate was too high in the main 
experiment; Section 2.11, but also see Appendix C). 
3.2 Trial exclusions 
Trials were excluded from analyses of the main experiment when we could determine 
with certainty that the participant did not fixate within a 3° radius around the fixation 
cross or when a participant blinked during either standard or probe stimulus 
presentation (Section 2.7). Unfortunately, for six participants the collected eye tracker 
data proved unreliable (it contained many sudden jumps in gaze location and occasional 
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time gaps in which no data was collected at all, possibly due to difficulties with the eye-
tracker’s focus on participants’ pupils). No trials were excluded for these six participants. 
For the other thirty participants we excluded on average 3% (maximally 12%) of the 
2600 trials of interest of the main experiment (Section 2.6.2.2).  
 
 
Fig 2 – Main outcomes at the group level. Fig. 2 a-b. Psychometric functions were fit to 
responses for A, V and AV (congruent and incongruent) conditions of each participant 
with each stimulus level (x-axis) expressed relative to the individual’s ∆𝑨𝑽 (≈ 𝑱𝑵𝑫𝑨, 
see Section 2.6.1.2). Shown here are the group-level means (+/- SEM in shaded area) 
of each condition (solid lines: 𝑨 = green, 𝑽 = visual, 𝑨𝑽∆=𝟎° = blue, 𝑨𝑽∆=−𝑿° = magenta, 
and 𝑨𝑽∆=+𝑿° = cyan). Similarly, using MLE-predicted parameters (see Eqs. 1-2) 
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hypothetical psychometric functions were constructed (dashed lines) to illustrate the 
MLE-predictions for 𝑨𝑽∆=𝟎° (panel A, in black), 𝑨𝑽∆=−𝑿° (panel B, in magenta) and 
𝑨𝑽∆=+𝑿° (cyan). The MLE-predicted psychometric functions all largely overlap with the 
empirical 𝑨𝑽 congruent condition. N.b. If participants were to completely ignore one 




∆𝑨𝑽 (vertical dashed black lines). Fig. 2 c. Sensory noise parameters 𝝈 were first 
normalized with respect to 𝝈𝑨𝑽,𝒎𝒍𝒆 (Eq. 2) per participant before the group-level 
means (colored bars) and 95% confidence intervals (i.e. ±1.96 SEM; black error bars) 
were computed. Note that 𝝈𝑨𝑽,𝒎𝒍𝒆 = 𝟏 by construction. Fig. 2 d. Group-level mean 
(±1.96 SEM) of empirical and MLE-predicted auditory weights (Eqs. 6 and 1). 
 
3.3 Main outcomes at the group level 
We jointly fitted (using the betabinomial model, Eq. 5) five psychometric functions to 
each participant’s dataset of the main experiment, one for each condition: Unisensory 
auditory and visual, audiovisual spatially congruent and spatially incongruent (A-left V-
right, and V-left A-right) (Section 2.8). Using the unisensory variances we then predicted 
(using MLE) the audiovisual variance and the PSEs of the incongruent audiovisual 
conditions (Eq. 1-2). Figure 2A-B summarizes these fits at the average group level (n.b. 
for illustration purposes we have normalized the x-axis with respect to ∆𝐴𝑉 ≈ 𝐽𝑁𝐷𝐴). It 
is immediately clear that the audiovisual slope (constrained to be equal for all three AV 
conditions) is steeper than both unisensory slopes (which seem almost perfectly 
matched, as we had intended; Section 2.6.1.3). The audiovisual slope is nearly identical 
to the MLE-predicted slope (the two curves overlap entirely). Moreover, the PSEs (i.e. 
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location at which 𝑃("probe right") = 0.5) for unisensory and AV congruent conditions 
are very similar (with a small bias for responding “probe right”, i.e. PSEs < 0°, for all 
three conditions). While the MLE-model predicts that the PSEs of the spatially 
incongruent conditions also coincide with the AV congruent condition (Figure 2B), the 
empirical PSEs of the incongruent conditions actually modestly deviate from the MLE-
predicted PSEs. Both incongruent PSEs suggest that the visual stimulus component was 
weighted stronger than expected based on MLE-predictions: e.g. when the visual and 






∆𝐴𝑉, respectively, this resulted in 
more “probe right” responses (thus a negative PSE shift; solid cyan line).  
For all participants and conditions we then expressed the psychometric functions’ slope 
parameters as the standard deviation of the sensory noise, 𝜎 (see Section 2.8), and we 
used Eqs. 1 & 6 to compute the MLE-predicted and empirical auditory weights. Figure 
2C-D summarize these parameters of interest at the average group-level (n.b. for 
illustration purposes we have normalized 𝜎 with respect to 𝜎𝐴𝑉,𝑚𝑙𝑒). In support of the 
MLE model we find no evidence that 𝜎𝐴𝑉,𝑒𝑚𝑝 > 𝜎𝐴𝑉,𝑚𝑙𝑒 at the group level: t(35) = 0.33, p 
= 0.37, 𝐵𝐹01= 4.24, 𝑑𝑧 = 0.06. However, in contradiction to the MLE model, we do find 
that the auditory weights are significantly smaller than predicted, 𝑤𝐴,𝑒𝑚𝑝 < 𝑤𝐴,𝑚𝑙𝑒: t(35) 
= 6.25, p < 0.0001, 𝐵𝐹10 > 10000, 𝑑𝑧 = 1.04. (Throughout this article we report results 
from one-sided t-tests because none of the Kolmogorov-Smirnov tests indicated that a 
non-parametric test was required.)   
3.4 Exploratory analyses at the individuals level 
While the results from the above-described group-level statistical tests are unambiguous 
and decisive for drawing conclusions regarding the validity of the MLE model, they do 
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not reveal the amount of uncertainty that is inherent with each individual’s parameter 
estimate. We used parametric bootstrapping to obtain 95% confidence intervals for the 
estimates and to perform statistical tests for differences between various parameters at 
the individuals level (Section 2.13). Figure 3 shows the results of this exploratory 
analysis. Panel A illustrates the extent to which we were successful at matching the 
visual reliability to the auditory reliability (by adjusting the size of the visual blob; 
Section 2.6.1.3). Please note that the unisensory data that is depicted here is collected 
during the main experiment only (sessions 2-3). The reliability match has deteriorated 
somewhat since the first session for seven participants and with these scores they would 
not have passed criterion as set for the first session (i.e. 𝜎𝐴𝑉,𝑚𝑙𝑒






the dotted blue line indicates the limit). However, deviances from equality were only 
moderate, so sensitivity for detecting differences with MLE-model predictions should 
still be high. (B) Indeed, a significant multisensory variance reduction is demonstrable for 
the majority of our participants (𝜎𝐴𝑉 < 𝑚𝑖𝑛(𝜎𝐴, 𝜎𝑉), N = 24). (C) Although there are five 
participants for whom the one-sided bootstrap tests show that the empirical audiovisual 
variance is greater than what was predicted (𝜎𝐴𝑉,𝑒𝑚𝑝 > 𝜎𝐴𝑉,𝑚𝑙𝑒), we note that there is 
an equal number of participants who show a substantial deviation into the other 
direction. The fact that so few participants deviate from the MLE-predictions despite 
having optimized experimental conditions for finding such differences is strong evidence 
in support of near-optimal multisensory integration. However, (D) we also find that 
twenty participants significantly overweighted the visual stimuli during audiovisual 
integration (𝑤𝐴,𝑒𝑚𝑝 < 𝑤𝐴,𝑚𝑙𝑒), which clearly demonstrates that the group-level result for 
visual overweighting is not an accidental finding that can be explained by uncertainty of 




Fig 3 – Results at the individuals level. For all panels (A-D): Diamonds represent 
combinations of two parameter estimates for the individual participants as obtained 
in the main experiment (Section 2.6.2.2.). 95% confidence intervals for each parameter 
(Section 2.13) are illustrated by horizontal (x-axis parameter) or vertical (y-axis 
parameter) black lines. Black dashed lines are drawn to represent equality at x=y. Dark 
shaded diamonds indicate that bootstrap tests demonstrated a significant difference 
between the two parameters (two-sided tests in panel A, one-sided tests in panels B-
D). Fig. 3 a. Most unisensory noise parameters are similar to each other, within the 
limits that were used as exclusion criteria in session 1 (shown here as blue dotted 
lines; Section 2.6.1.4.). Fig. 3 b. A significant multisensory variance reduction, relative 
to the most-reliable unisensory modality, is found for a majority of participants (dark 
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shaded; N=24). The color of the diamonds’ edges indicate the most-reliable unisensory 
modality for each participant (𝑨 = green, 𝑽 = red). Fig. 3 c. Most empirical audiovisual 
variances are not significantly different from the MLE-predicted audiovisual variances. 
Fig. 3 d. Significant visual overweighting relative to MLE-prediction is found for a 
majority of participants (N=20).  
 
3.5 Control analyses for the effects of unisensory biases and audiovisual spatial disparity 
The methods that we used to acquire the above-mentioned analyses results made two 
important assumptions: 1. that there is no meaningful difference between the slope 
parameters of the three audiovisual conditions (independent of spatial congruence), and 
2. that any left-right bias detected in the unisensory auditory and/or visual condition is 
irrelevant when computing empirical auditory weights because left-right biases for 
audiovisual trials are best described by the PSE of the AV congruent condition. As a 
control analysis we tested these two assumptions by 1. fitting psychometric functions 
using independent slope parameters for each of three audiovisual conditions, and 2. by 
computing the empirical auditory weights separately for the two incongruent conditions 
while taking unisensory left-right bias into account (see Eq. 8, Section 2.13). Importantly, 
as was already suggested in Fig. 2B, the results of this control analysis show that visual 
overweighting is independently significant in both incongruent conditions (𝑤𝐴,𝑉𝐿𝐴𝑅 <
𝑤𝐴,𝑚𝑙𝑒: t(35) = 3.30, p = 0.001, 𝐵𝐹10 = 31, 𝑑𝑧 = 0.55 and 𝑤𝐴,𝐴𝐿𝑉𝑅 < 𝑤𝐴,𝑚𝑙𝑒: t(35) = 2.12, p 
= 0.02, 𝐵𝐹10 = 2.56, 𝑑𝑧 = 0.35). The Bayes factors are much smaller than in the main 
analysis (c.f. 𝐵𝐹10 > 10000, see above), because the auditory weight estimates 
computed in this manner are affected by random deviations of the unisensory PSEs: e.g. 
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if 𝑃𝑆𝐸𝐴 < 0°, while the other PSEs are unaffected by biases, then 𝑤𝐴,𝐴𝐿𝑉𝑅 increases 
whereas 𝑤𝐴,𝑉𝐿𝐴𝑅 decreases (and vice versa for 𝑃𝑆𝐸𝐴 > 0°; see Eq. 8). Indeed, the Bayes 
factor is greater if we compare the mean of these two empirical weights for each 
participant against the MLE-predicted weights: t(35) = 3.82, p = 0.0003, 𝐵𝐹10 = 112, 𝑑𝑧 = 
0.63.  
Regarding the fitted sensory noise parameters for the audiovisual conditions 𝜎𝐴𝑉,𝑒𝑚𝑝 we 
find a significant effect of condition (repeated-measurements ANOVA with ‘AV 
condition’ as within-subjects factor: F(2) = 5.97, p = 0.004) with the order of the group 
means 𝜎𝐴𝑉,𝑉𝐿𝐴𝑅 < 𝜎𝐴𝑉,𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑔𝑟𝑢𝑒𝑛𝑡 < 𝜎𝐴𝑉,𝐴𝐿𝑉𝑅. In pairwise comparisons with 𝜎𝐴𝑉,𝑚𝑙𝑒 the 
only significant difference was found for 𝜎𝐴𝑉,𝐴𝐿𝑉𝑅 > 𝜎𝐴𝑉,𝑚𝑙𝑒: t(35) = 2.3, p = 0.01, 𝐵𝐹10 = 
3.67, 𝑑𝑧 = 0.39 (𝐵𝐹01 ≈ 10 for both 𝜎𝐴𝑉,𝑉𝐿𝐴𝑅 > 𝜎𝐴𝑉,𝑚𝑙𝑒 and 𝜎𝐴𝑉,𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑔𝑟𝑢𝑒𝑛𝑡 > 𝜎𝐴𝑉,𝑚𝑙𝑒). This 
may suggest that the forced-fusion assumption has been violated in the spatially 
incongruent condition ALVR (but there could be other explanations too; see Discussion 
Section). One may hypothesize that it is more likely for participants to notice the 
audiovisual disparity (thus not integrate A and V) in the ALVR condition if unisensory 
biases exist in the same direction as the audiovisual conflict: i.e. when 𝑃𝑆𝐸𝐴 > 0° and/or 
𝑃𝑆𝐸𝑉 < 0°. However, contrary to that hypothesis, we found no correlation between the 
relative difference 𝜎𝐴𝑉,𝐴𝐿𝑉𝑅/𝜎𝐴𝑉,𝑚𝑙𝑒 and the unisensory PSE difference 𝑃𝑆𝐸𝐴 − 𝑃𝑆𝐸𝑉 
(Pearson’s r = 0.14, p = 0.42). From these control analyses we conclude that unisensory 
biases are unlikely to have affected the results, but we did observe some evidence 
suggesting that participants’ behavioral results deviate from MLE-predictions not only in 




3.6 Results from the post-testing questionnaire 
Finally, we turned to the post-testing questionnaires to further guide our post-hoc 
exploratory analyses (Section 2.6.2.3). Thirteen participants reported that they 
occasionally experienced the auditory and visual signals as coming from two separate 
locations on audiovisual trials (i.e. the auditory and visual component signals of the AV 
probe were perceived on opposite sides of the AV standard). These responses indicate a 
breakdown of the forced-fusion assumption in these thirteen participants, at least on 
some trials. To investigate whether these thirteen participants showed a different 
pattern of results than the other twenty-three participants we performed a group level 
repeated-measurement ANOVA on the two main-outcome measures together: (i) 
relative sensory noise differences 𝜎𝐴𝑉,𝑒𝑚𝑝/𝜎𝐴𝑉,𝑚𝑙𝑒 and (ii) weights differences 
𝑤𝐴,𝑚𝑙𝑒 − 𝑤𝐴,𝑒𝑚𝑝 (as obtained using the primary analysis pipeline; Sections 2.8-9). The 
factor ‘𝜎𝐴𝑉-or-𝑤𝐴 measure’ was defined for within-subjects effects and a between-
subjects factor created two groups based on the questionnaire responses (i.e. 13 with- 
and 23 participants without experience of an AV disparity). The analysis demonstrated a 
significant main effect of the between-subjects factor: F(1) = 5.09, p = 0.027. Both 
deviations from the MLE-predictions (𝜎𝐴𝑉,𝑒𝑚𝑝 > 𝜎𝐴𝑉,𝑚𝑙𝑒 and 𝑤𝐴,𝑒𝑚𝑝 < 𝑤𝐴,𝑚𝑙𝑒) are 
exacerbated in the group of thirteen participants who claimed to have experienced 
occasional AV disparities; although neither of two independent one-sided two-sample t-
tests for differences between the two groups reached significance by themselves (t(34) = 
1.67, p = 0.052, Cohen’s d = 0.58 for 𝜎𝐴𝑉; and t(34) = 1.49, p = 0.073, Cohen’s d = 0.52 for 
𝑤𝐴). Notably, using only the subset of thirteen datasets from participants with reported 
experience of AV disparity, we did find a marginally significant difference for 𝜎𝐴𝑉,𝑒𝑚𝑝 >
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𝜎𝐴𝑉,𝑚𝑙𝑒 in accordance with what would be expected if the forced-fusion assumption is 
violated: t(12) = 1.89, p = 0.041, 𝐵𝐹10 = 2.09, 𝑑𝑧 = 0.52 (c.f. 𝐵𝐹01= 4.24 for the same test 
on all 36 datasets; see main outcomes above). Importantly, however, we also do still 
find significant visual overweighting in the subgroup of 23 participants who did not 
report to have experienced any audiovisual disparity (t(22) = 3.70, p = 0.0006, 𝐵𝐹10 = 
58.5, 𝑑𝑧 = 0.77), thus suggesting that visual overweighting is a general mechanism that is 




The aim of this study was to investigate the extent to which human behavior for 
audiovisual localization is in line with maximum likelihood estimation. Specifically, we 
have attempted to replicate the results of Alais and Burr’s (2004) seminal study in which 
they showed evidence that human observers integrate audiovisual spatial signals 
according to MLE. However, utilizing carefully designed methods that were peer-
reviewed and registered before data collection, we have presented evidence that naïve 
observers’ audiovisual responses cannot be fully explained by MLE predictions. While 
the data show a significant variance reduction for audiovisual relative to unisensory 
conditions in agreement with MLE, they also unambiguously show that participants 
weighted the visual signals significantly stronger than is predicted by MLE-predicted 
reliability-weighted integration. Before providing three alternative but not mutually-
exclusive explanations for these findings, we first discuss some differences with the 
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study of Alais and Burr (2004) and highlight the robustness of the observed visual 
overweighting.  
The design of this study has been optimized to create conditions in which we could test 
for deviations from the MLE predictions with high statistical power. (i) Relative to 
previously published psychophysics studies on audiovisual spatial localization (Alais & 
Burr, 2004; Battaglia et al., 2003) we have recruited six times more participants (N=36). 
(ii) Experimental sensitivity for detecting deviations from MLE predictions was 
maximized by matching the reliability of auditory and visual stimuli for each participant. 
(iii) Individualized audiovisual spatial disparity sizes ensured an adequate trade-off 
between the risk of violating the forced-fusion assumption (small disparities are 
preferred) and high statistical power for potential weights differences (large disparities 
are preferred; Appendix B). (iv) Stimulus locations were adjusted to each individual’s 
performance level such that the parameters of the psychometric functions could be 
reliably estimated based on a high number of trials at relevant stimulus levels. (v) High 
quality data was ensured by excluding participants that showed signs of inadequate or 
inconsistent performance and by using eye tracking to control for proper gaze fixation as 
well as removing missed trials due to blinks.  
The beneficial effects of these optimized experimental conditions are best illustrated by 
the exploratory analyses at the level of the individuals (Figure 3). Contrary to Alais and 
Burr (2004), we were able to demonstrate a significant audiovisual variance reduction 
(i.e. multisensory behavioral benefit) in two thirds of our participants, most likely 
because of smaller confidence intervals for our parameter estimates (i.e. more reliable 
results). Such variance reductions suggest that participants based their responses on 
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integrated audiovisual signals rather than probabilistically responding to either of the 
unisensory signals (i.e. they were not ‘cue-switching’; Ernst & Bülthoff, 2004). Moreover, 
significant visual overweighting was observed at the individuals-level in the majority of 
participants, thus excluding the possibility that this group-level deviation from MLE 
predictions was due to noisy parameter estimates. Post-hoc control analyses further 
consolidated that conclusion by showing that visual overweighting was independently 
present in both audiovisual conflict conditions and unlikely to have been influenced by 
unisensory biases. Finally, visual overweighting was significant at the group-level even 
when we constrained the analysis to a subset of participants who explicitly claimed to 
have had no experience of the audiovisual disparity (in a post-testing questionnaire).  
However, the fact that a third of our participants reported that they had occasionally 
perceived the auditory and visual probe on opposing sides of the standard indicates that 
the forced-fusion assumption may have been violated (even though we had taken great 
care to avoid that by using individualized conflict sizes). It is well-known that MLE-type 
integration of multisensory signals breaks down as a function of their spatial disparity 
(Gepshtein et al., 2005). Bayesian causal inference (BCI) is able to model the extent of 
this break down and it has successfully been used to predict human multisensory 
perception in conditions of partial integration (Körding, Beierholm, Ma et al., 2007; Rohe 
& Noppeney, 2015a, 2015b, 2016). One particular decision function of the BCI model 
(so-called ‘model-averaging’) even allows for partial integration on single trials without 
participants being aware of the multisensory conflict (Wozny et al., 2010; Rohe & 
Noppeney, 2015a). If our participants based their responses on such partially integrated 
visual spatial estimates (as opposed to partially integrated auditory spatial estimates), 
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then this could well explain the visual overweighting that we observed. Indeed, seven 
participants reported (in the post-testing questionnaire) that they had based their 
responses on the visual signals whenever in doubt. (We do not know whether more 
participants used this strategy, as this is unfortunately not something that we asked for 
directly in the questionnaire; the seven participants reported this voluntarily to the 
question about experiencing spatial disparities). 
An alternative explanation for visual overweighting was suggested by Battaglia et al. 
(2003). They had also observed visual overweighting in their audiovisual localization 
study (though we note that their visual stimuli, random-dot stereograms of bumps, are 
substantially different from the blurred blobs that were used in the current study and by 
Alais and Burr, 2004). Battaglia et al. (2003) hypothesized that observers may have 
developed a prior probability distribution to estimate a visual signal’s reliability in a 
Bayesian way. This prior would have higher probabilities for lower visual variances, in 
agreement with the fact that vision normally provides more reliable spatial estimates. 
Using such biased estimates of the visual reliability observers would overweight visual 
signals when applying reliability-weighted audiovisual integration.  
Importantly, both of the above explanations for visual overweighting, BCI and biased 
visual reliability estimates, would result in increased audiovisual variance relative to 
MLE-predictions. However, in proof-of-principle simulation studies we have 
demonstrated that it is likely for this variance increase to go unnoticed due to 
experimental noise; see Appendix D. By establishing that our design is more sensitive for 
detecting group-level weights differences than audiovisual variance differences, these 
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simulations thus confirm that BCI and biased visual reliability estimates form two 
plausible explanations for the main outcomes of the current study.  
A third explanation for visual overweighting is based on the hypothesis that it is us 
researchers who use the wrong reliability estimate to base MLE predictions on (as 
opposed to assuming that observers use a biased estimate of the actual visual reliability, 
as above). This is the case if the visual reliability during visual-only trials is lower than the 
visual reliability during audiovisual trials. For example, visual reliability might be higher 
in an audiovisual context because of low-level cross-modal salience boosting effects 
(Aller, Giani, Conrad, Watanabe & Noppeney, 2015) or because of top-down cognitive 
factors such as sound-induced increased attentional levels (Talsma, Senkowski, Soto-
Faraco & Woldorff, 2010). Such an increase of the visual reliability would lead an ideal 
observer to weigh the visual signals stronger during multisensory integration. Relative to 
MLE predictions by the researcher (based on the reliability as observed in the visual-only 
condition) this would manifest as visual overweighting and a small decrease of the 
audiovisual variance. Similar to the other two explanations discussed above, such a 
deviation of the predicted variance may have been obscured by experimental noise. 
(While this third hypothesis provides another plausible explanation for the main 
outcomes of the current study, we note that it fails to explain the results of our pilot 
study: there we observed an audiovisual variance that was higher than the most reliable 
unisensory variance (auditory) for all seven participants (Appendix A). Both the BCI 
model and a Bayesian model with a prior on visual reliability estimates would better 
match the pilot study’s results.) 
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In conclusion, we state that the here presented data illustrate the limitations of MLE in 
explaining human multisensory perception. While MLE describes a simple, elegant, and 
statistically optimal model for multisensory integration that provides an intuitive 
understanding for the behaviorally advantageous bisensory variance reduction that can 
be observed under some ideal experimental conditions (including the current 
experiment), it has failed to quantitatively predict the sensory weights that participants 
used when integrating audiovisual spatial signals. As with any model, MLE presents an 
incomplete description of reality and it makes assumptions that can be violated. In fact, 
the current experiment demonstrates that it is extremely hard, if not impossible, to 
design laboratory experiments that would not violate these assumptions or otherwise 
expose the limitations of MLE (provided the design also allows for sufficient statistical 
sensitivity). This statement is further supported by numerous previously published 
reports that human multisensory perception diverges from MLE predictions (Battaglia et 
al., 2003; Burr, Banks & Morrone, 2009; Fetsch, Turner, DeAngelis & Angelaki, 2009; 
Butler, Smith, Campos & Bülthoff, 2010; Prsa, Gale & Blanke, 2012; Rosas, Wagemans, 
Ernst & Wichmann, 2005; Bentvelzen, Leung & Alais, 2009). We therefore emphasize 
great caution when claiming that MLE is a fundamental or generic mechanism for 
multisensory integration. At best it provides an incomplete description of human 
multisensory perception. 
In agreement with recent recommendations (Rahnev and Denison, 2018), we believe 
that it is not only important to state whether behavioral data is in agreement with 
statistically optimal models, but also to investigate why participants deviate from the 
models’ predictions. The post-testing questionnaire has proven to be a useful tool to 
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direct such exploratory analyses. Participants’ responses suggested that Bayesian causal 
inference is a possible explanation for the current data and previously published 
psychophysics and neuroimaging work supports its validity in describing human 
multisensory perception (Körding, Beierholm, Ma et al., 2007; Rohe & Noppeney, 2015a, 
2015b, 2016). However, future research will be necessary to discard/confirm alternative 
mechanisms such as discussed above. Other questions also remain regarding the 
differences between our study’s results and those of Alais and Burr (2004). For example, 
does visual overweighting depend on whether participants are trained extensively on 
the auditory localization task? Furthermore, we should question why there was such 
strong visual overweighting in the pilot study (Appendix A) and in Battaglia et al., (2003). 
Might this depend on the type of visual stimulus that was used (i.e. a blurred blob, cloud 
of dots, random-dot stereogram)? These and other research questions will need to be 
addressed to better understand human deviations from statistically optimal reliability-
weighted multisensory integration.  
 
Appendix A: Pilot study 
Pilot study: Method 
Ten subjects participated in this pilot study. One participant was excluded because her 𝐴 
localisation accuracy was below 90% at 10° azimuth. Two other participants were 
excluded post-hoc, because they pressed random buttons in the latter half of the study’s 
experimental blocks. As a result, only seven participants (6 female, age range 18-20, all 
right handed) were included in the final analysis.  
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The experimental paradigm was comparable to the proposed research, but differed in 
the following aspects: First, the visual stimulus that was used in the pilot study was a 
cloud of 20 dots (diameter: 0.43° visual angle) sampled pseudo-randomly from a 
bivariate Gaussian distribution (as in: Rohe and Noppeney, 2015a). Participants were 
told that the 20 dots were generated by one underlying source in the centre of the 
cloud. Second, the size of the visual cloud (i.e. spatial reliability) was not titrated per 
participant: horizontal standard deviation was 10°, vertical standard deviation was 3°. 
Third, the order of standard and probe stimulus was randomised over trials. Participants 
reported whether the first or second stimulus was more to the left. Fourth, the following 
13 fixed locations were used: 0°, ±0.5°, ±1°, ±2.5°, ±5°, ±7.5°, ±10°. Fifth, the audiovisual 
disparity was fixed at ±5°. 
 
Fig A.1 - An overview of the most important pilot study results at the group level. The 
error bars depict the 95% confidence interval (±𝟏. 𝟗𝟔 ∗ 𝑺𝑬𝑴). Fig A.1 a. Empirical and 
MLE-predicted auditory weights (𝒘𝑨). Fig A.1 b. Empirical and MLE-predicted sensory 
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variances (𝝈𝟐). Before averaging across participants, the sensory variances of the 
individual participants were normalised with respect to 𝝈𝟐𝑨𝑽,𝒎𝒍𝒆 (for illustration 
purposes only). 
 
Pilot study: Results 
The most important results of the pilot study are shown in Fig A.1. Although the 𝐴 
reliability was greater than the 𝑉 reliability in all participants (non-normalised group-
level means: 𝜎𝑉 = 3.5°, 𝜎𝐴 = 1.77°), participants did not weight the more reliable 𝐴 
stimuli according to MLE predictions (Eq. 1, Section 2.1) in the 𝐴𝑉 context (𝑤𝐴,𝑒𝑚𝑝 < 
𝑤𝐴,𝑚𝑙𝑒; p < 0.05 for all participants). The group-level Wilcoxon signed rank test 
demonstrated a significant difference between the empirical and MLE-predicted 
auditory weights (p = 0.0078, 𝑑𝑧 = 2.99). While the variance of the 𝐴𝑉 conditions 
decreased relative to the unisensory 𝑉 condition, we observed no multisensory benefit 
relative to the more reliable unisensory 𝐴 condition (𝜎𝐴 < 𝜎𝐴𝑉,𝑒𝑚𝑝 for all participants). In 
line with this, the empirical variance for the 𝐴𝑉 conditions was significantly greater than 
predicted by the MLE model (Eq. 2, Section 2.1; p < 0.05 for all participants). The group-
level Wilcoxon signed rank test demonstrated a significant difference between the 
empirical and MLE-predicted 𝐴𝑉 variances (p = 0.0078, 𝑑𝑧 = 3.17). 
Importantly, the goodness of fits were sufficient for all seven participants (p > 0.05) and 
no lapse rate was greater than 0.06. We conclude that although the empirical auditory 
weights are quite high for an audiovisual localisation task (mean 𝑤𝐴,𝑒𝑚𝑝 = 0.41), we did 
not observe the MLE-predicted and previously reported ‘reverse ventriloquist effect’, i.e. 
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a shift of the perceived 𝐴𝑉 location toward the auditory signal on cue conflict trials 
(Alais & Burr, 2004). Instead, during audiovisual integration, all participants overweighed 
their less reliable visual modality, similar to the results of Battaglia et al., (2003). 
 
Appendix B: Selection of audiovisual disparity individually for each participant based 
on power analysis 
Observers’ sensory weights are estimated empirically by introducing a small conflict 
between the sensory cues– a procedure coined ‘perturbation analysis’ (Young, Landy & 
Maloney, 1993). This raises the question of how to select the conflict size (e.g. 
audiovisual disparity for spatial localization). On the one hand a greater conflict size is 
preferable, because it renders the perturbation analysis more sensitive for detecting 
deviations of observers’ empirical weights from MLE predictions. On the other hand, 
greater conflict sizes may prevent participants from integrating sensory signals into one 
unified percept according to forced fusion assumptions. Instead, observers are then 
likely to compute a perceptual estimate that takes into account the uncertainty about 
the world’s causal structure as accommodated by more complex models of causal 
inference (see Körding, Beierholm, Ma et al., 2007; Shams & Beierholm, 2010; Rohe and 
Noppeney, 2015a, 2015b, 2016). Moreover, previous research has shown that 
observers’ sensitivity to intersensory conflicts depends on their perceptual reliability 
(Rohe and Noppeney, 2015a). Collectively, these considerations suggest that i. we need 
to determine the minimal conflict size (i.e. here: spatial disparity) that enables 
detections of deviations of the empirical sensory weights from MLE predictions with 
high statistical power (e.g. 1-β=0.95) and that ii. we need to adjust this minimal conflict 
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size individually for each participant based on their unisensory perceptual reliability as 
indexed by their auditory JND.  
To determine the minimal conflict size (ΔAV in standardized JND units) that still enables 
detection of deviations of observers’ empirical weights from MLE predictions with high 
statistical power, we performed the following simulations:  
1. For each of the 36 participants, we initially sampled an auditory JND from a uniform 
distribution between 1.2 and 3.8° visual angle, i.e. a range of auditory JNDs that we 
usually observe for our audiovisual experimental set up and stimuli across participants. 
Exactly as in the current study, we set the visual JND equal to the auditory JND. The PSE 
of the A and V conditions were set to zero, i.e. we assumed no perceptual biases. The 
audiovisual JND and PSE were set to the MLE predicted values computed from the 
unisensory JNDs and PSEs according to Eq. 1 and Eq. 2 (Section 2.1); i.e. the PSE of the 
audiovisual condition was also set to zero. Hence, the ‘true’ empirical weights (to be 
computed from the 𝐴𝑉 PSEs) and the MLE-predicted weights (to be computed from the 
unisensory 𝐴 and 𝑉 JNDs) are by construction all equal to 0.5; reflecting equal 
perceptual reliabilities of the 𝐴 and 𝑉 signals. Likewise, by construction the difference 
between the ‘true’ empirical and MLE-predicted auditory weights is zero. To assess the 
variability (or uncertainty) of this difference between empirical and MLE-predicted 
auditory weight estimates, and how this variability will depend on the conflict size (i.e. 
spatial disparity ΔAV) we generate distributions of empirical and MLE-predicted weights 
as follows: 
2. For each participant, we parametrically bootstrap (Palamedes toolbox 1.8.2, Kingdom 
& Prins, 2016) 1000 𝐴 and 𝑉 data sets (with lapse rate parameter (λ) set to 0.02), 
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stimulus locations set according to the subject-specific auditory JND (see Section 
2.6.1.2.) and 40 trials per location), and we subsequently fit psychometric functions to 
each simulated data set. From the fitted unisensory JNDs we compute the MLE-
predicted auditory weights according to Eq. 1. This will generate a distribution of one 
thousand MLE-predicted auditory weights centred on 0.5, for each participant. 
3. Likewise, we sample 2 x 1000 𝐴𝑉 data sets and fit an 𝐴𝑉 psychometric function to 
each simulated data set. In order to evaluate the effect of spatial disparity on the 
precision of the estimated empirical auditory weights (and as a consequence also on the 
differences between empirical and MLE-predicted weights), we now arbitrarily assume 
that half of the 𝐴𝑉 data sets were generated by a positive conflict 𝐴𝑉∆=+𝑋° and the 
other half by a negative conflict 𝐴𝑉∆=−𝑋°. Empirical auditory weights are then computed 
based on Eq. 6 (Section 2.9) for a range of spatial disparity sizes in participant’s auditory 
JND units (i.e. ∆𝐴𝑉 = 𝑓𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑜𝑟 ∗ 𝐽𝑁𝐷;  with ‘factor’ logarithmically sampled in 50 steps 
from between 0.1 and 2). For each participant, this will generate a distribution of one 
thousand empirical auditory weights per spatial disparity ∆𝐴𝑉. By construction, the 
distributions of empirical weights are all centred on 0.5. Yet importantly, they vary in 
their spread: the larger the spatial disparity, the smaller the spread of the distribution of 
empirical weights (as follows directly from Eq. 6).  
4. Finally, we shift the distributions of empirical auditory weights by subtracting a ‘true’ 
(i.e. to be detected) variable value (range 0 – 0.25); thereby creating empirical weights 
distributions that are no longer centred at 0.5 (i.e. we ‘simulate’ visual overweighting). 
Critically, while the difference in means between i. the distributions of the MLE-
predicted weights and ii. the shifted distribution of empirical auditory weights is equal to 
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this specific value irrespective of spatial disparity, the variance of the empirical weight 
distribution and hence the overlap of the two distributions depends on the spatial 
disparity (∆𝐴𝑉).  
5. To enable a power analysis at the random effects group-level, we enter one 
bootstrapped pair of MLE-predicted and empirical weights (with specific subtracted 
‘true’ difference and spatial disparity level ∆𝐴𝑉) for each participant into one-sided 
paired t-tests (or one-sided Wilcoxon signed-rank tests if Kolmogorov-Smirnov tests 
indicated non-normal distributions). These one-sided group-level paired t-tests for each 
level of spatial disparity and imposed ‘true’ difference between empirical and MLE-
predicted weights are then repeated for each of the 1000 bootstraps. As a result of this 
procedure, we can compute the fraction of bootstraps (i.e. experiments) where the 
paired t-test successfully declares the empirical auditory weights for a particular ‘true’ 
difference as significantly smaller than the MLE-predicted auditory weights (p < 0.05). In 
other words, we compute the power of the statistical test separately for each 
combination of ‘true’ difference and spatial disparity.  
Fig. B.1 shows the minimum ‘true’ difference between empirical and MLE-predicted 
auditory weights that can be detected with a power of  ≥0.8, ≥0.9, ≥0.95, ≥0.99 as a 
function of spatial disparity (in JND-standardized units). The results from this power 
analysis suggest that for our study with 36 subjects, specific parameter choices and for a 
spatial disparity equal to an individual’s auditory JND (i.e. in Fig B.1, ∆AV = 1 in 
standardized JND units) a difference in empirical and MLE-predicted auditory weights of 
0.06 would be detected with a power of 0.95. Critically, while the minimal difference 
between empirical and MLE-predicted weights that can be detected with 0.95 power 
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rapidly increases for AV disparities smaller than one subject-specific auditory JND, AV 
disparities greater than one auditory JND have negligible impact on the power of 
perturbation analyses for our experimental choices. 
 
 
Fig B.1 – Results of power analysis simulations for selecting spatial disparity: Minimum 
deviations of empirical weights from MLE-predicted weights (𝒘𝑨,𝒎𝒍𝒆 ≈ 𝟎. 𝟓) that are 
detected with a power of ≥0.8 (circles), ≥0.9 (crosses), ≥0.95 (squares), ≥0.99 
(asterisks) as a function of AV spatial disparity (in standardized subject-specific 
auditory JND units). 
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Appendix C: Rationale for use of the betabinomial model 
Before any data was acquired in this study we had intended to use the binomial model 
for fitting of psychometric functions (with Eq. 4 for the likelihood). The main outcomes 
of the study (as determined by group-level one-sided t-tests), with analyses methods 
using the binomial model, are that we observe significant visual overweighting relative 
to MLE-predictions while the audiovisual SDs are not significantly different from MLE-
predicted audiovisual SDs (i.e. very similar to the main outcomes of the betabinomial 
model as reported in the Results Section).  
Methods as pre-registered (binomial model; N=36): 
𝜎𝐴𝑉,𝑒𝑚𝑝 > 𝜎𝐴𝑉,𝑚𝑙𝑒: t(35) = 0.38, p = 0.35, BF10 = 0.246, BF01 = 4.07, 𝑑𝑧 = 0.063 
𝑤𝐴,𝑒𝑚𝑝 < 𝑤𝐴,𝑚𝑙𝑒: t(35) = 6.14, p < 0.0001, BF10 > 10000, BF01 < 0.0001, 𝑑𝑧 = 1.02 
However, we found that the goodness-of-fit according to the bootstrap analysis using 
the binomial model was significantly bad (p < 0.05) for 13 participants. We cannot 
technically trust the parameter estimates for ‘bad’ fits, because the bad fits suggest that 
the applied model (consisting of five psychometric functions) is incorrect for these 
datasets. There are two solutions: we either change the data or we change the model. 
We explore both options in the discussion below and we will argue for the latter 
solution: a minor change to the model. 
We could have excluded and replaced all thirteen subjects that show a bad goodness-of-
fit, as we had originally written in the pre-registered methods. However, when we wrote 
that we thought that the goodness-of-fit measure (using the binomial model) would 
allow us to detect outliers among all datasets that were exceptionally noisy. We did not 
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expect to find that over one third of our participants would show a ‘bad’ fit. This means 
that we cannot speak of exceptionally noisy outliers anymore. Instead, it seems that 
some amount of such noise is characteristic to many of the acquired datasets.  
Some amount of measurement noise seems inherent to any psychophysical dataset, and 
it is expected to be larger for experiments that are spread over multiple sessions with 
thousands of trials and a total duration of several hours. Between sessions and blocks of 
trials attention and vigilance levels, as well as internalized criteria may fluctuate causing 
divergences in participants’ performance, thus leading to noise in the data. The 
simulated datasets that we generate for the parametric bootstrap analysis (to determine 
goodness-of-fit using the binomial model) do not contain such noise (i.e. performance 
fluctuations over time are not modelled). The binomial model does produce some 
random noise in the data (‘right’ responses are drawn at random from binomial 
distributions), but the predicted amount of this noise is considerably reduced when the 
total number of trials per probe location is high (as is the case in the current study). So, 
the quantitative fit (by means of the likelihood ratio-based measure, see Section 2.10) is 
likely better for the simulated datasets than for the empirical datasets.  
The above-raised concerns regarding the bootstrap test for goodness-of-fit using the 
binomial model are also described in the recent literature (e.g. Fründ, Haenel, & 
Wichmann, 2011). In fact, one of the authors that previously argued in favor of the 
bootstrapped goodness-of-fit test based on the binomial model (Wichmann & Hill, 
2001a), has recently co-developed a novel betabinomial model for psychometric 
function fitting that takes into account noise due to performance fluctuations over time 
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(Schütt, Harmeling, Macke, & Wichmann, 2016)13. The betabinomial distribution has one 
additional parameter, η, that models the amount of noise present in the data in addition 
to the predicted variance from the binomial distribution (when η=0 there is no such 
noise, when η=1 there is only noise). 
We have implemented the betabinomial model into our analysis scripts by (i) modifying 
the formula for computation of the likelihood per location (Eq. 4 becomes Eq. 5) and (ii) 
by drawing the probability of being correct per probe location from a beta distribution 
(with variance dependent on η and centred on the probability correct as given by the 
psychometric function) during parametric bootstrapping (i.e. when simulating datasets; 
see Section 2.10). To be clear, we only fit one additional parameter per participant: η is 
fit across the five psychometric functions simultaneously.  
Most importantly, using the bootstrap-based goodness-of-fit measure with the 
betabinomial model we find that none of the 36 participants shows a ‘bad’ fit (p > 0.05 
for all), thus suggesting that the betabinomial model is the correct model for all 
datasets. The fitted noise parameter η is higher for those thirteen participants that 
previously showed a bad fit (0.04 < η < 0.13) than for the other twenty-three 
participants (0 < η < 0.07), but all values of η are still modest (c.f. η=0.2 indicates a 
moderately overdispersed observer; Schütt, Harmeling, Macke, & Wichmann, 2016). The 
main group-level study outcomes using the betabinomial model (as reported in the 
Results Section) are very similar to the results that we found using the binomial model 
(see above), but the important difference is that we can now trust these fits to be of 
adequate quality. 
                                                          
13
 We were unaware of this development during stage-1 submission of the methods.  
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By applying the betabinomial model instead of the binomial model for psychometric 
functions we have effectively put all thirty-six datasets on a continuum of various noise 
levels in the data, instead of treating the thirteen datasets that resulted in a ‘bad’ 
goodness-of-fit as fundamentally different from the twenty-three other datasets. We 
will now provide evidence that justifies this choice by showing that the thirteen ‘bad’ 
datasets are not fundamentally different from the other twenty-three datasets.  
First, it is important to mention that many of the ‘bad’ fits only barely reached 
significance in the bootstrap goodness-of-fit analysis. This is best supported by the 
finding that none of the 36 participants had a bad goodness-of-fit (p<0.05) if the p-value 
was alternatively computed by comparing the deviance of the dataset with the 
theoretical distribution of deviances for a binomial model (i.e. for large numbers of trials 
this asymptotically approximates the chi-squared distribution; Wichmann & Hill, 2001a; 
Kingdom & Prins 2016). The fact that none of the 36 datasets results in a significantly 
bad fit using that alternative, commonly-used method supports the notion that the 
amount of additional noise in the datasets is modest at most (in agreement with the 
relatively small values that we found for η, see above).   
Second, when we perform the statistical tests for main outcome measures separately for 
the ‘good’ and ‘bad’ datasets, using the parameter values as fitted with the binomial 
model, the results for both groups showed very similar trends. This thus excludes the 
possibility that e.g. visual overweighting is due to bad model fits (the opposite seems 




Methods as pre-registered (binomial model): ‘Good’ goodness-of-fit subjects only 
(N=23): 
𝜎𝐴𝑉,𝑒𝑚𝑝 > 𝜎𝐴𝑉,𝑚𝑙𝑒: t(22) = 0.93, p = 0.18, BF10 = 0.52, BF01 = 1.92, 𝑑𝑧 = 0.19 
𝑤𝐴,𝑒𝑚𝑝 < 𝑤𝐴,𝑚𝑙𝑒: t(22) = 8.75, p < 0.0001, BF10 > 10000, BF01 < 0.0001, 𝑑𝑧 = 1.82  
Methods as pre-registered (binomial model): ‘Bad’ goodness-of-fit subjects only (N=13): 
𝜎𝐴𝑉,𝑒𝑚𝑝 > 𝜎𝐴𝑉,𝑚𝑙𝑒: t(12) = -0.57, p = 0.71, BF10 = 0.19, BF01 = 5.17, 𝑑𝑧 = 0.16 
𝑤𝐴,𝑒𝑚𝑝 < 𝑤𝐴,𝑚𝑙𝑒: t(12) = 1.55, p = 0.073, BF10 = 1.33, BF01 = 0.75, 𝑑𝑧 = 0.43 
Third, one may argue that the reason for the ‘bad’ fits is that we imposed constraints on 
the five psychometric functions: (i) they shared one lapse rate parameter and (ii) the 
three audiovisual conditions shared one slope parameter. If the underlying assumptions 
for these constraints are invalid (e.g. the lapse rate is different for auditory and visual 
conditions, or the variance is higher for spatially incongruent audiovisual conditions as 
opposed to the spatially congruent condition), then we should find that a model without 
these constraints fits the datasets much better. We tested this hypothesis by fitting a 
binomial model of five psychometric functions with five lapse rates and five slope 
parameters. We used parametric bootstrapping (applying the binomial model) to obtain 
a measure for goodness-of-fit for each dataset. For this unconstrained binomial model 
we again found thirteen significantly bad fits (ten of whom are the same datasets that 
showed ‘bad’ fits before). We further tested the assumption for equal audiovisual slopes 
by directly comparing the mean SD of the two incongruent audiovisual conditions with 
the SD of the congruent condition. We found no evidence that the assumption was 
violated (one-sided group-level t-test: 𝜎𝐴𝑉,𝑖𝑛𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑔𝑟 > 𝜎𝐴𝑉,𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑔𝑟, t(35) = 1.11, p=0.14, BF10 = 
0.54, BF01 = 1.85, 𝑑𝑧 = 0.18). We thus conclude that it is unlikely that the parameter 
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constraints on lapse rates and slopes were the reason for the significantly ‘bad’ 
goodness-of-fit test results. Instead, we argue that there is a modest amount of 
additional noise in all datasets that can be adequately taken into consideration by using 
the betabinomial model, leading to good model fits for all participants. 
 
Appendix D: Two simulations to explain visual overweighting with apparent AV 
variance as predicted by maximum likelihood estimation. 
The main outcome measures of this study suggest that participants put significantly 
more weight on the visual signals than is predicted by MLE (𝑤𝐴,𝑒𝑚𝑝 < 𝑤𝐴,𝑚𝑙𝑒), while at 
the same time managing to reduce their bisensory variance (relative to both unisensory 
variances) to the same extent as is predicted by MLE. This is an apparent contradiction 
because an observer should only be able to achieve such MLE-optimal variance 
reduction (Eq. 2) when the unisensory signals are weighted according to their respective 
reliabilities, exactly as the MLE model prescribes (Eq. 1). However, in two separate 
simulation studies we will here provide proof-of-principle evidence that it is possible to 
obtain a ‘seemingly’ MLE-optimal variance reduction while using a different weighting 
scheme. These simulations demonstrate that our study’s design was likely more 
sensitive to detecting deviations of the weights than to detect deviations of the 
audiovisual variances.  
Bayesian causal inference 
The Bayesian causal inference (BCI) model describes how an ideal observer deals with 
the uncertainty that is associated with unisensory location estimates, similar to the MLE-
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model (Section 2.1), while additionally taking into account the uncertainty about 
whether the unisensory signals come from common or separate sources. In other words, 
BCI prescribes whether or not unisensory signals should be integrated or segregated, 
and more specifically, to what extent they should be integrated. Without providing a full 
description of the BCI model (we kindly refer the reader to previously published work; 
Körding, Beierholm, Ma et al., 2007; Rohe & Noppeney, 2015a), we here simulated 
responses for a group of thirty-six BCI-ideal observers in the experimental setting of the 
current study for the two audiovisual incongruent conditions. We then fitted 
psychometric functions to these responses and show that, for certain parameter 
settings, the group-level statistical outcomes are similar to the behavioral outcomes as 
described in the Results Section.  
1. First, we briefly describe how a single location estimate is simulated for an audiovisual 
stimulus using the principles of Bayesian causal inference. Given the true auditory and 
visual locations 𝑆𝐴 and 𝑆𝑉, we randomly draw noise-disturbed internal estimates from 
their Gaussian sensory noise distributions ?̂?𝐴 ~ 𝑁(𝑆𝐴, 𝜎𝐴
2) and ?̂?𝑉 ~ 𝑁(𝑆𝑉, 𝜎𝑉
2). We 
then compute the posterior estimates under the two causal hypotheses: 1). the auditory 
and visual signals come from a common source (C=1) and need to be integrated; and 2). 
the two signals come from separate sources (C=2) and should not be integrated. N.b. in 
addition to the MLE-model, the Bayesian ideal observers simulated here multiply the 
likelihood with a normally distributed spatial prior 𝑃(𝑆) = 𝑁(𝜇𝑃, 𝜎𝑃
2), such that the 
best estimates for either causal structure can be computed according to: 
















































Applying the so-called ‘model averaging’ decision strategy, BCI ideal observers compute 
the final estimates for auditory and visual stimulus location as a weighted mean of the 
integration (C=1) and segregation (C=2) hypotheses, where the weights are determined 
by the posterior probability of each causal structure: 
        ?̂?𝐴,𝐵𝐶𝐼 = 𝑃(𝐶 = 1|?̂?𝐴, ?̂?𝑉) ∗ ?̂?𝐴𝑉,𝐶=1 + (1 − 𝑃(𝐶 = 1|?̂?𝐴, ?̂?𝑉)) ∗ ?̂?𝐴,𝐶=2  
       ?̂?𝑉,𝐵𝐶𝐼 = 𝑃(𝐶 = 1|?̂?𝐴, ?̂?𝑉) ∗ ?̂?𝐴𝑉,𝐶=1 + (1 − 𝑃(𝐶 = 1|?̂?𝐴, ?̂?𝑉)) ∗ ?̂?𝑉,𝐶=2  
With (by Bayes’ rule):   
                         𝑃(𝐶 = 1|?̂?𝐴, ?̂?𝑉) =
𝑃(?̂?𝐴,?̂?𝑉|𝐶=1)∗𝑃𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑚𝑜𝑛
𝑃(?̂?𝐴,?̂?𝑉|𝐶=1)∗𝑃𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑚𝑜𝑛+𝑃(?̂?𝐴,?̂?𝑉|𝐶=2)∗(1−𝑃𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑚𝑜𝑛)
      
𝑃𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑚𝑜𝑛 is the prior probability that the two signals originate from a common source 
independent of the actual stimulus locations (please see Körding, Beierholm, Ma et al., 
2007 for full details).  
2. For any one trial, we simulate location estimates for two audiovisual stimuli, standard 
and probe, and compute the difference between the estimates of each stimulus:  
  ∆?̂?𝐴,𝐵𝐶𝐼 = ?̂?𝐴,𝐵𝐶𝐼,𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑏𝑒 − ?̂?𝐴,𝐵𝐶𝐼,𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑛𝑑𝑎𝑟𝑑       and      ∆?̂?𝑉,𝐵𝐶𝐼 = ?̂?𝑉,𝐵𝐶𝐼,𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑏𝑒 −
?̂?𝑉,𝐵𝐶𝐼,𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑛𝑑𝑎𝑟𝑑     
We thus obtain two estimates for the difference between standard and probe: one for 
each sensory modality. We discretize these two difference estimates 
(𝑧 = "right" 𝑖𝑓  ∆?̂?𝐵𝐶𝐼 > 0° and 𝑧 = "left" 𝑖𝑓 ∆?̂?𝐵𝐶𝐼 ≤ 0°) to simulate modality-specific 
responses 𝑧𝐴 and 𝑧𝑉. However, since the experimental design of this study asks for the 
“location of the audiovisual probe relative to the audiovisual standard”, the BCI ideal 
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observer is placed for an impossible choice when 𝑧𝐴 ≠ 𝑧𝑉: which sensory modality 
should (s)he respond to? Based on (unrequested) information provided by seven 
participants in the post-testing questionnaire (Section 2.6.2.3) we make the important 
assumption here that all simulated observers respond 𝑧𝑉 when in doubt; as the seven 
participants had indeed self-reported to have done. This assumption results in visual 
overweighting (relative to MLE predictions) for any 𝑃𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑚𝑜𝑛 < 1; i.e. when the forced-
fusion assumption is violated.  
3. For one experiment, we simulate 40 responses (𝑧𝑉) for each of thirteen probe 
locations. We do this twice, once for each of the two incongruent conditions 𝐴𝑉∆=+𝑋° 
and 𝐴𝑉∆=−𝑋°. The process is repeated for thirty-six BCI ideal observers. For each 
simulated observer, the individualized probe locations 𝑆𝑝𝑟, audiovisual disparity ∆𝐴𝑉, 
and unisensory noise parameters 𝜎𝐴, 𝜎𝑉 are one-to-one matched to the locations, 
disparity and unisensory noise parameters that were used/obtained for the thirty-six 
real participants. The unknown spatial prior parameters are set to 𝜇𝑃 = 0° and 
𝜎𝑃 = 100°, thus assuming a near-uniform prior distribution for all simulated observers. 
𝑃𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑚𝑜𝑛 is constant across participants but its value varies for different simulation runs 
(see step 5 below).  
4. For each BCI ideal observer two psychometric functions are fitted to the simulated 
responses using the binomial model (Eq. 4), one for each of the incongruent conditions. 
To obtain one estimate of 𝜎𝐴𝑉,𝑒𝑚𝑝 the two simulated empirical AV variances are 
averaged. Following the procedure as outlined in Section 2.8-9, group-level paired t-
tests can then be performed to test for significant deviations from the MLE-predicted 
weights and audiovisual variances.   
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5. The above-described simulation analysis is repeated 1000 times for each of 11 
different values of 𝑃𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑚𝑜𝑛, spread at regular intervals between 0.5 and 1. For each 
setting of 𝑃𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑚𝑜𝑛 we compute the proportion of the 1000 statistical t-tests that 
resulted in significant deviations from the MLE-predictions, separately for weights and 
AV variances.  
Summary results of these simulations are shown in Figure D.1. We conclude that if our 
thirty-six participants would have behaved like BCI ideal observers with relatively high 
but not 100% certain prior beliefs of the audiovisual signals coming from a common 
source (i.e. 0.75 < 𝑃𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑚𝑜𝑛 ≤ 0.95), then it is likely to observe group-level test results 
similar to what we observed in the actual behavioral data: significant visual 





Fig D.1 – Results of the simulation analyses for ideal observers applying Bayesian 
causal inference with various strengths of their common source prior (panel A) and 
Bayesian observers utilizing a prior on their visual reliability estimates that favors 
smaller visual variance estimates (panel B). Displayed here are the proportions of 
simulated experiments (N=1000) that resulted in a significant difference between 
empirical and MLE-predicted parameters according to one-sided group-level t-tests. 
Fig. D.1 b. Please note that a prior strength of “0” indicates that a uniform prior was 
used for the simulations: i.e. the visual reliability estimates were unbiased. 
 
Bayesian prior on modality-specific reliability estimates 
Similar to what we observed in the current study, Battaglia et al. (2003) also observed 
visual overweighting in an audiovisual localization task. The authors proposed a Bayesian 
model that fitted their group-level data much better than the MLE-model. They 
hypothesized that a Bayesian observer would hold a prior belief that high visual spatial 
reliabilities are more probable than low visual spatial reliabilities, because under normal, 
non-laboratory, everyday-life conditions visual spatial reliability is most often reasonably 
high (at least more reliable than auditory spatial signals). When a Bayesian observer 
estimates the reliability of incoming visual sensory signals it makes use of a prior 
probability distribution to bias his visual reliability estimates towards higher values. 
Since the reliability estimates of the two unisensory modalities, 𝑟𝐴 and 𝑟𝑉, are used to 
define the weights for audiovisual integration (Eq. 1), such a bias would inevitably result 
in visual overweighting. Taking a similar simulation approach as we have done above for 
BCI ideal observers, we here generate responses for thirty-six observers that use 
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Bayesian visual reliability estimates (BVRE) to perform reliability-weighted integration. 
Testing a variety of strengths for the prior over visual reliabilities we show that 
significant visual overweighting can be observed as a group-level statistical outcome 
without a concurrent deviation of the audiovisual variance from MLE-predictions.  
1. We construct a set of 15 visual reliability priors using inverse-gamma probability 
distributions over the visual variance estimates 𝜎𝑉
2 (Battaglia et al., 2003). By setting the 
scaling parameter equal to the shape parameter, 𝛼 = 𝛽, we ensured that all priors 
peaked at similarly high probabilities for low variances, i.e. 𝜎𝑉
2 ≈ 1, while their 
probabilities decrease at different rates for increasing variance values; see Figure D.2.  
 
 
Fig D.2 – The fifteen prior probability distributions that were used in the simulations.   
 
2. To create conditions that are similar to our behavioral experiment we again match the 
individualized probe locations 𝑆𝑝𝑟, audiovisual disparity ∆𝐴𝑉, and (true) unisensory 
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noise parameters 𝜎𝐴, 𝜎𝑉 of thirty-six simulated BVRE observers to those of the thirty-six 
actual participants. These parameters are used to simulate internal unisensory estimates 
by randomly drawing from Gaussian sensory noise distributions centered on the true 
auditory and visual locations:  ?̂?𝐴 ~ 𝑁(𝑆𝐴, 𝜎𝐴
2)  and  ?̂?𝑉 ~ 𝑁(𝑆𝑉, 𝜎𝑉
2).  
3. BVRE observers integrate these unisensory estimates (step 2) weighted according to 
their estimated reliabilities (as opposed to their true reliabilities as in the MLE-model). In 
order to simulate the visual reliability estimates of the BVRE observers we fit a new 
psychometric function to the behavioral responses of the actual participants for the 
unisensory visual condition. However, instead of optimizing the function’s parameters 
by maximizing the likelihood we now maximize the posterior probability: i.e. the 
likelihood as obtained from Eq. 4 multiplied by the prior probability for these 
parameters. Notably, the prior probability over all parameters of the psychometric 
function is entirely determined by the prior probability of the visual variance estimate 
(as given by the prior probability distribution defined in step 1). The maximum posterior 
probability thus is biased towards lower visual variance estimates. These newly fitted 
visual variance estimates are used to determine the weights for audiovisual integration 
according to Eq. 1. N.b. The auditory variance estimates are assumed to be unbiased and 
set to equal the true auditory variance 𝜎𝐴
2 (Battaglia et al., 2003). 
4. For any one trial two integrated audiovisual location estimates: ?̂?𝐴𝑉,𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑛𝑑𝑎𝑟𝑑  and 
?̂?𝐴𝑉,𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑏𝑒 are computed. If the difference between these two estimates, ∆?̂?𝐴𝑉 =




5. For each BVRE observer 40 responses per probe location (N = 13) are simulated for 
each of the two incongruent audiovisual conditions. Subsequently, two psychometric 
functions are fitted to the simulated responses (by maximizing the likelihood according 
to the standard experimental methods; Eq. 4). From these psychometric functions we 








6. The above-described simulation process is repeated for all thirty-six BVRE observers 
such that the simulated empirical weights and noise parameters can be compared with 
the MLE-predicted weights and noise parameters (n.b. MLE-predictions are computed 
using the true unisensory noise parameters 𝜎𝐴, 𝜎𝑉 and equations 1 & 2). Group-level t-
tests determine whether a significant difference exists. One thousand such experiments 
are simulated for each of the 15 visual reliability priors (step 1). Moreover, we 
additionally perform one thousand experiments for unbiased visual reliability estimates 
(i.e. simulating a uniform prior, which is equivalent to simply generating responses 
according to the MLE model).  
Figure D.1b shows the summary results of these simulations. Significant visual 
overweighting is observed in all of the experiments that were modeled with a prior on 
the visual reliability; even when this prior was only moderate in strength. However, the 
prior strength needs to be reasonably strong in order to observe a significant deviation 
from the MLE-predictions in terms of audiovisual variance. This analysis thus confirms 
that the experimental design used in the current study is more sensitive for detecting 
weights differences and it provides a possible explanation for the two seemingly 
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It is widely believed that multisensory integration is consistent with the statistically 
optimal rules of maximum likelihood estimation (MLE): Best-precision bisensory 
estimates are obtained by computing a reliability-weighted average of the two 
unisensory signals. While human bisensory perceptual behavior has been shown to be in 
accordance with MLE-predictions for various combinations of sensory modalities, there 
also exist numerous reports of clear divergence from MLE-optimal multisensory 
integration. The current study aimed to investigate which factors affect statistical (sub-) 
optimality of human perception in a spatial audiovisual localization task. Our approach 
was two-fold: 1) We employed a 2x2 factorial between-subjects experimental design 
wherein we manipulated prior training and reward-based motivation. 2) We used 
Bayesian model comparison to arbitrate between previously-proposed explanations of 
apparent suboptimal multisensory perception. Results replicated previous findings of 
visual overweighting relative to MLE predictions. While prior training improved auditory 
localization performance significantly, we found no evidence that visual overweighting 
was smaller after training. Moreover, we found no effect of reward-based motivational 
factors on audiovisual integration. Model comparison analysis demonstrated that 
Bayesian causal inference with reliance on visual location estimates provided the most 
probable explanation for deviations from maximum likelihood estimation. This suggests 
that human observers who are required to make judgments about multisensory signals 
while facing uncertainty about the common origin of their unisensory components 
default to rely on cross-modally biased - but not fully integrated - estimates in the 




Multisensory integration is the combining of information from multiple sensory organs 
in order to obtain a coherent and robust understanding of the environment (Ernst & 
Bülthoff, 2004). For example, audiovisual speech integration may help us to infer who is 
saying what in a busy bar. If sensory information is merged probabilistically, i.e. taking 
into account the uncertainty associated with each unisensory stream, this will have the 
benefit of reducing one’s perceptual variance. Maximum likelihood estimation (MLE) 
describes a probabilistic information integration strategy in which unisensory estimates 
are weighed by their respective reliabilities when computing a multisensory average 
(Ernst & Banks, 2002). It is statistically optimal in the sense that it leads to the most 
precise multisensory estimates given the sensory noise.  
Many studies of human behavior have reported (near-) optimal multisensory integration 
for a variety of  object features and sensory combinations, including visual-tactile size 
and shape estimates (Ernst & Banks, 2002; Helbig & Ernst, 2007), audiovisual and visual-
proprioceptive location estimates (Alais & Burr, 2004; van Beers, Sittig & Denier van der 
Gon, 1996), audiovisual duration estimates (Hartcher-O’Brien, Di Luca & Ernst, 2014) 
and audiovisual, audiotactile, and visual-tactile numerosity judgments (Bresciani et al., 
2005; Bresciani, Dammeier & Ernst, 2006; Shams, Ma & Beierholm, 2005; Wozny, 
Beierholm & Shams, 2008). However, over the past decade accumulating research has 
also revealed examples of suboptimal multisensory integration where the variance 
reduction for the multisensory percept was lower than predicted by statistically optimal 
models and/or reliability weighting, although present, did not follow MLE predictions 
(Rahnev & Denison, 2018).  
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This sort of suboptimal multisensory integration may occur if assumptions of the MLE 
model are violated. For instance, the standard MLE model does not account for 
dependencies in the sensory noise across the two modalities (Gepshtein & Banks, 2003, 
Oruç, Maloney & Landy, 2003), additional supra-modal sources of noise (Burr, Banks & 
Morrone, 2009; Battaglia, Kersten & Schrater, 2011), differences in the modality-specific 
sensory noise between unisensory and bisensory stimulus presentations (Bejjanki, 
Clayards, Knill & Aslin 2011) or non-normal noise distributions (Burr et al., 2009). 
Likewise, the MLE model does not account for short-term perceptual adaptations 
(Triesch, Ballard & Jacobs, 2002; Wozny & Shams, 2011) or long-term priors (Odegaard, 
Wozny & Shams, 2015). For example, it has been argued that human observers may 
impose a prior on the sensory variances based on their everyday experiences leading to 
overweighting of a sensory signal in multisensory perception (e.g. the visual signal in 
spatial localization, Battaglia, Jacobs and Aslin, 2003; for other modalities see Butler, 
Smith, Campos & Bülthoff, 2010; Fetsch, Turner, DeAngelis & Angelaki, 2009; Maiworm 
& Röder, 2011; Prsa, Gale & Blanke, 2012). Furthermore, it has been suggested that 
participants may not be able to estimate their sensory reliability accurately when the 
task is unfamiliar (Rosas, Wagemans, Ernst & Wichmann, 2005) or complex (Beck, Ma, 
Pitkow, Latham & Pouget, 2012). Finally, the MLE model is limited to the special forced 
fusion case. It ignores the so-called causal inference problem, i.e. whether two signals 
come from a common source and should be integrated, and mandatorily binds signals 
into one unified percept. By contrast, hierarchical Bayesian causal inference 
accommodates the observer’s uncertainty about the world’s causal structure by 
explicitly modelling the potential causal structures (i.e. one or two sources) that may 
have generated the sensory signals. This enables a graceful transition between sensory 
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integration and segregation depending on the probabilities of the world’s causal 
structure (i.e. common vs. independent causes; Körding, Beierholm, Ma et al., 2007; 
Rohe & Noppeney, 2015a). Hence, human integration that has been considered 
putatively suboptimal from the MLE perspective may turn out to be optimal according to 
Bayesian Causal Inference.  
Given this plethora of potential reasons for MLE suboptimal human behaviour, this study 
aimed to identify the conditions that enable observers to integrate information across 
the senses in line with the predictions of the MLE model. For this, we focused on the 
integration of spatial signals from vision and audition where previous research has found 
both MLE-optimality (Alais & Burr, 2004) and MLE-suboptimality (Battaglia et al., 2003; 
Meijer & Noppeney, 2018) in human observers. In particular, we investigated task 
experience and motivation as potential factors that may influence whether human 
observers integrate sensory signals optimally in line with MLE predictions. Furthermore, 
we applied Bayesian model comparison to test the likelihood of various hypotheses for 
human multisensory perception diverging from maximum likelihood estimation.  
 
2. Method 
2.1 Experimental overview 
We investigated whether potential reward (‘motivation’) or prior training (‘task 
experience’) influence whether participants integrate visual and auditory signals for 
spatial localization optimally as predicted by maximum likelihood estimation. To address 
this, we manipulated whether observers were i. trained on the audiovisual localization 
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task for two days and/or ii. provided with a reward depending on their localization 
performance relative to a prior baseline measurement. Participants were grouped 
according to a 2x2 factorial between-subjects design: Group 1: no training, no reward; 
Group 2: no training, reward; Group 3: training, no reward; Group 4: training, reward. 
Fig. 1a provides an overview of the four versions of this experiment. Participants in 
groups 1 and 2 completed two experimental sessions: one introductory and one final 
test session during which the main experiment was performed and all data for analysis 
was obtained. Participants in groups 3 and 4 completed four experimental sessions: one 
introductory, two training and one final test session. All sessions lasted approximately 
2.5 hours and were performed on separate days. 
2.2 Participants 
We set out to recruit forty participants in total: ten participants per group. Six 
participants were excluded during the first session for failure to meet the required 
auditory localization performance criterion (see Section 2.5.1.2). These participants 
were replaced such that forty participants completed the experiment successfully (35 
females, mean age 19, ±1.6 years SD). All participants were university students who 
reported normal hearing, (corrected to) normal vision and no history of neurological or 
psychiatric disorder. All provided informed consent at the start of session 1. Participants 
were compensated by means of course credits. At sign-up participants knew whether 
they would attend a two or four-day study (groups 1-2 or 3-4, respectively), but were 
unaware of the potential to receive an additional performance-dependent monetary 
reward (groups 2 and 4). Participant allocation to groups with a potential reward was 
performed pseudorandomly by the computer program at the beginning of the final test 
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session. The study was approved by the human research review committee of the 
University of Birmingham (approval number ERN_11-0470AP4).  
2.3. Experimental setup and stimuli characteristics 
Visual stimuli were low-contrast greyscale circular blobs (16.7 ms duration) that were 
brightest in the centre (1.2 cd/m2) and gradually decreasing in brightness towards a 
black background (0.24 cd/m2). Their size was defined by the standard deviation of a 
bivariate Gaussian amplitude envelope, 𝜎𝑏𝑙𝑜𝑏, which was adjusted for each individual 
observer to match the visual reliability to the auditory reliability (see Section 2.5.1.3). 
The blobs were back-projected (60Hz DLP projector, BenQ MW529) on a grey screen 
(opaque fine PVC fabric, 127.5 cm width x 170 cm height) that was placed at a distance 
of 78 cm from the participants. 
Auditory stimuli were bursts of white noise (60 dB SPL, 16.7 ms including 5 ms on/off 
ramps) convolved with standardised head-related transfer functions (modulating phase 
and amplitude between left and right ear channels) to create the illusion of a spatial 
offset along the azimuth (Gardner & Martin, 1995; 
http://sound.media.mit.edu/resources/KEMAR.html). The sounds were presented by 
means of headphones (Sennheiser HD 280 Pro) with a playback frequency of 192 kHz. 
Audiovisual asynchronies were no larger than 3 ms. Stimulus presentation was 
controlled using Psychtoolbox 3.0.12 (Brainard, 1997; Kleiner, Brainard & Pelli, 2007; 
www.psychtoolbox.org) running on MATLAB R2016a (www.mathworks.com).  
Participants sat in a dark room with a chinrest to provide support and stability. 
Participants were instructed to focus their gaze on a grey fixation cross (1.2 cd/m2) prior 
to stimuli presentation and to remain central gaze focus during stimuli presentation. To 
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monitor their fixation we used a Tobii EyeX eye tracker (https://tobiigaming.com) that 
was calibrated before the start of each block of trials using the Matlab Toolbox EyeX 
(https://sourceforge.net/projects/matlabtoolboxeyex; Gibaldi, Vanegas, Bex & Maiello, 
2016). Corrective feedback regarding participants’ fixation was given after each block of 
trials.  
 
Fig 1 – a. Overview of the four versions of the experiment. Participants either attended 
two or four sessions (separate days), depending on whether they underwent two 
training sessions (groups 3 and 4). Participants that were allocated to groups 2 and 4 
had the chance to win a performance-based reward. The potential for such a reward 
was explained on-screen at the beginning of the final test session. See Section 2.5 for 
details on the experimental procedure. Fig 1 b. Timeline of one 𝑨𝑽-incongruent trial. 
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Participants were asked whether the second stimulus was to the left or right of the 
first stimulus (both 𝑨, 𝑽 or 𝑨𝑽). Audiovisual probe signals could contain a small spatial 
audiovisual conflict). Trial structure was identical for all experimental groups. See 
Section 2.4 for details on the two interval forced choice paradigm. 
 
2.4. Two interval forced choice task  
Similar to previous studies testing the validity of the MLE model for multisensory 
integration (e.g. Alais & Burr, 2004) we employed a two interval forced-choice (2IFC) 
paradigm wherein we presented a standard stimulus at 𝑆𝑠𝑡 = 0° and a probe stimulus at 
various locations along the azimuth (probe locations 𝑆𝑝𝑟 are individualized based on 
participants’ auditory performances, see Section 2.5.1.2). However, contrary to previous 
studies we always presented the standard first and the probe second so that 
participants could use the standard to update their reference point on a trial-to-trial 
basis (Dyjas, Bausenhart & Ulrich, 2012) and thus avoid sequential order effects (e.g. 
Wozny & Shams, 2011). The interstimulus interval was 500 ms. Two rectangles appeared 
on screen 500 ms after probe offset to prompt participants to report, by means of a 
button-press using either one of their index fingers, whether the probe was on the left 
or on the right of the standard. Participants were instructed to focus on accuracy and 
not on speed. Maximum response time was 1 second. The time between response and 




On each trial, probe and standard always had the same sensory modality: both auditory 
(𝐴), visual (𝑉), or audiovisual (𝐴𝑉). Participants were aware of the upcoming sensory 
modalities because they were presented in blocks and modalities were announced 
beforehand. Block order (𝐴, 𝑉 or 𝐴𝑉) in the final test session was pseudo-randomized. 
Importantly, while AV standard stimuli were always spatially congruent (audiovisual 
disparity ∆𝐴𝑉 = 0°), audiovisual probes could be spatially congruent (𝑆𝑝𝑟,𝐴 = 𝑆𝑝𝑟,𝑉 =
𝑆𝑝𝑟) or spatially incongruent (𝑆𝑝𝑟,𝐴 = 𝑆𝑝𝑟 −
1
2




∆𝐴𝑉 =  ±𝑋° set individually per participant, see Section 2.5.1.2). N.b. AV incongruent 
stimuli were only presented in the final test session.  
2.5. Experimental procedure 
In the following we will briefly describe the introductory, training (groups 3 and 4) and 
test sessions: 
2.5.1 Introductory session: The first session consisted of five experimental parts for all 
four groups: 
2.5.1.1. In order to familiarize themselves with the stimuli participants completed a 
short series of 𝑉, 𝐴, and 𝐴𝑉∆=0° trials (2 trials x 12 locations for each modality: 𝑆𝑝𝑟 was 
pseudo-randomly drawn from {±15°, ±13°, ±10°, ±7°, ±4°, ±1°}). The visual blob size 
was jittered between relatively small/easy settings: 𝜎𝑏𝑙𝑜𝑏 ~ {4°, 6°, 8°}. Immediate 
feedback was given after each response, i.e. a green (correct) or red (incorrect) circle 
was presented on screen for 200 ms. To ensure that participants understood the task 
these familiarization series were repeated if participants made errors in trials where 
𝑆𝑝𝑟 = ±15°. Participants were told to consider the 𝐴𝑉 stimulus as a ball bouncing on 
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the back of the screen. Presumably, thinking of the 𝐴𝑉 stimulus as one audiovisual event 
increases an observer’s likelihood to integrate the auditory and visual signals (Alais & 
Burr, 2004). 
2.5.1.2. The first real task for participants was to complete a series of 𝐴 trials (20 trials x 
13 locations: 𝑆𝑝𝑟~ {±10°, ±7°, ±5°, ±3°, ±2°, ±1°, 0°}). Participants were excluded (and 
replaced, see Section 2.2) from further participating in the study if they made more than 
four mistakes on those forty trials where 𝑆𝑝𝑟,𝐴 = ±10°. A psychometric function was fit 
to the proportion of “right” responses (see Section 2.6) to obtain the perceived 
reliability of the auditory stimuli for each participant (n.b. reliability is here expressed in 
terms of the just noticeable difference: 𝐽𝑁𝐷𝐴). This auditory reliability measurement 
served four important functions: 
i. From here onwards, all probe locations (for 𝐴, 𝑉 and 𝐴𝑉 trials) were set relative to the 
auditory JND as 𝑆𝑝𝑟 =  𝐽𝑁𝐷𝐴 ∗ {±3, ±2.5, ±2, ±1.5, ±1, ±0.5,0}, rounded to 0.5° under 
the constraint of having thirteen unique probe locations for each participant. Using 
individualized probe locations relative to performance ensures that parameters of the 
psychometric functions can be adequately fitted because samples are obtained on all 
essential parts of the curve (Wichmann & Hill, 2001a).  
ii. The blob size (𝜎𝑏𝑙𝑜𝑏, see Section 2.3) was individually titrated such that the visual JND 
matched the auditory JND for each participant (see Section 2.5.1.3). Equating the 
unisensory reliabilities leads to the greatest audiovisual variance reduction according to 
MLE predictions, thus maximizing the sensitivity of this study to observe this 
characteristic signature of optimal multisensory integration.  
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iii. The audiovisual disparity for spatially incongruent stimuli was set to equal the 
auditory JND: ∆𝐴𝑉 = ±𝐽𝑁𝐷𝐴 (rounded to the nearest half degree visual angle). The 
choice for a correct conflict size of the bisensory signals is a delicate one. On the one 
hand we would like to use large conflict sizes because this would maximize experimental 
sensitivity for measuring the sensory weights that are used for multisensory integration. 
On the other hand, by decreasing the audiovisual disparity we lower the risk that 
participants experience the two sensory signals as coming from different source 
locations and we thus increase the probability of the signals being integrated (Körding, 
Beierholm, Ma et al., 2007; Rohe & Noppeney, 2015a). By setting the disparity size equal 
to the unisensory reliability levels (assuming 𝐽𝑁𝐷𝑉 ≈ 𝐽𝑁𝐷𝐴) we balance these two 
objectives (Meijer & Noppeney, 2018; Rohde, van Dam & Ernst, 2016). 
iv. The auditory performance measurement of this first session was used as a baseline 
reference for comparison with the auditory performance in the final test session for 
participants in group 2. In order to obtain a monetary reward these participants had to 
improve their performance (i.e. decrease 𝐽𝑁𝐷𝐴) in the final test session relative to this 
baseline (and similarly improve 𝑉 and 𝐴𝑉∆=0° performance; see Section 2.5.3). 
2.5.1.3. Next, participants completed a series of 𝑉 trials in which we adaptively 
controlled the Gaussian blobs’ size by adjusting 𝜎𝑏𝑙𝑜𝑏. This task aimed to match the 
visual reliability to the auditory reliability for each participant. First we obtained the 
hypothetical probe locations (±𝑋°) that would have led to auditory accuracy levels of 
68%, 79% and 87% (using the fitted auditory psychometric function; see Section 2.5.1.2 
above). Then we used these three location pairs as visual probe locations at which we 
aimed to match the accuracy levels by increasing 𝜎𝑏𝑙𝑜𝑏 if accuracy was too high and 
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decreasing 𝜎𝑏𝑙𝑜𝑏 if accuracy was too low. For each location pair we made use of two 
adaptive weighted up/down staircases (Kingdom and Prins, 2016), one starting at an 
artificially high 𝜎𝑏𝑙𝑜𝑏 and one starting at a very low value for 𝜎𝑏𝑙𝑜𝑏. All six staircases were 
presented interleaved. Each staircase was terminated after thirty reversals. The 
participant-specific 𝜎𝑏𝑙𝑜𝑏 was computed as the average across all six staircases, where 
each staircase was averaged over the last twenty reversals. 
2.5.1.4. To confirm that the unisensory reliabilities were successfully matched 
participants completed a series of 𝑉 trials with the individualized blob sizes from the 
staircase procedure above (20 trials x 13 locations; using participant-specific probe 
locations, see Section 2.5.1.2). A psychometric function was then fitted to the responses 
in order to obtain an estimate of the visual reliability (Section 2.6). If the difference 
between the two unisensory reliabilities was too large, i.e. if 𝐽𝑁𝐷𝑉
2 < 0.5 ∗ 𝐽𝑁𝐷𝐴
2 or 
𝐽𝑁𝐷𝑉
2 > 2 ∗ 𝐽𝑁𝐷𝐴
2, then we adjusted 𝜎𝑏𝑙𝑜𝑏 slightly (±3° in desired direction) and asked 
the participant to complete another series of 𝑉 trials with this new setting. After such an 
adjustment we were able to confirm for all participants that the unisensory reliabilities 
were sufficiently matched (i.e. 𝐽𝑁𝐷𝑉 was between limits mentioned above). The final 
participant-specific 𝜎𝑏𝑙𝑜𝑏 was used in subsequent experimental parts. Moreover, the 
𝐽𝑁𝐷𝑉 served as a baseline reference for participants in group 2 to determine whether a 
reward was earned (see Section 2.5.3). 
2.5.1.5. The final task in the first session was a series with 𝐴𝑉∆=0° trials (20 trials x 13 
locations). Although the purpose of this task, to provide a baseline reference for the 
performance-based reward (see Section 2.5.3), was only relevant for participants in 
group 2, we required all participants to complete this task for consistency reasons across 
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groups. A psychometric function was fit to the responses (Section 2.6) to obtain 
𝐽𝑁𝐷𝐴𝑉,∆=0°.  
2.5.2. Training sessions: Participants in groups 3 and 4 attended two training sessions 
that participants in groups 1 and 2 skipped.  
During the first of two training sessions participants completed an equal number of 𝐴, 𝑉, 
and 𝐴𝑉∆=0° trials (60 trials x 12 individualized probe locations x 3 conditions), divided 
into 6 blocks per condition that were presented in pseudorandom order. Critically, after 
every response participants were given immediate corrective feedback, similar to the 
familiarization task of the introductory session (Section 2.5.1.1). In order to encourage 
participants’ training progress, they were also shown whether their overall percentage 
of correct responses at the end of each block was better or worse (on a 6-point color-
coded scale) than their score for the latest previous block of the same condition (𝐴, 𝑉 or 
𝐴𝑉∆=0°). To avoid participants comparing their performance across conditions absolute 
scores were not provided.  
The second of the two training sessions started with a short repetition of the training (20 
trials x 12 individualized probe locations x 3 conditions); in two blocks per condition (𝐴, 
𝑉, and 𝐴𝑉∆=0°). Thereafter, participants repeated the calibration and baseline 
measurements of session 1 because the performance for each of the conditions may 
have changed as a result of the training. 𝐽𝑁𝐷𝐴 was acquired to reset 𝑆𝑝𝑟 and ∆𝐴𝑉 
(Section 2.5.1.2), 𝜎𝑏𝑙𝑜𝑏 was recalibrated for the new 𝐽𝑁𝐷𝐴 (Section 2.5.1.3), 𝐽𝑁𝐷𝑉 was 
obtained to confirm that the new reliabilities were sufficiently matched (Section 2.5.1.4) 
and 𝐽𝑁𝐷𝐴𝑉,∆=0° baseline reference was renewed (Section 2.5.1.5). These new 𝑆𝑝𝑟, ∆𝐴𝑉 
and 𝜎𝑏𝑙𝑜𝑏 were used in the final test session.  
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2.5.3. Final test session: The main experiment for all four groups was performed entirely 
in the final session (second session for groups 1 and 2; fourth session for groups 3 and 
4). Only the data that was acquired in this final session was used for the analyses on MLE 
parameter comparison (Section 2.8) and Bayesian model comparison (Section 2.9).  
Main experiment: Participants completed 520 trials (40 trials x 13 individualized probe 
locations) for each of the five conditions (𝐴, 𝑉, 𝐴𝑉∆=0°, 𝐴𝑉∆=+𝑋°, 𝐴𝑉∆=−𝑋°), divided into 
10 blocks per modality (𝐴, 𝑉 or 𝐴𝑉) that were presented in pseudorandom order. The 
𝐴𝑉 blocks were three times longer than the unisensory blocks because spatially 
congruent and incongruent trials were presented intermixed. 
Performance dependent reward: Before starting the main experiment participants in 
groups 2 and 4 were informed that they were eligible to win a monetary reward (£10) if 
their overall percentage correct (across all locations) for the 𝐴, 𝑉 and 𝐴𝑉∆=0° signal 
responses was greater in the final session than in their baseline (i.e. the introductory 
session for group 2, the second training session for group 4), consistently across all three 
conditions. Importantly, participants were not aware of any potential reward during the 
introductory/training sessions.  
2.6 Fitting psychometric functions 
Participants proportions of ‘perceived right’ across the thirteen probe locations for one 
stimulus condition (e.g. 𝐴, 𝑉 or 𝐴𝑉∆=0°, see Sections 2.5.1.2, 2.5.1.4, and 2.5.1.5) were 
summarized by means of fitting a cumulative Gaussian function:  
(1)  𝜓(𝑆𝑝𝑟) =  𝜆 + (
1
2






where 𝑃𝑆𝐸 is the point of subjective equality (i.e. the mean of the Gaussian; 𝜓(𝑃𝑆𝐸) =
0.5) and 𝜆 is the lapse rate (i.e. the probability that a participant makes a mistake 
independent of probe location 𝑆𝑝𝑟, for example due to blinking, inattention, erroneous 
button press, etc.). The just noticeable difference, 𝐽𝑁𝐷, represents the standard 
deviation of the noise across stimuli differences (i.e. probe relative to standard). Please 
note that, since the sensory noise of both stimuli contribute equally to the JND in 2IFC 
tasks, the JND equals 𝜎√2; where 𝜎 is the standard deviation of the Gaussian-
distributed sensory noise for the particular sensory signal (Kingdom & Prins, 2016). N.b. 
In Sections 2.8-9 and in the Results Section 3 we refer to 𝐽𝑁𝐷/√2 as 𝜎𝑒𝑚𝑝 (where 𝑒𝑚𝑝 
stands for empirical).  
In addition to the three parameters that define the psychometric function (𝐽𝑁𝐷, 𝑃𝑆𝐸, 
𝜆), we also fitted a fourth parameter, η, that represents a normalized value (between 0 
and 1) for the amount of additional noise in the system, e.g. accounting for participants 
getting tired or otherwise changing their task performance over the course of the 2.5 
hour session. In other words, we made use of the betabinomial model for fitting of 
psychometric functions (Schütt, Harmeling, Macke & Wichmann, 2016). The four 
parameter values were optimized (i.e. ‘fit’) by maximizing the likelihood (𝐿) of observing 
participants’ responses given the model: 
(2) 𝐿𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 = ∏
𝐵( 𝑘𝑖+ 𝜂
′?̅?𝑖 ,   𝑛𝑖−𝑘𝑖+𝜂
′(1−?̅?𝑖) )
𝐵( 𝜂′?̅?𝑖 ,   𝜂
′(1−?̅?𝑖) )
𝑁





where ?̅?𝑖 = 𝜓(𝑆𝑝𝑟,𝑖| 𝐽𝑁𝐷, 𝑃𝑆𝐸, 𝜆) is the expected probability of observing a ‘right’ 
response given probe location 𝑆𝑝𝑟,𝑖 and parameter values for 𝐽𝑁𝐷, 𝑃𝑆𝐸 and 𝜆 (see Eq. 
1); 𝑘𝑖  is the empirical number of ‘right’ responses out of 𝑛𝑖  trials, and 𝑁 is the total 
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number of probe locations. Capital letter B represents the beta function. To find the 
maximum likelihood estimate (for values of 𝐽𝑁𝐷, 𝑃𝑆𝐸, 𝜆 and η) we made use of the 
Nelder-Mead optimization algorithm as implemented in Palamedes toolbox 1.8.2 
(www.palamedestoolbox.org). 
2.7 Analysis Overview 
In a previous study, with an experimental design that was very similar to the current 
methods, we found that behavioral responses of many participants deviated from MLE-
predicted audiovisual spatial integration (Meijer & Noppeney, 2018). In this study our 
aims were two-fold: 1) To investigate whether we can influence participants’ behavior 
with training or reward to behave more like statistically optimal ‘ideal observers’ that 
integrate multisensory signals according to MLE principles. 2) To assess which of a 
subset of previously proposed explanations for deviation from MLE predictions provides 
the best fit to participants’ empirical behavior. To answer these two research questions 
we made use of two different analysis methods: 1) Parameter comparison according to 
classical statistical procedures in line with prior literature on audiovisual integration 
whereby we compared differences between empirical and MLE-predicted parameters 
(JNDs and sensory weights) across the four experimental groups in a 2x2 between-
subjects factorial design, specifically looking at the main effects of training and reward 
(Section 2.8). 2) We applied Bayesian model comparison techniques to assess which of 
six alternative models best fitted the behavioral response data. The first of these models 
assumes that participants performed multisensory integration according to MLE, 
whereas the five other models introduce variations to the MLE computational rules that 
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may or may not be statistically optimal given certain circumstances (e.g. when 
assumptions of the MLE model are violated; Section 2.9).   
2.8 Empirical vs. MLE-predicted parameter comparison 
In order to obtain empirical parameter estimates we jointly fitted five psychometric 
functions to participants’ responses for the five conditions of the main experiment (𝐴, 𝑉, 
𝐴𝑉∆=0°, 𝐴𝑉∆=+𝑋° and 𝐴𝑉∆=−𝑋°; Section 2.5.3). To avoid biases of the 𝜎𝑒𝑚𝑝 estimates by 
different lapse rate estimates across conditions (see Wichmann & Hill, 2001a) we 
constrained the five lapse rates (λ, Section 2.6) to be equal. In other words, we assumed 
that the proportion of location-independent mistakes is comparable across conditions. 
Sharing one lapse rate across five conditions has the additional advantage that the 
estimate is more reliable because it is based on a greater number of trials (Kingdom and 
Prins, 2016). Similarly, we only fitted one betabinomial noise factor η. Furthermore, 
𝜎𝑒𝑚𝑝s of both 𝐴𝑉-incongruent conditions were constrained to be equal, because we 
expected no differences between them (n.b. in earlier studies a mean multisensory 𝜎𝑒𝑚𝑝 
was commonly computed, e.g. Alais & Burr, 2004). However, the 𝐴𝑉-congruent 𝜎𝑒𝑚𝑝 
was allowed to differ from the 𝐴𝑉-incongruent 𝜎𝑒𝑚𝑝 in order to investigate whether the 
audiovisual disparity (albeit small) affects multisensory integration. Given those 
constraints we jointly optimized parameter values for five PSEs (one for each condition), 
four 𝜎𝑒𝑚𝑝s (𝐴, 𝑉, 𝐴𝑉∆=0°, 𝐴𝑉∆=±𝑋°), one lapse rate (λ) and one betabinomial noise factor 
(η) by maximizing the overall likelihood across all five conditions (i.e. the product of the 
condition-specific likelihoods: 𝐿𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑙𝑙 = ∏ 𝐿𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛,𝑐
5
𝑐=1  ; see Eq. 2) making use of the 
Nelder-Mead optimization algorithm (as above). 
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The empirical auditory weight was computed from the difference between the two 𝐴𝑉-
incongruent PSEs relative to the individualized audiovisual disparity according to (Fetsch, 








Using empirically determined 𝜎𝐴 and 𝜎𝑉 we computed MLE-predictions for 𝜎𝐴𝑉 and 𝑤𝐴 
(i.e. parameter values that are to be expected if participants integrated the audiovisual 
signals according to maximum likelihood estimation; Ernst & Banks, 2002): 
(4) 𝜎𝐴𝑉,𝑚𝑙𝑒 = √
𝜎𝑉2∗𝜎𝐴2
𝜎𝑉2+𝜎𝐴2





Critically, the MLE model assumes that audiovisual signals are fused into a single unified 
percept independent of whether the audiovisual disparity is present. In other words, it 
ignores the so-called ‘causal inference problem’ for the 𝐴𝑉 conflict trials (Shams & 
Beierholm, 2010) and assumes that 𝜎𝐴𝑉 is identical for spatially congruent and 
incongruent stimuli (i.e. the forced fusion assumption).  
We compared the empirical auditory weight (𝑤𝐴,𝑒𝑚𝑝) and audiovisual sensory noise 
parameters (𝜎𝑒𝑚𝑝) to the respective MLE-predicted parameters for each participant. To 
visualize the effect size of such differences at the individual level we parametrically 
bootstrapped 95% confidence intervals for each parameter estimate using the following 
procedure (Wichmann & Hill, 2001b; Kingdom & Prins, 2016; Meijer & Noppeney, 2018): 
Using each observer’s empirically determined parameter values and assuming the 
betabinomial generative model (Schütt, Harmeling, Macke & Wichmann, 2016) we 
simulated 5000 datasets, i.e. proportions of ‘right’ responses across the individualized 
126 
 
probe locations, for all five conditions. We then jointly fitted five psychometric functions 
(as above) to each simulated dataset and computed the empirical auditory weights and 
MLE-predictions according to equations 3-4. The 95% confidence interval for each 
parameter was defined as the interval between the 2.5 and 97.5 percentiles across all 
5000 bootstrapped parameter estimates.  
The main interest of this parameter-based analysis was to investigate whether training 
and motivation (i.e. reward) affected the differences between empirical and MLE-
predicted parameter values. To test for such main effects we performed group-level 2x2 
ANOVAs on these differences for 𝜎𝐴𝑉 and 𝑤𝐴, categorizing the parameter values 
according to the four experimental groups. Additionally, in order to quantify evidence 
against the main effects of training and/or reward (i.e. in favour of the null-hypotheses 
stating there are no such effects) we also computed Bayes factors between the full 
model (that included all factors) and reduced null models (where one factor was not 
taken into account) (Rouder, Morey, Speckman & Province, 2012; as implemented in 
BayesFactor Package 0.9.12-2, using Cauchy priors for standardized effect sizes and 
default settings; http://bayesfactorpcl.r-forge.r-project.org/; computations in R 3.4.1). 
𝐵𝐹01 > 1 denotes the Bayes Factor in favor of the null model (i.e. no effect), while 
𝐵𝐹10 > 1 denotes its inverse where model evidence suggests an effect of the particular 
factor.  
2.9 Bayesian model comparison  
Using Bayesian model comparison we contrasted the MLE model with five competitor 
models that embody different multisensory decisional or perceptual strategies. All six 
models jointly predict the behavioral response pattern for the five empirical conditions 
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in terms of the proportions of ‘perceived right’ (?̅?𝑖) per probe location (𝑆𝑝𝑟,𝑖), enabling us 
to compute the overall likelihood similar to the above-described psychometric function-
based approach (Eq. 2). The main difference with the method above is that these six 
models constrict predictions for 𝐴𝑉 responses almost entirely based on unisensory 
parameter values (𝑃𝑆𝐸𝐴, 𝑃𝑆𝐸𝑉, 𝜎𝐴 and 𝜎𝑉) and model-specific computational rules that 
prescribe how two unisensory signals are combined to reach ‘left’/’right’ decisions on 
𝐴𝑉 trials. Specifically, four of the audiovisual parameters that were fitted in Section 2.8 
(𝑃𝑆𝐸𝐴𝑉,∆=+𝑋°, 𝑃𝑆𝐸𝐴𝑉,∆=±𝑋°, 𝜎𝐴𝑉,∆=0° and 𝜎𝐴𝑉,∆=±𝑋°) were not included as free 
parameters in any of these six models. Nevertheless, all models contain one free 
parameter for the audiovisual bias: i.e. 𝑃𝑆𝐸𝐴𝑉𝑐 (where the ‘c’ stands for congruent, i.e. 
∆𝐴𝑉 = 0°, but we note that this audiovisual left/right bias is also applied in the 𝐴𝑉-
incongruent conditions). Furthermore, all models contain one lapse rate (λ) and one 
betabinomial noise factor (η) as free parameters that are shared across the five 
conditions. Finally, four models include an additional eighth parameter that is specific to 
those models (see Table 1 for an overview). 
For all models, the unisensory (𝐴, 𝑉) expected proportions of ‘right’ responses (?̅?𝑖 for 
𝑆𝑝𝑟,𝑖, Eq. 2) were computed directly using the formula for cumulative Gaussians (Eq. 1). 
However, since no such analytical solution for response probabilities ?̅? is known for the 
Bayesian causal inference model (Section 2.9.5; but see Körding, Beierholm, Ma et al., 
2007) they were approximated for 𝐴𝑉 conditions by means of simulating 1000 trials 




We now first describe the computational details for each of the six models, before we 
elaborate on the methods that were used to compare the models’ predictive 
performances (Section 2.9.10).  
2.9.1. Maximum likelihood estimation (MLE) 
For any audiovisual trial, noise-disturbed auditory and visual sensory signals, 𝑥𝐴 and 𝑥𝑉, 
were independently sampled from normal distributions centered on the true 
(individualized) stimulus location, separately for standard and probe (with 𝑆𝑝𝑟,𝐴 and 






For both standard and probe, these unisensory signals were then integrated according 
to MLE-prescribed reliability-weighted summation (with 𝑤𝐴 computed via Eq. 4; 
𝑤𝑉 = 1 − 𝑤𝐴):  
(6) ?̂?𝑠𝑡,𝐴𝑉 = 𝑤𝐴𝑥𝑠𝑡,𝐴 + 𝑤𝑉𝑥𝑠𝑡,𝑉    and    ?̂?𝑝𝑟,𝐴𝑉 = 𝑤𝐴𝑥𝑝𝑟,𝐴 + 𝑤𝑉𝑥𝑝𝑟,𝑉 
In order to account for left/right biases we subtracted 𝑃𝑆𝐸𝐴𝑉𝑐 from the difference of the 
two spatial estimates: ∆?̂?𝐴𝑉 = ?̂?𝑝𝑟,𝐴𝑉 − ?̂?𝑠𝑡,𝐴𝑉 − 𝑃𝑆𝐸𝐴𝑉𝑐. A ‘right’ response was assigned 
when the estimated difference ∆?̂?𝐴𝑉 was greater than zero.  
This procedure was repeated for each of 1000 simulations, after which the probability of 
a ‘right’ response could be computed. Finally, the expected proportion of ‘right’ 
responses was obtained by adjusting for the lapse rate (λ):  
(7) ?̅? = 𝜆 + (1 − 2𝜆)𝑝(′𝑟𝑖𝑔ℎ𝑡′) 
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For each 𝐴𝑉 condition, ?̅? was separately computed for all thirteen individualized probe 
locations. 
2.9.2. Visual reliability increase 
One of the key assumptions that we and other researchers have made when validating 
MLE as a mechanism for multisensory integration via psychometric function fitting (e.g. 
Section 2.8) is that the sensory reliabilities do not change when the signals are 
presented as bisensory stimuli. However, this assumption might be violated. For 
example, low-level auditory-to-visual cross-modal modulation may boost the visual 
signals’ salience prior to spatial integration leading to an increased reliability of the 
visual signals (Meijer & Noppeney, 2018; see also Bejjanki et al., 2011 for an alternative 
reliability change of the visual signal in audiovisual speech integration).  
In the ‘𝑉 reliability increase’ model we introduced a cross-modal modulation factor, 
𝑐𝐴→𝑉, that decreases visual sensory noise under 𝐴𝑉 conditions: 𝜎𝑉,𝐴𝑉 = 𝑐𝐴→𝑉 𝜎𝑉 (where 
𝑐𝐴→𝑉 ∈ [0,1]). We assumed that observers are aware of such a change in reliability and 
use 𝜎𝑉,𝐴𝑉 to compute the sensory weights (Eq. 4) for reliability-weighted integration (Eq. 
6). All other model computations are similar to the MLE model (Section 2.9.1). 
The effect of an increased visual reliability under 𝐴𝑉 conditions, which observers have 
correctly taken into account but researchers were unaware of, is that the empirical 
auditory weight is smaller than the MLE-predicted auditory weight (i.e. apparent visual 
overweighting). However, contrary to other variations of the MLE-model that are 
discussed below, the empirical multisensory variance in such cases should be lower than 
predicted by MLE: 𝜎𝐴𝑉,𝑒𝑚𝑝 < 𝜎𝐴𝑉,𝑚𝑙𝑒. 
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2.9.3. Correlated noise 
While the parameter-based method that we described in Section 2.8 takes into account 
some additional sources of measurement noise (e.g. by including lapse rate λ and 
betabinomial noise factor η) the empirically determined JND is assumed to solely 
depend on the amount of sensory noise (𝐽𝑁𝐷 = 𝜎√2). However, it is possible for 
additional supra-modal sources of noise (e.g. an unstable amodal spatial reference 
frame) to increase the variance of the spatial estimates and so contribute to the JND 
(Burr et al., 2009; Mueller & Weidemann, 2008). Likewise, the final spatial estimates, ?̂?𝑠𝑡 
and ?̂?𝑝𝑟 could be based on a sample of the posterior rather than the full distribution 
(Battaglia et al., 2011). Such post-integration perturbations can be viewed as a special 
case of correlated noise and violates the MLE assumption for independent noise in each 
modality. A statistically optimal observer would estimate the amount of correlated noise 
and take it into account when computing reliability-based sensory weights (Oruç, 





𝜎𝑉2+𝜎𝐴2−2 𝜌 𝜎𝐴 𝜎𝑉
       and      𝑤𝑉
′ = 1 − 𝑤𝐴
′  
In the ‘correlated noise’ model we jointly sampled 𝑥𝐴 and 𝑥𝑉 from a bivariate Gaussian 
distribution with covariance 𝜌𝜎𝐴𝜎𝑉; separately for standard and probe (n.b. correlation 
𝜌 is a free parameter). We assumed that observers were able to accurately estimate 𝜌 
and performed reliability-weighted integration utilizing the corrected weights, 𝑤𝐴
′  and 
𝑤𝑉
′ , to obtain ?̂?𝑠𝑡,𝐴𝑉 and ?̂?𝑝𝑟,𝐴𝑉 (Eq. 6). Further computations to obtain the expected 
proportions of ‘right’ responses ?̅? were identical to the MLE model.  
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If an observer optimally applied the corrected weighting scheme for multisensory signals 
with correlated noise, but a researcher ignorantly compared empirical with MLE-
predicted parameter values, then (s)he would find that the more reliable modality is 
overweighed: i.e. 𝑤𝐴
′ <  𝑤𝐴,𝑚𝑙𝑒 if 𝜎𝑉 < 𝜎𝐴, and vice versa. Moreover, (s)he would find 
that: 𝜎𝐴𝑉,𝑒𝑚𝑝 > 𝜎𝐴𝑉,𝑚𝑙𝑒 (Oruç, Maloney & Landy, 2003).  
2.9.4. Visual reliability prior 
If observers are unable to accurately estimate the reliability of each sensory stimulus, 
then their behavior is likely to deviate from MLE predictions. As an explanation for visual 
overweighting (relative to MLE) Battaglia et al. (2003) proposed that observers made use 
of a prior probability distribution to estimate the visual reliability. This prior favors 
smaller estimates of 𝜎𝑉 because the visual modality is normally highly reliable for spatial 
localization. The biasing effect of such a prior would be greater for visual stimuli whose 
reliability is difficult to estimate; for example because of unfamiliarity or complex 
designs (Beck et al., 2012).  
We here adopted the suggestion for such Bayesian estimation of the visual sensory 
reliability by allowing the estimate to be smaller than the true reliability: ?̂?𝑉 ≤ 𝜎𝑉. 
Implementation was performed by addition of free parameter 𝜋?̂?𝑉, constrained to the 
interval [0,1]; where ?̂?𝑉 = 𝜋?̂?𝑉 𝜎𝑉. Trial simulations used the true 𝜎𝑉 to randomly 
sample sensory noise (Eq. 5), but the biased estimate ?̂?𝑉 was used to compute the 
sensory weights (Eq. 4) for audiovisual integration (Eq. 6). Other computations were 
similar to the MLE model.  
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Contrary to the correlated noise model, the ‘𝑉 reliability prior’ model can only inflict 
visual overweighting (relative to MLE; i.e. not auditory overweighting). As for any 
deviation from MLE-weights (Eq. 4), the bisensory variance reduction is statistically 
suboptimal: 𝜎𝐴𝑉,𝑒𝑚𝑝 > 𝜎𝐴𝑉,𝑚𝑙𝑒. 
2.9.5. Bayesian causal inference (BCI) 
On many, if not most, occasions in daily life two sensory signals should not be 
integrated, even when they are received simultaneously. Yet, the MLE model assumes 
that all multisensory signals are integrated (i.e. forced fusion). Bayesian causal inference 
(BCI; Körding, Beierholm, Ma et al., 2007; Rohe & Noppeney, 2015a) allows observers to 
assess whether to integrate or segregate multiple sensory signals on each occurrence by 
computing the probability that the sensory signals originate from a common source:   




𝑃𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑚𝑜𝑛 represents a participant’s prior belief that two sensory signals are caused by 
the same event. In this study we have attempted to create conditions where 𝑃𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑚𝑜𝑛 ≈
1, but the BCI model allows this parameter to be fit freely for each participant. The 
terms 𝑃(𝑥𝐴, 𝑥𝑉|𝐶 = 1) and 𝑃(𝑥𝐴, 𝑥𝑉|𝐶 = 2) are the likelihoods for observing 𝑥𝐴, 𝑥𝑉 
given either one or two sources; they depend on the sensory noise parameters, 𝜎𝐴 and 
𝜎𝑉, as well as on a spatial prior distribution, 𝑃(𝑆) = 𝑁(𝜇𝑝, 𝜎𝑝
2). We set 𝜇𝑝 = 0° and 
𝜎𝑝 = 100° in our simulations; thus essentially assuming an uninformative spatial prior. 
For computational details of the BCI model we refer the interested reader to Körding, 
Beierholm, Ma et al. (2007).  
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On each 𝐴𝑉 trial simulation we sampled 𝑥𝐴 and 𝑥𝑉 as before (Eq. 5) and computed 
spatial estimates for both causal hypotheses (i.e. one or two sources): ?̂?𝐴𝑉,𝐶=1 is the 
integrated spatial estimate using MLE-optimal weights (Eqs. 4 & 6), while ?̂?𝐴,𝐶=2 = 𝑥𝐴 
and ?̂?𝑉,𝐶=2 = 𝑥𝑉 are the segregated spatial estimates (n.b. negligible effects of the near-
uniform spatial prior were not ignored in the actual computations but are not 
mentioned here for sake of brevity). Simulated BCI observers then utilized the so-called 
‘model-averaging’ decision function (Rohe & Noppeney, 2015a) to obtain statistically 
optimal spatial estimates (i.e. most accurate across many occurrences) by computing the 
probability-weighted mean of the integrated and segregated estimates: 
(10)    ?̂?𝑉,𝐵𝐶𝐼 = 𝑃(𝐶 = 1|𝑥𝐴, 𝑥𝑉)?̂?𝐴𝑉,𝐶=1 + (1 − 𝑃(𝐶 = 1|𝑥𝐴, 𝑥𝑉))?̂?𝑉,𝐶=2 
and likewise for auditory estimates ?̂?𝐴,𝐵𝐶𝐼 (Körding, Beierholm, Ma et al., 2007). 
Critically, BCI observers thus ended up with two distinct location estimates for one 
audiovisual stimulus: ?̂?𝑉,𝐵𝐶𝐼 and ?̂?𝐴,𝐵𝐶𝐼. Similarly, there were two modality-specific 
estimates for the difference between probe and standard: ∆?̂?𝑉,𝐵𝐶𝐼 = ?̂?𝑝𝑟,𝑉,𝐵𝐶𝐼 −
?̂?𝑠𝑡,𝑉,𝐵𝐶𝐼 − 𝑃𝑆𝐸𝐴𝑉𝑐  and ∆?̂?𝐴,𝐵𝐶𝐼 (likewise). Occasionally, this resulted in BCI observers 
being forced to choose between a ‘left’ or ’right’ response based on either auditory or 
visual estimate ∆?̂?. In the trial simulations here we follow the proposal by Meijer & 
Noppeney (2018) who argued that observers may have consistently provided responses 
based on visual estimates, since that could potentially explain visual overweighting in 
their behavioral data.  
Finally, the probability of a ‘right’ response is computed across 1000 simulations for 
each probe location and the lapse rate is taken into account according to Eq. 7. While 
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the distribution of spatial estimates ?̂?𝑝𝑟,𝑉,𝐵𝐶𝐼 across trials is bimodal for ∆𝐴𝑉 > 0° and 
𝑃𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑚𝑜𝑛 < 1, we note that the distribution of differences ∆?̂?𝑉,𝐵𝐶𝐼 across trials for 
relatively small ∆𝐴𝑉 is approximately normally distributed. Divergence from normality 
might plausibly be mistaken for measurement noise when fitting a cumulative Gaussian 
(n.b. similarly true for the cue-switching model, Sections 2.9.6). We further note that the 
JND of such a fitted psychometric function for spatially incongruent 𝐴𝑉 conditions 
should be greater than predicted by the MLE model if 𝑃𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑚𝑜𝑛 < 1.  
2.9.6. Cue switching 
Finally, the cue switching model embodies a decisional strategy that does not integrate 
the unisensory signals, but instead selects one of the signals (𝐴 or V) as their final 
estimate on every trial in proportion to relative sensory reliabilities. This statistically 
suboptimal strategy may explain empirical findings that show sensory weighting 
according to their relative reliabilities identical to MLE, but without any multisensory 
benefit in terms of variance reduction: 𝜎𝐴𝑉 ≥ 𝑚𝑖𝑛(𝜎𝐴, 𝜎𝑉) (Ernst & Bülthoff, 2004). 
To implement cue switching in 𝐴𝑉 trial simulations we computed two modality-specific 
estimates for the difference between probe and standard: ∆?̂?𝐴 = 𝑥𝑝𝑟,𝐴 − 𝑥𝑠𝑡,𝐴 − 𝑃𝑆𝐸𝐴𝑉𝑐  
and ∆?̂?𝑉 = 𝑥𝑝𝑟,𝑉 − 𝑥𝑠𝑡,𝑉 − 𝑃𝑆𝐸𝐴𝑉𝑐, where noise-perturbed signals 𝑥𝐴, 𝑥𝑉 were randomly 
sampled according to Eq. 5. MLE-optimal sensory weights (Eq. 4) then determined the 
probability with which either estimate was selected: ∆?̂?𝐴 or ∆?̂?𝑉. The expected 






Model Name Overweighting 𝝈𝑨𝑽 Prediction 8th Parameter 
MLE No 𝜎𝐴𝑉,𝑒𝑚𝑝 = 𝜎𝐴𝑉,𝑚𝑙𝑒 No 
V reliability change Vision 𝜎𝐴𝑉,𝑒𝑚𝑝 ≤ 𝜎𝐴𝑉,𝑚𝑙𝑒 𝑐𝐴→𝑉 ∈ [0,1] 
Correlated noise Most reliable modality 𝜎𝐴𝑉,𝑒𝑚𝑝 ≥ 𝜎𝐴𝑉,𝑚𝑙𝑒 𝜌 ∈  [0,1] 
V reliability prior Vision 𝜎𝐴𝑉,𝑒𝑚𝑝 ≥ 𝜎𝐴𝑉,𝑚𝑙𝑒 𝜋?̂?𝑉 ∈  [0,1] 
BCI Vision 𝜎𝐴𝑉,𝑒𝑚𝑝 ≥ 𝜎𝐴𝑉,𝑚𝑙𝑒 𝑃𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑚𝑜𝑛 ∈ [0,1] 
Cue switching No 𝜎𝐴𝑉 ≥ 𝑚𝑖𝑛(𝜎𝐴, 𝜎𝑉) No 
 
Table 1 - An overview of the six models for Bayesian model comparison with regards 
to expected sensory overweighting (relative to MLE) and the predicted amount of 
audiovisual sensory noise. All six models contain the following seven free parameters: 
𝝈𝑨, 𝝈𝑽, 𝑷𝑺𝑬𝑨, 𝑷𝑺𝑬𝑽, 𝑷𝑺𝑬𝑨𝑽𝒄, λ, η. Four models contain an additional eighth free 
parameter.  
 
2.9.10. Model comparison: 
Simply put, the aim of this model comparison analysis was to select the model with the 
highest likelihood of generating behavioral responses such as the ones that were 
acquired in this study. To control for model overfitting on this particular data set we 




Parameter values for each of the six models (per participant) were first optimized using 
maximum likelihood estimation as implemented in the Bayesian Adaptive Direct Search 
algorithm (BADS v1.0.5; Acerbi & Ma, 2017; https://github.com/lacerbi/bads). 
Thereafter, we performed Markov Chain Monte Carlo (MCMC) simulations by which we 
obtained an estimate of the entire posterior probability distribution across all 
parameters. The here employed Ensemble Inversion Slice Sampling algorithm (Acerbi, 
Dokka, Angelaki & Ma, 2018; https://github.com/lacerbi/eissample) is an affine-invariant 
MCMC sampler that requires relatively little tuning. We used a default number of chains 
per ensemble (2𝑝 + 2, with 𝑝 the number of free parameters of the model), where each 
chain was initialized to the maximum likelihood estimate plus some random jitter. Prior 
distribution functions were flat but bounded within a reasonably wide interval for each 
parameter. We acquired 10,000 samples for each posterior distribution, after discarding 
twice that number for warm-up (i.e. burn-in) and further discarding 9/10 samples to 
reduce autocorrelation of the chains (i.e. thinning). Convergence of the chains was 
checked (for both mixing and stationarity; Gelman et al., 2013) by splitting each chain in 
half (thus obtaining 𝑚 = 4𝑝 + 4 half-sequences), and comparing the across-chains 
estimate of the variance of the posterior distribution (for each parameter) with the 
mean of the variances for each half-sequence. Specifically, we computed the potential 





𝑗=1 )⁄ . Moreover, we computed the 
effective sample size ?̂?𝑒𝑓𝑓 for each parameter by correcting for its autocorrelation. If 
either max (?̂?) > 1.1 or min(?̂?𝑒𝑓𝑓) < 5𝑚 (Gelman et al., 2013), then we reran the 
MCMC simulation with increased warm-up period (105 samples) and more thinning 
(29/30); repeating if necessary until both criteria were met. While these tests do not 
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guarantee convergence, visual inspection of the marginal distributions did not indicate 
reasons for concern. Finally, having obtained an estimate of the multidimensional 
posterior we approximated the cross-validated leave-one-out log-likelihood (𝐿𝐿𝑐𝑣) by 
means of Pareto-smoothed importance sampling (Vehtari, Gelman & Gabry, 2017; 
https://github.com/avehtari/PSIS).  
A fixed-effects model comparison at the group level was performed by bootstrapping 
the sum across subjects of the differences between 𝐿𝐿𝑐𝑣 of one model versus the 𝐿𝐿𝑐𝑣 
of a reference model (Adler & Ma, 2018a). Specifically, for each particular model, we 
first computed the 𝐿𝐿𝑐𝑣 differences with the MLE model per participant. We then 
randomly sampled, with replacement, N of these differences and computed the sum 
(where N is the number of participants). We repeated this sampling procedure 10,000 
times to obtain a distribution of summed 𝐿𝐿𝑐𝑣 differences. The bootstrapped 
distributions for each model were then summarized by their medians and 95% 
confidence intervals. The fixed-effects analysis implicitly assumes that all participants 
utilized the same model (i.e. the same multisensory integration strategy).  
Alternatively, Bayesian model comparison at the random-effects group-level allows 
heterogeneity between participants and selects the best fitting model based on the 
probability across participants that a certain model outperforms all other models. We 
computed the protected exceedance probabilities (PXP) and Bayesian omnibus risk 
(BOR) (Rigoux, Stephan, Friston & Daunizeau, 2014) as implemented in SPM12 
(www.fil.ion.ucl.ac.uk/spm). PXP quantifies the probability for each model that its 
likelihood exceeds that of other models (corrected for chance), whereas BOR is a 
normalized Bayes factor that indicates whether there is evidence to belief that the 
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observed PXP differences are due to chance (e.g. 𝐵𝑂𝑅 < 0.25 corresponds to 𝐵𝐹10 > 3 
and means that differences are probably not caused by chance).  
To visualize the ways in which the various models modulated their parameters to match 
participants’ behavioral data we summarized the expected response probabilities ?̅?(𝑆𝑝𝑟) 
that were generated during the MCMC simulations by means of psychometric functions. 
Specifically, for each model and participant we randomly sampled 1000 parameter sets 
from the posterior distribution. For each of the parameter sets we i. generated response 
probabilities ?̅? according to the particular model’s rules, ii. jointly fitted five 
psychometric functions (according to the methodology described in Section 2.6 and 2.8), 
and iii. computed the empirical auditory weight according to Eq. 3. We thus obtained 
1000 x N estimates for each summary parameter (𝜎𝐴, 𝜎𝑉, 𝜎𝐴𝑉,∆=0°, 𝜎𝐴𝑉,∆=±𝑋°, 𝑤𝐴,𝑒𝑚𝑝). 
Next, we computed the group-level means for each of the 1000 samples per parameter. 
In a final step we then summarized the 1000 synthesized group means by their mean 
and standard deviation (i.e. mean and SEM) for each parameter (Acerbi et al., 2018; 
Adler & Ma, 2018a). 
 
3. Results 
Forty participants completed the main experiment in their final session of the study. 
Auditory and visual reliabilities were approximately matched for all participants in a 
separate session prior to the main task by modulating the size of the visual blob (i.e. 
larger blobs appear blurred and are more difficult to localize). Additionally, twenty 
participants underwent two training sessions in which they received feedback on nearly 
one thousand trials per modality: 𝐴, 𝑉, 𝐴𝑉. Their reliabilities were re-matched after the 
139 
 
training. Finally, before starting the first trial of the main experiment half of the trained 
and half of the untrained participants (selected at random) were told that they could 
win a monetary reward if they improved their localization performance for all three 
modalities relative to the previous session (i.e. baseline measurements). Participants 
were thus effectively subdivided into four groups of N=10 whereby we manipulated 
training and reward (i.e. ‘motivation’) in a 2x2 between-subjects factorial design. (Please 
see Method Sections 2.3-5 and Figure 1 for details on the experimental procedure.)  
We here first present results of the groups-based analysis for effects of training and 
reward on audiovisual spatial integration (see Section 2.8), before we evaluate 
participants’ behavioral results by means of Bayesian model comparison (see Section 
2.9). 
3.1 Effects of training and reward 
Efficacy of training was assessed by means of a one-sided paired t-test on the auditory 
JNDs that were obtained from the baseline measurements before and after training (i.e. 
in session 1 and 3; see Section 2.5.1.2 and 2.5.2). See Figure 2a. The auditory JNDs were 
significantly smaller after training, t(19) = 2.5, p = 0.01, thus indicating that participants 
had improved their auditory localization performance through training. We note that 
our experimental design did not allow us to test the efficacy of training in 𝑉 and 𝐴𝑉 
modalities because visual blob sizes were individually re-adjusted after the training. 
While it was important to provide equal training in all three modalities to avoid 
participants becoming disproportionately confident for auditory stimuli and therefore 
possibly changing their audiovisual response strategies (e.g. actively ignoring the visual 
stimuli), we also argue that the auditory training was most important for our purposes 
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because auditory spatial localization tasks may feel somewhat unnatural to first-time 
participants and extensive training may thus help participants to better judge their own 
auditory spatial localization abilities (and presumably be able to set the weights for 
audiovisual integration accordingly).  
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Fig 2 – Effects of training and reward on sensory noise parameters. Fig. 2a left-hand 
side: Mean (±SEM) fitted sensory noise parameters (i.e. behavioral variance; 
𝝈 = 𝑱𝑵𝑫/√𝟐) across all twenty participants in the training groups, before and after 
training. Auditory sensory noise decreased significantly after training indicating the 
expected performance increase. Although visual and audiovisual sensory noise 
parameters have not changed significantly with training, the size of the blob had to be 
increased in order to equate visual performance to the auditory modality once again 
(see Section 2.5; i.e. more spatial blurring was applied, indicating that training had also 
led to a performance boost in the visual modality), see panel on right-hand side. Fig. 
2b effect of reward: Fitted auditory (green), visual (red) and audiovisual (spatially 
congruent; blue) sensory noise parameters of baseline and main task measurements, 
for the four experimental groups. Performance did not increase for participants that 
were offered a conditional reward.  
 
Efficacy of the offered reward, that should have motivated participants to aim for 
maximum performance in the main experiment, was assessed by comparison with 𝐴, 𝑉, 
and 𝐴𝑉 baseline performance measurements (acquired in the experimental session 
prior to the main experiment). See Figure 2b. Only four out of twenty participants 
managed to (numerically) improve performance in all three modalities and thus received 
the monetary reward. For a more detailed analysis we performed a 2 (training/no 




, with data from all participants. We found no significant 
main effect for ‘reward’, F(1) = 3.34, p = 0.076. In fact upon closer inspection this ‘nearly 
142 
 
significant’ effect was caused by decreased performance in the visual and audiovisual 
modalities for participants who were offered the reward. We conclude that we were 
unable to demonstrate a modulatory effect of the motivational rewards on participants’ 
performance (i.e. JNDs). Another way of assessing the effect of reward on participants’ 
behavior was by comparison of the fitted lapse rates (λ) and betabinomial noise factors 
(η) in the main experiment (Sections 2.6 and 2.8) between the twenty participants who 
were/were not offered a potential reward: we would expect that motivated participants 
have smaller values for both. Indeed, we found that the group means for λ and η were 
numerically smaller in the reward-offered group, though neither difference was 
significant: t(38) = 1.22, p = 0.11 for λ and t(38) = 0.26, p = 0.40 for η (two-sample t-
tests). However, we note that fitted values for λ and η approached zero for many 
participants in both groups (with and without reward), so the reason for not finding a 
significant difference might be a ceiling effect.  
Having established a significant performance improvement for training, but not for 
reward, we then focused on our main question: whether any of the two interventions 
had affected multisensory integration in the main experiment. To obtain summary 
parameters of participants’ behavior that we could compare to MLE-predicted 
parameter values, five psychometric functions were fitted to participants’ empirical 
proportions of ‘right’ responses (40 trials x 13 locations for each of five conditions: 𝐴, 𝑉, 
𝐴𝑉∆=0°, 𝐴𝑉∆=+𝑋°, 𝐴𝑉∆=−𝑋°, where 𝑋° is the individualized audiovisual disparity for 
spatially incongruent trials, see Section 2.5.1.2). The results for each of the four 




Fig 3 – Overview of the parameter-based results for the four experimental groups. Fig. 
3 a-b. Mean fitted sensory noise parameters (i.e. behavioral variance; 𝝈 = 𝑱𝑵𝑫/√𝟐) 
and auditory weights per group (±SEM). MLE-predicted AV sensory noise and auditory 
weights were computed using 𝝈𝑨, 𝝈𝑽 per participant (according to Eq. 4). Fig. 3 c-d. 
auditory weights (empirical vs. MLE-predicted) and unisensory noise parameters (𝝈𝑽 
vs. 𝝈𝑨) for individual participants. Black solid lines depict bootstrapped 95% 
confidence intervals for each parameter estimate. Dashed black lines indicate equality 
(i.e. x=y). Participants were color coded by ranking them per group for the amount of 
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visual overweighting: i.e. dark shaded diamonds indicate participants with large 
auditory weight differences 𝒘𝑨,𝒎𝒍𝒆 − 𝒘𝑨,𝒆𝒎𝒑. Color coding in panel D was consistent 
with that of panel C. While unisensory reliabilities (𝝈𝑨, 𝝈𝑽) of all participants were 
matched within acceptable limits prior to the main experiment (see Section 2.5.1.4), 
for some participants they were no longer matched during the main experiment. 
These participants can be recognized in Fig 3d by diamonds that lie outside the 
acceptable range as depicted by the blue dotted lines.  
 
Overall we observed a variance reduction for audiovisual relative to unisensory 
conditions across all four groups (Fig 3a), but the audiovisual variances are larger than 
predicted by MLE (𝜎𝐴𝑉,𝑚𝑙𝑒 < 𝜎𝐴𝑉,∆=±𝑋°) as confirmed by independent one-sided paired t-
tests for each group: p < 0.05 for all. The deviation from MLE predictions is even 
stronger for the empirical sensory weights (Fig 3b): visual overweighting is observed in 
all four groups (𝑤𝐴,𝑚𝑙𝑒 <  𝜎𝐴𝑉,𝑚𝑙𝑒; one-sided paired t-tests for each group: t(9) > 2.9, p < 
0.01). To test whether the factors ‘training’ or ‘reward’ affected the amount of 
suboptimal variance reduction and/or visual overweighting we performed two 
independent two-way ANOVAs on the differences between empirical and MLE-predicted 
parameters (𝜎𝐴𝑉,𝑚𝑙𝑒 − 𝜎𝐴𝑉,∆=±𝑋°, and 𝑤𝐴,𝑚𝑙𝑒 −  𝑤𝐴,𝑒𝑚𝑝). We found no effect of reward 
for either parameter comparison (F(1) < 1, 𝐵𝐹01 = 3.1 and F(1) < 1, 𝐵𝐹01 = 2.7, 
respectively) and no significant interactions between reward and training. However, 
there was a significant main effect of training on the variance differences (F(1) = 5.6, p = 
0.02, 𝐵𝐹01 = 0.34); but not on the weights differences (F(1) < 1, 𝐵𝐹01 = 2.7). Contrary to 
the hypothesis that training would help participants to behave more like MLE-optimal 
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ideal observers, we observed that trained participants exhibited greater suboptimality in 
terms of their audiovisual variance (at least for the spatially incongruent conditions; we 
found no such significant effect of training for the congruent condition: 𝜎𝐴𝑉,𝑚𝑙𝑒 −
𝜎𝐴𝑉,∆=0°, F(1) < 1, 𝐵𝐹01 = 2.9).  
Rather than suggesting that prior training causes observers to integrate audiovisual 
signals less efficiently, we argue that the above-described finding is confounded by the 
fact that trained participants were more likely to have larger 𝜎𝑉 than 𝜎𝐴 (as 
demonstrated by an ANOVA on 𝜎𝑉 − 𝜎𝐴; there was a significant difference between 
trained and untrained participants: F(1) = 4.3, p = 0.04; driven mainly by four observers 
in group 4: ‘With Training, With Reward’, see Fig. 3b). MLE predicts high auditory 
weights for 𝜎𝑉 ≫ 𝜎𝐴, but the data showed that all participants had relied on the visual 
signals substantially (𝑚𝑎𝑥(𝑤𝐴,𝑒𝑚𝑝) = 0.64, see Fig 3c). Color-coding participants by the 
amount of visual overweighting (ranking participants within each experimental group 
according to 𝑤𝐴,𝑚𝑙𝑒 − 𝑤𝐴,𝑒𝑚𝑝) reveals that participants whose weights deviated most 
from MLE-predictions were participants whose visual sensory noise estimates were 
relatively high (throughout all experimental groups; see Fig 3d). Indeed, we found 
significant correlations (across all participants regardless of their experimental group) 
between the relative difference in unisensory noise (
𝜎𝑉−𝜎𝐴
𝜎𝐴
) and the extent to which 
participants deviated from MLE predictions in terms of audiovisual variance and visual 




Fig 4 – MLE predictions deviate progressively from human audiovisual integration 
when auditory spatial signals are more reliable than visual spatial signals. Diamonds 
indicate individual participants (across all four experimental groups) with color coding 
identical to Fig. 3c-d: i.e. darker shading for participants who exhibit stronger visual 
overweighting (as ranked within each experimental group). Dashed red lines illustrate 
results of a linear regression. Pearson’s correlation coefficients and their respective p-
values are shown in the legend (top-left corners).   
In conclusion, these behavioral data do not support the hypotheses that prior training or 
extra motivation leads to audiovisual spatial integration in line with maximum likelihood 
estimation. Instead, we observed evidence to suggest that divergence from MLE 
predictions was larger when the auditory reliability happened to be higher than the 





3.2 Bayesian model comparison 
Since the parameter-based analysis did not demonstrate meaningful modulatory effects 
of training or reward (see above), we pooled across all participants for the model-based 
analysis. The aim of this analysis was to compare several previously proposed 
explanations for findings that multisensory perceptual behavior diverged from MLE 
predictions (e.g. Battaglia et al., 2003; Burr et al., 2009; Meijer & Noppeney, 2018). 
Based on such proposals we designed six models (one of which implemented MLE) to 
generate synthetic ‘left’/‘right’ responses for audiovisual trials under experimental 
conditions that were identical to those used for our individual participants (Section 2.9). 
This approach essentially enabled us to compare how well the model-specific artificially 
generated response patterns matched response patterns of human observers. The fit 
was quantitatively expressed for each participant by computing an approximation of the 
cross-validated log-likelihood (𝐿𝐿𝑐𝑣, see Section 2.9.10) across all five conditions: 𝐴, 𝑉, 
𝐴𝑉∆=0°, 𝐴𝑉∆=+𝑋°, 𝐴𝑉∆=−𝑋°.  
To visualize the extent to which the models were able to simulate human observers we 
summarized their generated data in the same way: by fitting psychometric functions and 
plotting the relevant parameter estimates. Fig. 5a (top rows) shows the results with 
regards to the sensory noise and auditory weights: The colored bars represent 
participants’ group-level means ±SEMs for reference; the black error bars on top show 
the models’ simulated group-level means ±SEMs (see Section 2.9.10 for methodological 
details). Four of the models contained an additional model-specific parameter; those are 
presented in the bottom row of Fig. 5a. We shortly discuss each model’s fit to gain 
insight into each of the proposed explanations for human multisensory perception: 
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1. The MLE model predicts 𝐴𝑉 responses based on reliability-weighted averages of the 
unisensory estimates under forced fusion assumptions. In order to approximately fit 
human observer’s visual overweighting pattern (i.e. to match the PSEs in the 𝐴𝑉-
incongruent conditions), it was forced to modify its unisensory noise parameters 𝜎𝐴 and 
𝜎𝑉. The model balanced this trade-off and ended up predicting neither of them 
perfectly.  
 2. The second model allowed visual sensory noise under 𝐴𝑉 conditions to be smaller 
than the unisensory visual noise: 𝜎𝑉,𝐴𝑉 = 𝑐𝐴→𝑉 𝜎𝑉  (where 𝑐𝐴→𝑉 ∈ [0,1]). By setting 
𝑐𝐴→𝑉 < 1 the model would be able to predict visual overweighting. However, if it did so, 
it would also predict 𝜎𝐴𝑉 to be smaller than predicted by MLE. Since the latter would 
negatively affect the fit of all three 𝐴𝑉 conditions this was not preferred and 𝑐𝐴→𝑉 was 
instead set close to one, thereby making the model essentially similar to the MLE model. 
In an attempt to better account for visual overweighting, the second model further 
compromised its fit of the auditory variance.  
3. Correlated noise leads to visual overweighting if the visual reliability is higher than the 
auditory reliability. By allowing some amount of correlated noise, 𝜌 > 0, the third model 
was not forced to compromise on the unisensory noise levels as much as the two 
models discussed above.    
4. The fourth model implements the suggestion by Battaglia et al. (2003) that visual 
overweighting can be explained by a Bayesian prior on the visual reliability estimates 
that favors high values (i.e. low ?̂?𝑉). We modelled this prior by introduction of 𝜋?̂?𝑉, a 
factor between 0 and 1 that modifies the visual reliability estimate according to 
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?̂?𝑉 = 𝜋?̂?𝑉  𝜎𝑉. By setting 𝜋?̂?𝑉 < 1 the model was effectively capable of simulating visual 
overweighting without having to compromise fits of the unisensory noise estimates.  
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Fig 5 – Qualitative and quantitative model comparison results. Fig. 5 a. Psychometric 
functions were fitted to the model-generated proportions of ‘right’ responses to 
compare the empirical parameter estimates of our participants (colored bars; group 
mean ±SEM, same data as Fig 3 a-b but pooled across groups) to the fitted models’ 
parameter estimates (black error bars). The third row depicts the model-specific 
additional parameter estimates (group-level means as colored bars, ±SEM as black 
error bars). Fig. 5 b. Quantitative model comparison results of fixed-effects (left panel) 
and Bayesian random-effects (right panel) analyses. See main text for details (Section 
3.2).  
5. Bayesian causal inference (e.g. Körding, Beierholm, Ma et al., 2007) is different from 
all of the above models because it does not assume forced fusion. Instead it modulates 
the prior probability of a common source by adjusting the free parameter 𝑃𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑚𝑜𝑛 per 
participant (i.e. 𝑃𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑚𝑜𝑛 = 1 leads to forced fusion, 𝑃𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑚𝑜𝑛 = 0 leads to no fusion at 
all). Sensory signals on any one trial are only integrated to the extent that a common 
source can be inferred for them: i.e. they are partially integrated under what has 
become known as the ‘model-averaging’ decision function (e.g. Rohe & Noppeney, 
2015a). Critically, in our implementation of the BCI model here we let the final 
‘left’/‘right’ response depend on the (partially-integrated) location estimates for the 
visual modality (as previously proposed in Meijer & Noppeney, 2018). This choice lets 
the BCI model simulate visual overweighting by setting common-source prior 
𝑃𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑚𝑜𝑛 < 1. The main difference with the ‘visual reliability prior model’ (Nr. 4) is that 
the BCI model predicts that the fitted JND of spatially incongruent conditions (i.e. 
𝜎𝐴𝑉,∆=±𝑋°) is higher than the JND of the spatially congruent condition.   
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6. The sixth model implements cue switching: a strategy in which auditory and visual 
signals are not integrated. Instead, the model probabilistically selects either auditory or 
visual estimates in proportion to their reliabilities (Ernst & Bülthoff, 2004). Similar to the 
MLE model, cue switching will assign higher visual weights when 𝜎𝑉 < 𝜎𝐴. Since the 
signals are not integrated, cue switching does not predict a multisensory variance 
reduction. In an attempt to approximately fit the low empirical audiovisual sensory noise 
and visual overweighting it set 𝜎𝑉 artificially low. Despite major deviations for the visual 
noise parameter the model is still incapable of substantially lowering 𝜎𝐴𝑉 estimates in 
the spatially incongruent conditions.   
The above-described visualizations of the model fits suggest that the ‘𝑉 reliability prior’ 
and BCI models performed best, on average across participants. A fixed effects 
quantitative model comparison confirms that suggestion (see Fig 5b, left panel). The 
group-level analysis was performed on the sum of the participant-specific differences 
between 𝐿𝐿𝑐𝑣 and the 𝐿𝐿𝑐𝑣 of the MLE model (nr. 1). To account for variance across 
participants we performed a bootstrap analysis of the summed differences and depict 
the median and 95% confidence intervals (Adler & Ma, 2018a). With summed 𝐿𝐿𝑐𝑣 
differences of 66 and 68, respectively, it is clear that the ‘𝑉 reliability prior’ and BCI 
models performed much better than MLE model. However, the 95% confidence interval 
sizes are relatively large, suggesting substantial variations of 𝐿𝐿𝑐𝑣 across participants 
and models. This makes conclusive inference from the fixed-effects analysis risky, 




To better account for the variance across participants we performed a Bayesian random-
effects analysis that is based on participant-specific probabilities that a certain model-
evidence (𝐿𝐿𝑐𝑣) exceeds that of all other models (Rigoux et al., 2014). The group-level 
protected exceedance probabilities (PXP) for each model are shown in Fig 5b (right 
panel). This analysis leads to a clear winner: the BCI model has the highest corrected-for-
chance probability of being the best fitting model across participants: PXP = 0.675. 
Moreover, the Bayesian omnibus risk is low (BOR = 0.057), thus suggesting that the 
observed differences between PXP are very unlikely to be a coincidence.  
 
4. Discussion 
The objectives for this study were two-fold: we first examined the impact of prior 
training and motivational rewards on audiovisual spatial integration by comparing 
human behavioral results against MLE predictions in a 2x2 between-subjects factorial 
design. We found that neither of these factors influenced participants to behave more 
like MLE-optimal ideal observers: audiovisual integration diverged from MLE predictions 
in all four experimental groups independent of the manipulations. We then set out to 
compare various explanations for such divergence by means of Bayesian model 
comparison. The results from this second analysis were unambiguous: Bayesian causal 
inference provided the best fit to the data. It thus seems that the most likely reason 
participants did not integrate audiovisual stimuli according to MLE was that they did not 
automatically infer a common causal origin for the auditory and visual signals (i.e. the 
forced fusion assumption was violated). 
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Bayesian causal inference is a powerful explanatory model for multisensory integration 
that has successfully matched human perception across various combinations of sensory 
modalities and tasks, including audiovisual localization (Körding, Beierholm, Ma et al., 
2007; Rohe & Noppeney, 2015a), audiovisual temporal judgments (Magnotti, Ma & 
Beauchamp, 2013; McGovern, Roudaia, Newell & Roach, 2016), audiovisual speech 
processing (Magnotti & Beauchamp, 2017), and recently even visual-vestibular heading 
estimation (for which it was previously thought that the brain performs forced fusion 
under all conflict sizes; Acerbi et al., 2018; de Winkel, Katliar & Bülthoff, 2017). 
Furthermore, there exists substantial evidence from neuroimaging studies that supports 
the notion that Bayesian causal inference is implemented in a hierarchical fashion by the 
human cortex (Rohe & Noppeney, 2015b, 2016). Given the abundance of studies that 
endorse BCI as a perceptual mechanism it may not be a surprise that this model 
performed best in the current study. However, the novelty here is that it fitted best in 
experimental conditions that were previously assumed to impose forced fusion (Alais & 
Burr, 2004). The finding that BCI explains human perceptual behavior better than MLE 
even under individually optimized ‘forced-fusion conditions’ provides a clear word of 
caution for future experiments that still wish to assume forced fusion, and may help to 
explain previously reported findings where human multisensory integration deviated 
from MLE predictions (see further below for examples and Rahnev & Denison, 2018 for a 
review).  
In the current study, we made one critical assumption in the BCI model: that observers 
base their ‘left’/‘right’ responses for audiovisual trials on partially-integrated location 
estimates in the visual sensory modality. On audiovisual trials where a common source 
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cannot be inferred with full certainty, disparate modality-specific signals are ‘corrected’ 
for the probability of a common source by applying partial reliability-weighted 
integration according to BCI, but an observer will be left with two spatial estimates that 
do not necessarily agree with each other: one auditory and one visual. What to do if only 
one ‘audiovisual’ response is required? Further combining the estimates is not 
appropriate, because that would imply certainty of a common origin, which was ruled 
out earlier. We argue that participants make a cognitive decision based on life-long 
experience to let their responses depend on the partially-integrated visual estimates 
because vision is generally most informative for localization.  
Supporting evidence for such an experience-based decision strategy comes from a study 
by Jacobs and Fine (1999). Their participants performed a 2IFC depth discrimination task 
based on texture and motion cues (both in vision). By introducing various conflict sizes 
between the two cues reliability-weighted integration could be examined (similar to the 
current study). Participants performed two test sessions, each of which was preceded by 
a training session with auditory feedback. Crucially, the training trials differed from the 
test trials in that only one cue was informative with regards to the difference between 
probe and standard; the other cue was identical for both stimuli. In a cross-over design, 
the two training sessions alternated which of the cues was informative: texture or 
motion. Results of the two test sessions showed that equally-reliable cues were 
weighted heavier if that cue was informative in the preceding training session (as 
opposed to when it was uninformative in the preceding training session). We suggest 
that these empirical weight differences can be explained by partial integration under BCI 
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rules where participants selected the depth estimate of the cue that was most accurate 
in the preceding training session.  
Direct support for the notion that observers are able to cognitively select the most 
relevant of the partially-integrated sensory signals comes from a study by Ernst and 
Banks (2000; but see Ernst, 2006). Their participants performed two versions of a 2IFC 
visual-tactile size discrimination task. In one version participants compared a bisensory 
visual-tactile stimulus (𝑉𝑇) in one interval to a unisensory visual stimulus (𝑉) in the other 
interval. In the second version they compared 𝑉𝑇 against a unisensory tactile stimulus 
(𝑇). Results indicated that the visual weights were higher in the 𝑉𝑇 vs. 𝑉 task version 
and, vice versa, tactile weights were higher for 𝑉𝑇 vs. 𝑇. It is noteworthy that visual and 
tactile weights would be identical in both task versions under assumptions of MLE in 
forced fusion. Instead, partial integration according to BCI can explain the discrepancy if 
participants selected the most relevant size estimate for 𝑉𝑇 depending on the sensory 
modality against which it had to be compared.  
Selecting one modality’s partially-integrated estimates (over the other’s) leads to 
overweighting of that modality relative to MLE predictions. In the current study, 
responding ‘left’ or ‘right’ based on visual estimates because that sensory modality is 
deemed most informative for spatial localization leads to visual overweighting when 
compared to MLE. This was a crucial assumption for the BCI model to fit our behavioral 
data well. However, it seems plausible that reliance on partially-integrated estimates of 
the sensory modality that is normally most informative is not limited to audiovisual 
spatial integration. The sensory modality that is reportedly overweighted in 
multisensory integration experiments is oftentimes the modality that is generally 
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dominant for the task at hand. For example, vestibular overweighting for visual-
vestibular heading (Butler et al., 2010; Fetsch et al., 2009) but visual overweighting in 
visual-vestibular self-rotation tasks (Prsa et al., 2012), haptic overweighting in visual-
haptic slant discrimination (Rosas et al., 2005) and auditory overweighting for 
audiovisual temporal discrimination tasks (Burr et al., 2009; Maiworm & Röder, 2011). 
Future research, applying similar hypothesis-driven (model) comparison methods, will 
be necessary to confirm whether the suggestion for such a general mechanism holds 
true across various combinations of sensory modalities.  
Returning to the other findings that were presented in this study, we first note that the 
correlation between unisensory reliability differences and deviations from MLE 
predictions (see Figure 4) is a natural consequence of Bayesian causal inference: as the 
unisensory reliability difference increases the BCI model predicts fewer trials on which a 
common source is inferred (Rohe & Noppeney, 2015a). Interestingly, this correlation can 
also be observed in data that was previously presented as evidence to support the MLE 
model. For example, one of the figures in the seminal paper by Ernst and Banks (2002) 
shows that the visual modality (normally dominant in size estimation) was overweighted 
during visual-haptic integration in the condition where the visual noise was highest and 
where the difference between unisensory reliabilities was greatest (𝑤𝑉,𝑒𝑚𝑝 ≈ 0.3, 
whereas 𝑤𝑉,𝑚𝑙𝑒 ≈ 0.15; their figure 3c).  
The reason why larger unisensory reliability differences were more common for our 
trained participants is not immediately clear. We speculate that some of these 
participants were unable to preserve the performance improvement that they had 
gained in the training sessions, specifically for the visual sensory modality (Fig 2b shows 
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a visual performance decrease between baseline after training and main task). This may 
have happened because the maximum number of seven days that we allowed for 
between two consecutive sessions was quite a long period. Similarly, the extensive time 
gaps between consecutive sessions are a valid concern that could potentially explain 
why we did not observe an improvement of multisensory integration efficiency with 
training. Alais and Burr (2004) reported that their participants, who integrated 
audiovisual spatial signals according to MLE, were well trained on the localization task. 
So why did our trained participants, under similar experimental conditions, deviate so 
much from MLE? There might be other reasons for the observed behavioral discrepancy 
besides effective training. For example, one may argue that our participants integrated 
audiovisual signals to a lesser extent because the auditory signals were here presented 
through headphones, whereas Alais and Burr (2004) had used speakers that were placed 
at the edge of the screen. Our finding of a relatively low 𝑃𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑚𝑜𝑛 (group mean ≈ 0.6, see 
Fig. 5a) would support such a hypothesis.  
The fact that we did not observe a significant improvement of performance or lapse rate 
(i.e. measures that are independent of AV-integration strategies) as a consequence of 
the motivational reward is another limitation of the current study. The amount of the 
monetary reward (£10, i.e. 13 USD) may not have been high enough to motivate our 
participants to stay highly attentive for the 2.5 hour duration of the final test session. 
Alternatively, one may argue that participants in the non-reward groups were already 
motivated without the need for a monetary reward. Finally, we acknowledge that subtle 
changes that were possibly induced by our manipulations of training and reward may 
have failed to appear in analyses because our 2x2 between-subjects design with ten 
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participants in each group would have been underpowered to detect them with 
certainty. Nonetheless, we note that deviations from MLE predictions were 
independently significant for all four experimental groups.  
In conclusion, our data have not shown evidence that prior training or motivational 
reward aid observers in perceptually behaving more like MLE-optimal observers, 
although we have discussed some limitations of our experimental design. We also 
evaluated various reasons for why the MLE model might not be the correct ‘ideal 
observer’ to compare behavioral data against. Comparison with our participants’ 
responses suggested that Bayesian causal inference provides a better model for 
statistically optimal multisensory integration, because it is also valid when observers 
cannot be entirely sure that multisensory signals are caused by common events: i.e. in 
most daily life situations and in many laboratory experiments, even under so-called 
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One advantage of multisensory integration is that it reduces the amount of sensory 
uncertainty that is associated with perceptual estimates. While this statement is 
generally considered to be true because of the precision improvement that is observed 
across many trials, direct evidence on a per-trial basis is not readily available. Here we 
tested whether sensory uncertainty decreases after audiovisual spatial integration in a 
two-interval forced choice task by asking participants to report their confidence on each 
trial. Moreover, we studied whether participants’ ability to introspect on stimulus 
uncertainty was different for multisensory and unisensory stimuli. To be able to answer 
both research questions while avoiding the risks for confounds we extended an existing 
model-based approach for estimation of metacognitive sensitivity (meta-d’) such that it 
could be applied to experimental designs with psychometric functions. Results showed 
that participants’ type-2 criteria were lower for more reliable stimuli, across three visual 
(and audiovisual) reliability levels. Importantly, criteria were also lower for audiovisual 
versus unisensory conditions thus demonstrating that multisensory integration boosted 
participants’ confidence. After correcting metacognitive sensitivity levels for type-1 task 
performance, we concluded that participants’ introspective abilities were unaffected by 
the sensory modality of the stimuli. Specifically, we found that the amount of 
metacognitive noise was equal for unisensory and multisensory conditions, and 
independent of stimulus reliability. These results support a hierarchical view of 
perceptual decision making in which multisensory integration occurs at an early stage 
and supra-modal metacognitive processes are able to access sensory uncertainty 
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similarly for unisensory and multisensory estimates to compute decision confidence at a 
later stage in the hierarchy. 
 
1. Introduction 
Sensory signals vary from very clear to clearly unreliable. Think of the difference 
between instantly recognizing your friend’s face in a classroom and trying to figure out 
whether the light that shines through the morning fog is from an oncoming vehicle or an 
immobile street light. Such sensory (un)certainty plays a large role in our every-day 
decisions: Do we greet the person in class? Should we step aside for the light? To avoid 
costly mistakes by fully committing to potentially erroneous inferences about sensory 
signals it is essential that the human brain is able to assess sensory reliability and use it 
to attach appropriate levels of confidence to their perceptual decisions (Pouget, 
Drugowitsch & Kepecs, 2016). In simple perceptual experiments (where task difficulty is 
determined by sensory characteristics such as the signal-to-noise ratio) an increase of 
sensory uncertainty should lead to lower confidence, and vice versa. Indeed, it seems 
that humans are able to access sensory uncertainty through metacognitive mechanisms 
and use this knowledge to predict the validity of their perceptual decisions (Yeung & 
Summerfield, 2012). The extent to which observers are able to differentiate correct from 
incorrect responses in perceptual tasks, by means of high versus low confidence 
judgments, is called metacognitive sensitivity (Fleming & Lau, 2014). 
Multisensory integration is one of the prime examples for showing how the perceptual 
system deals with sensory uncertainty through probabilistic inference (Pouget, Beck, Ma 
& Latham, 2013). The brain combines redundant sources of sensory information from 
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multiple modalities in a (nearly) statistically-optimal fashion by weighing each sensory 
signal by its reliability according to maximum likelihood estimation (MLE; Ernst & Banks, 
2002). The benefit of such integration is that multisensory estimates are more precise, 
as can be measured empirically by a reduction in the behavioral variance across many 
experimental trials (Rohde, van Dam & Ernst, 2016). Importantly, MLE-like probabilistic 
integration not only predicts a behavioral benefit across trials, precision should also 
increase for each single-trial estimate. Presumably, multisensory integration thus 
reduces sensory uncertainty and should lead to increased levels of confidence. However, 
according to our current knowledge, empirical research that conclusively confirms this 
hypothesis has not yet been performed (Deroy, Spence & Noppeney, 2016). The current 
study addresses this fundamental question by investigating whether confidence is higher 
for audiovisual versus unisensory auditory and visual spatial localization responses. 
If multisensory integration does indeed lead to a boost of confidence because of a 
reduction in sensory uncertainty, this would suggest that observers are able to estimate 
the sensory reliability of their integrated percepts. The logical second research question 
is whether the degree to which observers can use such metacognitive insight to their 
benefit by making appropriate confidence judgments is equal for unisensory and 
multisensorily integrated percepts (Deroy et al., 2016). In other words, we would wish to 
quantitatively compare metacognitive sensitivity for identical stimuli that are presented 
in a unisensory or a multisensory context.  
Two methodological concerns need to be addressed when confronting these two 
research questions. 1) Mean confidence levels are confounded by perceptual accuracy 
(so-called type-1 task performance) and by metacognitive sensitivity (type-2 
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performance). The explanation for that statement is simple: mean confidence is 
generally higher for correct (as opposed to incorrect) responses, and this difference is 
(by definition) greater with higher metacognitive sensitivity. 2) Metacognitive sensitivity 
has a theoretical upper limit that is defined by type-1 performance. While the full 
explanation for this relationship is more complex (see Maniscalco & Lau, 2012, 2014) the 
intuitive understanding is that one cannot expect an observer that is relatively bad at 
performing the type-1 perceptual task to simultaneously be able to differentiate well 
between his/her correct and incorrect responses by means of high/low confidence 
judgments. While the second point of concern can potentially be avoided by ensuring 
that type-1 performance is identical for unisensory and multisensory conditions (e.g. by 
means of staircase procedures), the first point implies that mean confidence level is not 
a safe measure to use for assessing whether confidence increases with multisensory 
integration (unless one can ascertain that metacognitive sensitivity and type-1 accuracy 
are both equal across conditions). It would be better to take a different approach.  
Maniscalco & Lau (2012) have introduced the concept of meta-d’: a measure for 
expressing metacognitive sensitivity in terms of the type-1 performance (d’) that a 
hypothetical type-2 ideal observer (who makes statistically-optimal confidence 
judgments based on signal detection theory) would need to have in order to best match 
a (true) observer’s type-2 performance. In other words: they proposed to fit an ideal 
observer model to the confidence responses of a participant (conditional on type-1 
responses, but independent from the participant’s type-1 performance) with the ideal 
observer’s perceptual performance as a free parameter termed meta-d’ (where the 
prefix indicates that it is based on the participant’s metacognitive sensitivity). While 
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meta-d’ thus represents the observed metacognitive sensitivity of the participant, d’ can 
be interpreted as the statistically optimal metacognitive sensitivity (given type-1 
performance). The ratio between these two measures, 𝑀𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜 =
𝑚𝑒𝑡𝑎−𝑑′
𝑑′
, has become a 
common measure to quantify metacognitive efficiency (Fleming & Lau, 2014; Bang, 
Shekhar & Rahnev, 2018). The ratio will be exactly 1 for ideal observers, and lower for 
most human observers. By computing metacognitive efficiency index 𝑀𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜 one 
effectively overcomes the confounding effect of type-1 performance on metacognitive 
sensitivity by normalization (which has become possible since the two measures are 
expressed in common signal-to-noise units). From this methodological evaluation we 
conclude that metacognitive efficiency can be used to investigate potential differences 
between unisensory and multisensory metacognitive insight.  
The meta-d’ ideal observer model additionally fits as free parameters so-called type-2 
criteria that determine the level of evidence that needs to be exceeded in order to make 
a higher confidence judgment. These type-2 criteria effectively model a participant’s 
metacognitive bias (general under- or overconfidence): i.e. the fitted criteria will be 
greater (/smaller) if a participant requires more (/less) sensory evidence to make high 
confidence judgments. Such type-2 criteria thus hold potential for being used to answer 
our first research question: We expect type-2 criteria to be lower for multisensory as 
opposed to unisensory trials, because the sensory difference (e.g. between two stimuli 
in a two-interval forced-choice task) that is required to make a highly confident decision 
is smaller under conditions of reduced sensory noise. However, one major limitation of 
the meta-d’ model fitting approach is that its parameters are normalized to signal-to-
noise units of the hypothetical ideal-observer’s type-1 performance. In other words, the 
167 
 
fitted type-2 criteria values depend on the observer’s metacognitive sensitivity (by which 
they are normalized). Therefore, the interpretation of any type-2 criteria difference 
between conditions with unequal type-2 performance is troublesome.  
Another limitation of the meta-d’ approach is that the ideal observer can only be fit to 
one stimulus level. This requires the experimenter to carefully titrate type-1 
performance for each participant to optimize chances of avoiding type-2 ceiling/floor 
effects: e.g. when the task is too easy (/hard) an observer will only respond with high 
(/low) confidence. It has been proposed that one could fit meta-d’ to multiple stimulus 
levels separately, e.g. using an experimental design that is commonly used for fitting 
type-1 psychometric functions (Fleming & Lau, 2014), after which the multiple meta-d’ 
estimates could be summarized by a linear regression analysis (e.g. see Klein, 2001). 
However, this may not be a practical approach as the range of stimulus levels on which 
metacognitive sensitivity can be assessed without meeting ceiling/floor complications is 
limited. Moreover, the proposed approach is likely theoretically invalid in asymmetrical 
experimental designs or when participants exhibit type-1 biases/priors (Drugowitsch, 
Moreno-Bote & Pouget, 2014).  
To overcome these limitations we have developed a new approach that applies the 
rationale behind meta-d’ to psychometric function-based experimental designs. Instead 
of using signal-detection theory to model an ideal observer, we used Bayesian 
probability theory to derive the statistically optimal observer’s type-2 response 
probabilities. In analogy to meta-d’, we express metacognitive sensitivity as the type-1 
performance measure that the ideal observer would have needed to best match a 
participant’s confidence responses across multiple stimulus levels: meta-JND (where JND 
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stands for the just-noticeable difference; Kingdom & Prins, 2016). By comparing the 
fitted meta-JND to an observer’s type-1 JND, we can express metacognitive efficiency 
using a similar 𝑀𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜. Moreover, meta-JND does not normalize its parameters to signal-
to-noise units, such that they can be meaningfully interpreted and compared across 
different conditions with various metacognitive sensitivities. We can thus use meta-JND 
and its associated type-2 criteria to investigate whether multisensory integration affects 




We employed an audiovisual spatial localization task for which we have previously 
established that a significant variance reduction can be observed for multisensory 
relative to unisensory stimulus conditions (Meijer & Noppeney, 2018; see also Alais & 
Burr, 2004). The experimental design was very similar to our previous study. We here 
present a summary that includes the most important modifications (for a detailed 
description of the experimental procedures see additionally Appendix A).  
In a two-interval forced-choice (2IFC) task participants were asked to indicate whether 
they perceived the second of two consecutively presented stimuli to the left or to the 
right of the first stimulus (guessing if unsure). In addition to this type-1 location 
response, participants concurrently selected a confidence level for their location 
decision from a 4-point scale that was indicated as going from “guess” to “certain”. They 
were actively encouraged to introspect, emphasizing accuracy over speed (maximum 
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response time was 3 seconds), and to use all four confidence levels. By means of a 
mouse response that allowed participants to simultaneously select a location response 
and a confidence level (see Figure 1) we have attempted to avoid discrepancies between 
type-1 performance and metacognitive sensitivity (n.b. previous studies that used 
sequential response designs have occasionally reported super-optimal type-2 
performance, suggesting that the accumulation of evidence continues after type-1 
responses have been made such that subsequent confidence judgments can be based on 
enhanced sensory information; Fleming, 2016; Murphy, Robertson, Harty & O’Connell, 
2016; Siedlecka, Paulewicz & Wierzchoń, 2016; van den Berg et al., 2016; see also Kiani, 
Corthell & Shadlen, 2014). 
The first stimulus (i.e. standard) was always presented straight ahead of the participant 
(at 0° visual angle) and served as a reference point. After an interstimulus interval of 500 
ms the second stimulus (probe) was presented pseudo-randomly at one of thirteen 
locations along the azimuth. After another 500 ms the butterfly-shaped response 
prompt appeared (see Figure 1). Both stimuli were either auditory (𝐴), visual (𝑉), or 
audiovisual (𝐴𝑉). For reasons of investigating reliability-weighted integration (that fall 
outside the scope of the current report), the audiovisual probe stimulus was presented 
with a small spatial disparity, ∆𝐴𝑉 = ±𝑋°, in two out of three audiovisual conditions 
(the third 𝐴𝑉 condition being spatially congruent: ∆𝐴𝑉 = 0°). Probe locations and 
audiovisual disparity sizes were adjusted for each individual to ensure adequate 
sampling of the psychometric functions (Wichmann & Hill, 2001a) and to minimize the 
risk of participants noticing the audiovisual conflict (i.e. to avoid violations of the forced-




Fig 1 – Illustration of the 2IFC spatial localization task and response mechanism. 
Participants indicated whether the probe was perceived as left or right of the standard 
by moving their mouse cursor to either side of the ‘butterfly’ shape (prior to every trial 
the cursor was centered to avoid sequential trial-to-trial biases). One of four 
confidence levels was automatically highlighted (white) when the cursor was above it. 
By moving the mouse up or down a different confidence level could be selected. It was 
possible to change the selected the type-1 location and confidence level until the 
response was confirmed by a left mouse-button click.    
 
The total experiment was spread over four sessions that took place on separate days. In 
the first session we measured the subjective spatial reliability of the auditory stimuli 
(short bursts of white noise) and consecutively modified the spatial reliability of the 
visual stimuli (greyscale blurred Gaussian blobs) to match the auditory reliability (by 
means of adjusting the blob’s size through an adaptive staircase procedure). 
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Approximate matching of the unisensory reliabilities is important to optimize conditions 
for observing a multisensory variance reduction (Meijer & Noppeney, 2018; Rohde et al., 
2016). The main experiment, wherein we acquired the behavioral data that is presented 
in Section 3, took place in sessions 2-4. In the main experiment we introduced two 
additional visual reliability levels: for the so-called high visual reliability level we set the 
blob size 25% smaller relative to the size for which unisensory reliabilities were 
individually matched (i.e. medium visual reliability level), and for the low visual reliability 
level the blobs were 25% larger. All three visual reliability levels were also used for the 
audiovisual spatially congruent and incongruent conditions, thus making a total of 
thirteen conditions: 1x𝐴 + 3x𝑉 + 3x𝐴𝑉∆=0° + 3x𝐴𝑉∆=−𝑋° + 3x𝐴𝑉∆=+𝑋°. For each of the 
twelve 𝑉 or 𝐴𝑉 conditions participants completed 468 trials (36 x 13 locations). Twice 
more 𝐴 trials were completed (72 x 13 locations) to compensate for the fact that there 
was only one 𝐴 condition.  
2.2 Analysis 
For each observer, and separately for each of the thirteen conditions, we fitted 
psychometric functions to the proportions of ‘perceived right’ location responses (i.e. 
we fitted cumulative Gaussians with a correction for the lapse rate making use of the 
Palamedes toolbox 1.8.2 for Matlab;  www.palamedestoolbox.org). We thus obtained a 
type-1 JND and PSE (point of subjective equality; Kingdom & Prins, 2016) for each 
condition.  
Building on and extending previous work by Acuna, Berniker, Fernandes & Körding 
(2015) and Maniscalco & Lau (2012) we have derived (using Bayesian probability theory, 
see Appendix B) a pair of equations to compute the probability with which a statistically 
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optimal ideal observer would select a certain confidence level 𝑘 (out of N possible 
confidence levels) conditional on location response 𝑧 for standard and probe stimulus 
locations 𝑆𝑠𝑡 and 𝑆𝑝𝑟, and given certain parameter values for type-1 JND and PSE, and a 
set of N+1 type-2 criteria 𝑪𝟐∆𝒙 (where the subscript ∆𝑥 indicates that these criteria 
represent differences between internal estimates 𝑥 of probe and standard; i.e. in the 
current spatial localization experiment the criteria would be in units of degrees visual 
angle, just like JND, PSE and the stimulus location difference ∆𝑆 = 𝑆𝑝𝑟 − 𝑆𝑠𝑡): 


























We use this pair of equations to compute the likelihood for each confidence judgment 
that was made by the participant, given a set of subject- and condition-specific model 
parameter values. It thus enables us to optimize the parameter values by means of 
maximum likelihood estimation (across all trials and locations within one condition after 
making a correction for a type-2 lapse rate that is fitted as an additional free parameter; 
see Appendix B Section B.6 for details of the fitting procedure). We note that the type-1 
PSE that was obtained from the psychometric function (see above) is a fixed parameter 
and is not fitted. We further fix the values for 𝐶2∆𝑥,1 = 0° and 𝐶2∆𝑥,𝑁+1 = ∞°. We thus 
obtain maximum likelihood estimates for the JND, N-1 type-2 criteria and one type-2 
lapse rate. Critically, this JND is fitted to the metacognitive judgments of the participant, 
so we will henceforth refer to it as meta-JND.  
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By fitting the ideal observer model to the confidence responses of a participant (for a 
particular condition in the current experiment) we summarize the selected proportions 
of all four confidence levels, conditional on both left and right responses, for each of 
thirteen probe locations (i.e. up to 4 x 2 x 13 = 104 empirical proportions of confidence 
judgments) with the following five parameters: meta-JND, three type-2 criteria and one 
type-2 lapse rate. This method begs the question of how well the ideal observer model is 
capable of matching the empirical proportions of confidence responses. Therefore, we 
quantify an absolute goodness-of-fit for each model fit by computing the ratio between 
the information that would be gained (in terms of relative entropy or Kullback-Leibler 
divergence) by fitting a chance model (wherein all confidence levels are equally probable 
independent of stimulus locations and type-1 response) versus the information that was 
gained by fitting the ideal observer model (Acerbi, Dokka, Angelaki & Ma, 2018; Shen & 
Ma, 2016; https://github.com/lacerbi/gofit). A goodness-of-fit of 0% means that the 
model performs equally well as the chance model, whereas 100% means that all 
empirical information (i.e. entropy) is effectively explained by the model. This method 
for computing the goodness-of-fit is similar to computing the coefficient of 
determination (𝑅2) but it applies to discrete response distributions. While we 
acknowledge that the use of cross-validated (log-)likelihoods is advocated for 
computation of the information gained by the model, we instead used an approximation 
for computational ease and speed: −0.5 ∗ 𝐴𝐼𝐶𝑐 (where 𝐴𝐼𝐶𝑐 is the Akaike Information 
Criterion corrected for small sample sizes; Burnham & Anderson, 2002).    
Although, confusingly, meta-JND is a measure for the observed metacognitive sensitivity 
of the participant parameterized as the type-1 sensitivity of a hypothetical ideal 
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observer, it is important to note that fitting meta-JNDs does not assume that observers 
compute confidence judgments in a statistically optimal way. The ability to also match 
suboptimal metacognitive behavior is paramount given the increasing amount of 
evidence that disputes the hypothesis for metacognitive optimality of human observers; 
Adler & Ma, 2018a; Aitchison, Bang, Bahrami & Latham, 2015; Denison, Adler, Carrasco 
& Ma, 2018; Maniscalco, Peters & Lau, 2016; but also see Fetsch, Kiani, Newsome & 
Shadlen, 2014; Sanders, Hangya & Kepecs, 2016). The model allows for various sources 
of divergence from optimality. First, we have incorporated a type-2 lapse rate 
parameter. Second, the free mapping of confidence as an optimally defined posterior 
probability of being correct (Drugowitsch et al., 2014, Hangya, Sanders & Kepecs, 2016; 
Pouget et al., 2016) onto an N-point confidence scale by means of individually adjusting 
the type-2 criteria allows for a generous amount of flexibility. Third, and possibly most 
important, a certain level of metacognitive sensitivity can only meaningfully be 
interpreted as statistically optimal when it is conditional on the type-1 performance 
level (Maniscalco & Lau, 2012). However, it is fundamental to the meta-JND (and meta-
d’) approach that the ideal observer model is fit without making it conditional on a 
participant’s type-1 performance.  
In fact, fitting of meta-JND (and meta-d’) allows researchers to compare directly the 
empirical metacognitive sensitivity of the participant against the theoretical 
metacognitive sensitivity of a statistically optimal observer with the same type-1 
performance. The comparison is commonly known for meta-d’ as the metacognitive 
efficiency ratio (Fleming & Lau, 2014; Bang, Shekhar & Rahnev, 2018). Here, we define a 
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similar ratio for meta-JND: 𝑀𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜 =
𝐽𝑁𝐷
𝑚𝑒𝑡𝑎−𝐽𝑁𝐷
. Since we expect meta-JND to be larger 
for suboptimal observers, this ratio would normally range between zero and one.  
Computing the 𝑀𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜 is only one of many ways in which we could compare empirical 
versus statistically optimal metacognitive sensitivity. From the perspective of the type-1 
JND as a measure of sensory noise (Kingdom & Prins, 2016) it is natural to express the 
difference between type-1 JND and meta-JND in terms of added (metacognitive) 
Gaussian noise with standard deviation 𝜎𝑚𝑒𝑡𝑎 = √𝑚𝑒𝑡𝑎𝐽𝑁𝐷2 − 𝐽𝑁𝐷2 (see also Bang et 
al., 2018). This method of quantifying metacognitive suboptimality is appealing because 
of its intuitive interpretation. Since we expect 𝑚𝑒𝑡𝑎𝐽𝑁𝐷 ≥ 𝐽𝑁𝐷, we also expect 
𝜎𝑚𝑒𝑡𝑎 ≥ 0°. Metacognitive noise 𝜎𝑚𝑒𝑡𝑎 is zero when 𝑚𝑒𝑡𝑎𝐽𝑁𝐷 = 𝐽𝑁𝐷 (i.e. for an ideal 
observer). Please note that there is no upper bound for 𝑚𝑒𝑡𝑎𝐽𝑁𝐷 or 𝜎𝑚𝑒𝑡𝑎: they will 
tend to go to infinity when participants provide random confidence responses. We have 
computed 𝜎𝑚𝑒𝑡𝑎 alongside 𝑀𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜 for all conditions of each participant. For practical 
reasons, we have set 𝜎𝑚𝑒𝑡𝑎 = 0° whenever (𝑚𝑒𝑡𝑎𝐽𝑁𝐷
2 − 𝐽𝑁𝐷2) < 0° (e.g. this may 
occur due to measurement noise).  
To determine whether differences between the various measures (JND, meta-JND, 
𝑀𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜, 𝜎𝑚𝑒𝑡𝑎) could be explained by experimental conditions (e.g. visual reliability level) 
we performed repeated-measures ANOVAs. To be able to quantify evidence against the 
existence of any such effect we also computed default Bayes factors for ANOVA designs 
(making use of BayesFactor Package 0.9.12-2 with default parameter settings, applying 
Cauchy priors to standardized effect sizes and setting ‘subject-ID’ as random factor; 
Rouder, Morey, Speckman & Province, 2012; http://bayesfactorpcl.r-forge.r-
project.org/). A Bayes factor 𝐵𝐹01 > 1 indicates that there is more evidence that 
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supports the null hypothesis that there is no effect of the tested factor. Both ANOVAs 
and Bayes Factor ANOVAs were performed in R 3.4.1. 
1. Results 
Data from twenty-two participants was included in the analyses (see Appendix A.1 for 
details). We fitted psychometric functions to their type-1 localization responses and 
Bayesian ideal observer models to their type-2 confidence judgments, separately for 
each of thirteen experimental conditions: one 𝐴 condition and three visual reliability 
conditions for 𝑉, 𝐴𝑉∆=0° (i.e. spatially incongruent), 𝐴𝑉∆=−𝑋° and 𝐴𝑉∆=+𝑋° (i.e. spatially 
incongruent with a small, so-called unnoticeable spatial disparity ∆𝐴𝑉). Before we 
investigate group-level results to address the main research questions on metacognitive 
efficiency and absolute confidence for multisensory versus unisensory conditions, we 
will first evaluate the performance of the here developed meta-JND model. 
3.1 Fitting meta-JND 
Figure 2 illustrates fitting behavior of the meta-JND model for three representative fits 
(from three different conditions of three different participants). We have summarized 
the empirical and model-predicted behavior in terms of mean confidence levels per 
probe location (following suggestions by Hangya et al., 2016; Sanders et al., 2016; see 
also Adler & Ma, 2018a, 2018b). The depicted data shows three very different 
metacognitive biases: Panel A shows an observer with a tendency to report high 
confidence whereas the observer in panel B prefers low confidence levels. The observer 
in panel C, on the other hand, seems to avoid either of the extremes and rather reports 
intermediate confidence levels 2 and 3. The model efficiently fits such biases by 
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adjusting the type-2 criteria 𝑪𝟐∆𝒙: fitting smaller criteria for the observer in panel A, 
larger ones for the observer in panel B, and adjusting 𝐶2∆𝑥,2 and 𝐶2∆𝑥,4 in opposite 
directions for the observer in panel C. Furthermore, the observer in panel C generally 
needed larger spatial differences between probe and standard to distinctively 
differentiate correct from incorrect responses by means of high versus low confidence 
judgments. Such lower metacognitive sensitivity is fitted by increasing the meta-JND 
parameter value. The actual mean confidence level difference between correct and 
incorrect responses (i.e. yellow shaded areas in Figure 2) is the result of a complex 
interplay between all model parameters: type-1 PSE, meta-JND, type-2 criteria and type-




Fig 2 – Illustration of the meta-JND model fits for three conditions of three different 
participants (with individualized probe locations on x-axis, see Appendix A.3).  Fig. 2 a. 
Auditory condition. Fig. 2 b. Visual condition with medium reliability. Fig. 2 c. 
Audiovisual incongruent condition (𝑨𝑽∆=−𝑿°) with low visual reliability. Participant’s 
type-2 responses (confidence levels 1-4) were summarized per probe location by 
computing the mean confidence level, conditional on their type-1 location responses 
(solid colored lines; triangular markers indicate the type-1 location responses: Left or 
Right). The expected mean confidence levels for the model (with parameter values 
that were fitted to participant’s data listed on the right) were computed as a weighted 
average, using the predicted confidence probabilities as weights (dashed black lines). 
Yellow shaded areas illustrate the difference between mean confidence levels for 
correct and incorrect type-1 responses (but note that the yellow area is not a good 
quantitative indicator of metacognitive sensitivity in terms of meta-JND, because it is 
also affected by the other model parameters). The vertical dotted lines illustrate the 
type-2 criteria adjusted for the PSE (i.e. left-right bias) in units of visual angle (note 
that these are internal brain estimates, unlike the true spatial locations of the probes). 
The upper bounds of the grey shaded areas indicate the confidence levels that would 
have been chosen if the internal spatial estimate (∆𝒙 = 𝒙𝒑𝒓 − 𝒙𝒔𝒕) falls between two 
particular type-2 criteria (confidence level 1 is given for ∆𝒙 near zero but is not 
shown). N.B. some empirical data points are ‘missing’ because the participants made 





To test whether the model is capable of disentangling the effects of each parameter we 
performed a model parameter recovery analysis for a multidimensional grid of realistic 
parameter values for JND, 𝑪𝟐∆𝒙, 𝜆2 and PSE. For each combination of parameters we 
simulated one thousand confidence responses for each of thirteen probe locations using 
Monte Carlo sampling and the generative model as described in Appendix B. We then 
fitted the model to each of the generated datasets. Visual inspection of the fitted 
parameters against the generating parameters, separately for each of the three relevant 
parameters, revealed no systematic biases of the model fits and only very small 
inaccuracies. We thus concluded that, given a sufficient amount of data, the model is 
capable of retrieving the true parameter values despite their complex interplay.  
Although parameter recovery thus suggests that the model by itself is valid, the more 
important question is whether the model is also capable of accurately fitting human 
behavior. To quantify the model’s ability to do so, we have computed the absolute 
goodness-of-fit (Shen & Ma, 2016; Acerbi, et al., 2018). This measure expresses the 
goodness-of-fit as a percentage between 0% (not better than a chance model) and 100% 
(a perfect fit in terms of the variance in the data that was explained by the model). The 
mean goodness-of-fit across all 286 (= 22 participants x 13 conditions) fits is 92%. The 
minimum goodness-of-fit was 66%. The minimum mean goodness-of-fit for any 
participant (average across conditions) was 80%. We conclude that the model fits were 
of reasonable quality. We also checked whether a bad fit automatically leads to high 
values for meta-JND, but we found no correlation between absolute goodness-of-fit and 
meta-JND (Pearson’s r = -0.10, p = 0.09), thus suggesting that the model does not exhibit 




Fig 3 – Mean group-level results for type-1 JND (panel A), meta-JND (panel B), 𝑴𝒓𝒂𝒕𝒊𝒐 
(panel C) and 𝝈𝒎𝒆𝒕𝒂 (panel D). The bars are colored by sensory modality (and 
audiovisual spatial congruency). There are three visual reliability levels for the visual 
and audiovisual conditions, indicated as H = high, M = medium, L = low. The auditory 
condition is also labelled as ‘medium’ because the visual medium reliability level was 
matched to the auditory reliability individually for each participant (see Appendix A.3). 
 
3.2 Type-1 JND, meta-JND, 𝑀𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜 and 𝜎𝑚𝑒𝑡𝑎 
Group-level averages for type-1 sensitivity (JND), metacognitive sensitivity (meta-JND), 
metacognitive efficiency (𝑀𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜) and metacognitive noise (𝜎𝑚𝑒𝑡𝑎) are shown in Figure 3 
for each of the thirteen experimental conditions. To investigate the effect of visual 
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reliability (H = high, M = medium, L = low) on each of these measures, we performed 
eight independent repeated-measures ANOVAs. For the unisensory visual condition, 
‘reliability’ was the only within-subjects factor with three levels. For the audiovisual 
conditions we included ‘AV-congruency’ as an additional within-subjects factor with two 
levels: congruent vs. incongruent (computing the mean across both incongruent 
conditions per participant). Bayes factors 𝐵𝐹01 express evidence in favour of the null-
hypothesis (i.e. no effect). The results of these statistical tests are summarized in Table 
1.  
 Effect of Reliability  ::  Vis Effect of Reliability   ::  AV 
JND F(2) = 40.8, p < 0.001, 𝐵𝐹01 < 0.001 F(2) = 54.1, p < 0.001, 𝐵𝐹01 < 0.001 
meta-JND F(2) = 21.7, p < 0.001, 𝐵𝐹01 < 0.001 F(2) = 2.25, p = 0.11, 𝑩𝑭𝟎𝟏 = 2.09 
𝑴𝒓𝒂𝒕𝒊𝒐 F(2) = 5.75, p = 0.006, 𝐵𝐹01 = 0.066 F(2) = 12.6, p < 0.001, 𝐵𝐹01 < 0.001 
𝝈𝒎𝒆𝒕𝒂 F(2) = 1.06, p = 0.36, 𝑩𝑭𝟎𝟏 = 2.47 F(2) < 1, 𝑩𝑭𝟎𝟏 = 11.1 
 
Table 1 – Repeated-measures ANOVAs and corresponding Bayes Factor analyses. 
Shown are the results for a main effect of the visual reliability separately for 
unisensory visual conditions (left) and audiovisual conditions (right). The tests that 
resulted in no significant effect of ‘reliability’ are printed in bold. There were no 
significant effects of ‘AV-congruency’ in any of the tests: F(1) < 3.83, p > 0.05, 𝑩𝑭𝟎𝟏 > 
0.94 for all tests.  
 
As intended by design, we found that the size of the visual blobs (that defined the three 
visual reliability levels for visual and audiovisual conditions) had significantly affected 
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localization performance: i.e. more spatial blurring of the visual stimuli led to reduced 
levels of type-1 sensitivity (JND) in both unisensory and audiovisual conditions. 
Furthermore, decreasing the visual reliability also negatively affected type-2 sensitivity 
(meta-JND). These effects were to be expected based on the relationship that exists 
between type-1 and type-2 performance (Maniscalco & Lau, 2012). However, the 
influence of visual reliability on meta-JNDs is less pronounced, and it is not significant for 
the audiovisual conditions.  
Meta-JNDs were generally greater than type-1 JNDs resulting in metacognitive efficiency 
ratios below one. (We found a few exceptions where 𝑀𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜 > 1, with a maximum of 
1.27, but we contribute these type-2 super-optimal findings to measurement noise.) 
Interestingly, we found a significant effect of visual reliability level on 𝑀𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜, for both 
visual and audiovisual conditions. The fact that we observed this difference for the 
audiovisual efficiency ratios and type-1 JNDs, but not for meta-JNDs, suggests that the 
reliability effect on metacognitive efficiency ratios is driven by the type-1 JNDs rather 
than the meta-JNDs. This suggestion is further corroborated by looking at the 
metacognitive noise estimates 𝜎𝑚𝑒𝑡𝑎. The statistical tests revealed that metacognitive 
noise levels were unaffected by the amount of type-1 sensory noise. We conclude that, 
while metacognitive sensitivity (meta-JND) is influenced by type-1 sensory performance 
because the latter provides a theoretical maximum for the former (Maniscalco & Lau, 
2012), the amount of noise that is added during metacognitive processing is not affected 
by type-1 task performance.  
To focus more specifically on the current study’s interest in multisensory integration, we 
next assessed the difference in metacognitive noise between auditory, visual and 
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audiovisual conditions. Since we found no effect of ‘AV-congruency’ (see caption of 
Table 1) we averaged the audiovisual 𝜎𝑚𝑒𝑡𝑎 for each participant. To test whether 
metacognitive noise levels were different in any of the sensory modalities (𝐴, 𝑉, 𝐴𝑉) we 
performed three independent repeated-measurement ANOVAs: one for each visual 
reliability of 𝑉 and 𝐴𝑉, with (the only set of) auditory 𝜎𝑚𝑒𝑡𝑎 included in all three tests. 
We found no effect of sensory modality for any of the reliability levels: F(2) < 1, 𝐵𝐹01 = 
9.44 (High),  F(2) < 1, 𝐵𝐹01 = 4.62 (Medium),  F(2) = 1.11, p = 0.34, 𝐵𝐹01 = 2.28 (Low).  
 
 Fig 4 – Metacognitive noise for all 286 fits (22 participants x 13 conditions). To 
illustrate the consistency of 𝝈𝒎𝒆𝒕𝒂 for each participant across conditions we sorted the 
participants by their mean 𝝈𝒎𝒆𝒕𝒂. Note that the color-coding depicts the natural 
logarithm of each 𝝈𝒎𝒆𝒕𝒂.  
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The above-described results suggest that metacognitive noise is stable across modalities 
and independent of visual reliability levels. To further investigate this we compared the 
intra-participants variance (i.e. the SD of 𝜎𝑚𝑒𝑡𝑎 across conditions for each participant) 
with the inter-participants variance (the SD of 𝜎𝑚𝑒𝑡𝑎 across participants for each 
condition). Figure 4 illustrates the difference between both measures (i.e. compare 
horizontal versus vertical colors). While there are large differences in the amount of 
metacognitive noise between participants, the amount of variance across various 
sensory modalities and reliability levels for each participant is relatively small. A two-
sample t-test (for 22 against 13 SDs, respectively) confirmed that the intra-participant 
variance of 𝜎𝑚𝑒𝑡𝑎 (mean SD = 1.02) is significantly smaller than the inter-participant 
variance (mean SD = 1.94): t(33) = -6.01, p < 0.001.  
3.3 Type-2 criteria 
The experimental design allowed participants to select one of four confidence levels on 
each 2IFC trial. The meta-JND model assumes that such a confidence judgment depends 
on the internal estimate of the spatial difference between probe and standard (∆𝑥): a 
higher confidence level is selected when ∆𝑥 exceeds a certain type-2 criterion. There are 
three criteria to separate four confidence levels. The group-level means of these criteria 
are shown in Figure 5.  
A lower type-2 criterion generally results in more high confidence ratings. We 
hypothesized that the placement of such criteria depends on the reliability of the stimuli 
(since we expected higher confidence judgments for more reliable stimuli). To 
investigate this hypothesis we performed two repeated-measures ANOVAs, one for 𝑉 
and one for 𝐴𝑉 conditions (as before). Besides ‘reliability’, we added ‘C2-level’ as a 
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second within-subjects factor with three levels: 𝐶2∆𝑥,2, 𝐶2∆𝑥,3 and 𝐶2∆𝑥,4. The ANOVA 
for the 𝐴𝑉 conditions also contained a third within-subjects factor: ‘AV-condition’ with 
three levels (∆𝐴𝑉 = 0°, ∆𝐴𝑉 = −𝑋° and ∆𝐴𝑉 = +𝑋°). Both ANOVAs confirmed the 
hypothesis that fitted type-2 criteria were smaller for more reliable stimuli: F(2) = 23.8, p 
< 0.001, 𝐵𝐹01 < 0.001 (𝑉) and F(2) = 4.55, p = 0.011, 𝐵𝐹01 < 0.60 (𝐴𝑉). Noteworthy is 
that there was no difference between AV conditions: F(2) < 1, 𝐵𝐹01 = 49.2.  
The question of whether multisensory integration leads to higher confidence can be 
viewed as a special case of the above-discussed 𝐶2∆𝑥 reliability dependency. If we 
assume that multisensory integration does not only lead to a variance reduction across 
trials (as was found empirically; e.g. Ernst & Banks, 2002; Alais & Burr, 2004), but also 
results in a sensory noise reduction for any one multisensory stimulus (as is predicted by 
maximum likelihood estimation) then we should also observe a confidence boost for 
multisensory as opposed to unisensory stimuli. Specifically, we should find that 
audiovisual type-2 criteria are lower than the minimum of either auditory or visual type-
2 criteria. To assess this hypothesis we computed the mean audiovisual 𝑪𝟐∆𝒙 across the 
three (in)congruent conditions (per participant, reliability level and 𝐶2∆𝑥 level) and 
compared those against the lowest unisensory type-2 criteria (either 𝐴 or 𝑉, per 
participant, reliability level and 𝐶2∆𝑥 level) by means of a repeated-measures ANOVA 
with three within-subject factors: ‘reliability’ (3 levels), ‘C2-level’ (3 levels) and ‘Uni-vs-
AV’ (2 levels). The analysis revealed a significant difference between unisensory and 
multisensory type-2 criteria, F(1) = 14.6, p < 0.001, 𝐵𝐹01 < 0.0074, indicating that 
participants adjusted their criteria for audiovisual relative to unisensory trials. Simply 
put, this criterion change is a clear signature of the confidence boost for multisensory 
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trials. Neither the interaction between ‘Uni-vs-AV’ and ‘reliability’ nor the interaction 
between ‘Uni-vs-AV’ and ‘C2-level’ were significant (F(2) = 0.72, p = 0.49 and F(2) = 1.39, 
p = 0.25, respectively) thus suggesting that the difference between the minimum 
unisensory and bisensory type-2 criteria does not depend on the particular reliability 
level or type-2 criterion.  
 
 
Fig 5 – Group-level mean metacognitive biases. We computed the mean across 
participants for each of the three fitted criteria per condition. These criteria separate 
each bar in the plot into three confidence levels: darkest = 1 (low confidence), lightest 
= 3. The highest confidence level = 4 corresponds to the area above the bar (top of the 




3.4 Predicting Type-1 JNDs and type-2 criteria based on maximum likelihood estimation 
To see whether participants had indeed integrated the multisensory signals, we tested 
for an audiovisual variance reduction of the type-1 localization responses. Similar to the 
above-described approach for type-2 criteria, we now computed the mean audiovisual 
type-1 JNDs and compared these to the smallest unisensory JNDs (per participant and 
reliability level). A repeated-measures ANOVA (two within-subject factors: ‘reliability’ 
and ‘Uni-vs-AV’) confirmed significance of the audiovisual variance reduction: F(1) = 
48.2, p < 0.001, 𝐵𝐹01 < 0.001 (see Fig. 3A). A more stringent test for multisensory 
variance reduction is to compare the empirical mean audiovisual JNDs to the predicted 
bisensory JNDs based on the unisensory JNDs and integration according to maximum 





2)⁄ . The repeated-measures ANOVA (with the 
same factors as before) suggests that participants did indeed integrate the sensory 
signals in line with MLE: F(1) < 1, 𝐵𝐹01 = 5.44.  
Since we were able to predict the degree to which the audiovisual JNDs decreased 
relative to the unisensory JNDs (using MLE predictions, see above), we set out to see 
whether we could also predict the degree to which the audiovisual type-2 criteria 
decrease relative to the unisensory type-2 criteria. In order to do so, we make an 
important assumption: each criterion that separates two confidence levels (𝐶2∆𝑥), 
relates to a particular Bayesian posterior probability of being correct which is 
independent of the sensory modality (see also Appendix B.3). In other words, if for 
example 𝐶2∆𝑥,3 for the auditory modality relates to a posterior probability of 0.8, then 
we assume that 𝐶2∆𝑥,3 for the visual modality relates to that same posterior probability. 
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If we further assume a flat spatial prior, then the posterior probability of being correct 
can be computed using the formula for a cumulative Gaussian: 
1
2




Equation B.4). By inserting the unisensory (type-1) JNDs and type-2 criteria we 
computed the posterior probability of being correct for each of the four unisensory 
conditions (1 x A and 3 x V) per participant and criterion level. We then averaged the 
posterior probabilities across A and V to obtain three reliability-specific posterior 
probabilities (per participant and criterion level). Following the assumption that these 
posterior probabilities for each criterion level are independent of the sensory modality, 
we then predicted (i.e. computed) the audiovisual type-2 criteria by inserting the MLE-
predicted audiovisual JNDs (𝐽𝑁𝐷𝐴𝑉,𝑀𝐿𝐸) into the inverse of the cumulative Gaussian (i.e. 
‘norminv’ in Matlab; 𝜇 = 0°). Note that the predicted audiovisual type-2 criteria are thus 
entirely based on unisensory data: auditory and visual type-1 JNDs and type-2 criteria. 
We then compared the predicted audiovisual criteria with the actually fitted audiovisual 
criteria (mean across the three AV conditions: 𝐴𝑉∆=0°, 𝐴𝑉∆=−𝑥° and 𝐴𝑉∆=+𝑥°).  
Figure 6 depicts the results of the above described analysis. The scatter plot shows an 
excellent correlation between predicted and fitted type-2 criteria (coefficient of 
determination 𝑅2 = 0.85). Importantly, the relationship between predicted and fitted 
criteria is also unbiased. (In contrast, a similar scatter plot, not shown, for audiovisual 
versus unisensory type-2 criteria shows a clear bias with ~75% of the markers indicating 
that the audiovisual criteria are smaller than the unisensory criteria; c.f. last analyses in 
Section 3.3). A repeated measures ANOVA with three within-subject factors: ‘reliability’ 
(3 levels), ‘C2-level’ (3 levels) and ‘Predicted-vs-Fitted’ (2 levels) revealed no significant 
difference between predicted and fitted audiovisual type-2 criteria: F(1) = 2.57, p = 0.11, 
189 
 
𝐵𝐹01 = 2.60 (n.b. the data were log-transformed for this analysis). This result (i) confirms 
the fixed mapping of a particular criterion level (𝐶2∆𝑥,𝑖) to the Bayesian posterior 
probability of being correct independent of the sensory modality, and (ii) it 
demonstrates that observers are able to set their type-2 criteria based on the sensory 
uncertainty of the stimuli, equally for unisensory and multisensory stimuli.   
 
Fig 6 – Predicting audiovisual type-2 criteria. The figure shows a scatterplot for 
comparison of the mean (across congruent and incongruent AV conditions) fitted 
audiovisual type-2 criteria (y-axis) and the predicted audiovisual type-2 criteria based 
on unisensory JNDs and unisensory type-2 criteria only (x-axis). The diagonal dashed 
red line indicates equality (x=y). Different colors and symbols indicate the reliability 
level and type-2 criterion (see legend). There is one marker of each kind per 




The current audiovisual spatial integration study empirically answers two fundamental 
questions concerning the interaction between multisensory integration and 
metacognition (Deroy et al., 2016). First, we have shown that metacognitive processes 
for making confidence judgments on perceptual decisions are equally effective for 
unisensory and multisensory stimuli. Specifically, we found that metacognitive noise was 
not larger for audiovisual relative to unisensory signals, thus implying that multisensory 
integration is not associated with a loss of introspective ability. Second, we 
demonstrated that multisensory integration leads to increased levels of confidence 
through a type-2 criteria shift that corresponds to the degree of integration-induced 
audiovisual variance reduction. This finding provides strong support for the hypothesis 
that multisensory integration reduces sensory uncertainty on a per-stimulus basis, above 
and beyond the established behavioral precision improvement that is found across many 
stimulus presentations (e.g. Ernst & Banks, 2002; Alais & Burr, 2004).   
To be able to answer these questions adequately we have extended the now popular 
meta-d’ approach that expresses metacognitive sensitivity in terms of the type-1 
performance of an ideal observer model (Maniscalco & Lau, 2012). Using Bayesian 
probability theory, we have derived a statistically-optimal observer model for 
confidence judgments that can be applied to psychometric function-based experimental 
designs and expresses metacognitive sensitivity as ‘meta-JND’. The extension yielded 
some noteworthy benefits over the original signal-detection based approach. 1. The use 
of multiple stimulus levels avoids the need to carefully titrate experimental conditions to 
prevent ceiling/floor effects. 2. Estimates of metacognitive sensitivity and metacognitive 
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bias based on a range of stimulus levels are likely to be more accurate and potentially 
generalize better across various experimental tasks. 3. The measurement units for both 
meta-JND and type-2 criteria are intuitive to comprehend and free of 
interdependencies. In particular, the fitted values for type-2 criteria are unaffected by an 
observer’s metacognitive sensitivity, which allows for straightforward comparisons of 
metacognitive biases across conditions and sensory modalities.  
Nevertheless, a model-based parameterization of human metacognitive sensitivity and 
metacognitive bias would only be useful if the model is sufficiently able to describe 
human behavior. Based on the model’s absolute goodness-of-fit (Acerbi et al., 2018; 
Shen & Ma, 2016) we considered the fits to be suffienciently good to make reliable 
inferences with the parameter estimates that were obtained. Yet, we believe it 
worthwhile for future research to formally test the current model, that is loosely based 
on a Bayesian ideal observer with flexibility to be able to make suboptimal inferences, 
against other observer models that instead apply heuristics to predict human confidence 
judgments (Adler & Ma, 2018a). 
Our finding that the commonly-used metacognitive efficiency ratio (Fleming & Lau, 
2014) negatively correlates with stimulus reliability was previously also recognized by 
Bang, Shekhar & Rahnev (2018). Similar to us, they reasoned that this was most likely a 
consequence of type-1 performance on the computed sensitivity ratio and does not 
indicate a genuine decrease of introspective ability for more reliable stimuli. Our novel 
approach allowed us to directly quantify the difference between type-1 JND and meta-
JND in terms of the added metacognitive noise. By doing so we demonstrated that the 
amount of metacognitive noise was unaffected by type-1 sensory noise and relatively 
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stable for each participant across various conditions. Specifically, we found that is was 
not affected by the sensory modality of the stimuli (𝐴, 𝑉, 𝐴𝑉). Such intra-subject 
stability for metacognitive performance across modalities corresponds well with 
previous findings of metacognitive consistency across various tasks and experimental 
designs (Ais, Zylberberg, Barttfeld & Sigman, 2016; Song et al., 2011). Together with the 
finding of a fixed mapping relationship between type-2 criteria and the Bayesian 
posterior probability of being correct independent of sensory modality (Section 3.4), this 
strongly supports previous proposals for the supra-modality of metacognition (De 
Gardelle, Le Corre & Mamassian, 2016; Faivre, Filevich, Solovey, Kühn & Blanke, 2018).  
The here presented results on supra-modal metacognitive noise contribute to the 
abundance of evidence that points towards a hierarchical model for metacognitive 
perceptual decision making (Bang et al., 2018; De Martino, Fleming, Garrett & Dolan, 
2013; Fleming et al., 2015; Jang, Wallsten & Huber, 2012; Maniscalco & Lau, 2016; 
Mueller & Weidemann, 2008; Rahnev, Nee, Riddle, Larson & D’Esposito, 2016; Van den 
Berg, Yoo & Ma, 2017). According to such a hierarchical view, metacogniton follows 
ordinary perceptual processes in a second stage of processing. Neuroimaging evidence 
suggests that the prefrontal cortex plays an important role in this late-stage forming of 
confidence judgments about perceptual decisions (De Martino et al., 2013; Murphy et 
al., 2016; Rahnev et al., 2016; Wokke, Cleeremans & Ridderinkhof, 2017). Presumably, 
these frontal areas would base their confidence judgments on ‘read outs’ of sensory 
uncertainty that is encoded elsewhere in the brain (e.g. sensory and parietal areas). 
Given the amount of noise in the nervous system as a whole (Faisal, Selen & Wolpert, 
2008) it is very plausible that metacognitive noise impedes observers from reaching 
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statistically optimal metacognitive sensitivity. Task complexity (Beck, Ma, Pitkow, 
Latham & Pouget, 2012) and unstable use of type-2 criteria over the course of the 
experiment may further exacerbate empircally determined metacognitive noise values 
(Maniscalco & Lau, 2012; Mueller & Weidemann, 2008). Keeping in mind the impressive 
differences in metacognitive noise levels between participants, an interesting direction 
for future research is to investigate what other factors influence our metacognitive 
abilities (Bang et al., 2018; Fleming et al., 2015). 
Our model-based approach allowed us to examine metacognitive biases independently 
from metacognitive sensitivity. We found that the fitted type-2 criteria were smaller for 
multisensory stimuli than for either of the unisensory component stimuli by themselves. 
Since these criteria were fitted to the confidence judgments of participants, with 
identical stimulus locations for the bisensory and unisensory conditions, we concluded 
that participants’ confidence was higher for multisensory as opposed to unisensory 
stimuli. Given the complexity with which mean confidence levels are affected by 
metacognitive sensitivity and type-2 lapse rate, we argue that differences of type-2 
criteria provide the safest way to quantify confidence differences between conditions 
(see also Fleming & Lau, 2014).  
Furthermore, the type-2 criteria across three visual reliability levels indicated that the 
criterion shift for multisensory stimuli was most likely based on reduced sensory 
uncertainty for the integrated sensory signals. In fact, the degree to which the type-2 
criteria were smaller corresponded to predictions that were made based on sensory 
integration according to maximum likelihood estimation. We thus concluded that the 
confidence increase for multisensory decisions probably resulted from a sensory noise 
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reduction after multisensory integration. Although this may seem obvious at first 
thought, we argue that this is a critical finding which, as far as we are aware, has not 
been published before. While sensory noise reduction has widely been accepted as a 
fundamental beneficial property of multisensory integration (e.g. through maximum 
likelihood estimation), direct evidence for this proposal has been limited. In fact, despite 
the popularity of probabilistic models for multisensory perception (e.g. Ma, Beck, 
Latham & Pouget, 2006; Pouget et al., 2013), there is little direct 
neuroimaging/neurophysiological evidence for probabilistic perceptual encoding in the 
brain (van Bergen, Ma, Pratte & Jehee, 2015). Instead, most evidence supporting the 
sensory uncertainty reduction hypothesis for multisensory integration comes from 
psychophysics experiments wherein a behavioral variance reduction is observed across 
many trials (Ernst & Banks, 2002; Alais & Burr, 2004). Although such findings may indeed 
suggest that multisensory integration according to MLE has taken place, they can also be 
explained by simple weighted averaging of two unisensory point estimates on any one 
trial (Rahnev, 2018). In other words, they do not necessarily provide evidence that 
probability distributions were used during multisensory integration. We believe that the 
here shown confidence boost by multisensory noise reduction contributes new evidence 
in favour of distribution-based integration, because weighted averaging of point-based 
estimates would not be sufficient to explain the multisensory confidence boost 
(although more complex alternative explanations might).  
In summary, the current study provides support for a hierarchical view of multisensory 
decision making (see also Faivre et al., 2018). At lower stages in the hierarchy unisensory 
signals are integrated, weighted by their reliability, leading to sensory noise reduction 
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for the multisensory estimates. At a second stage, metacognitive processes examine the 
sensory uncertainty that is associated with the multisensory estimates and assign 
corresponding confidence levels to the perceptual decisions. Metacognitive noise 
perturbs sensory uncertainty estimates causing metacognitive sensitivity to be 
suboptimal. Importantly, although the amount of metacognitive noise varies 
dramatically from person to person, the amount seems independent of sensory modality 
or stimulus reliability. Multisensory noise reduction thus translates into relatively higher 
decision confidence and the ability to introspect on sensory uncertainty is equal for 
unisensory and multisensorily integrated stimuli.  
 
Appendix A: Details of experimental methods 
A.1. Sample characteristics 
Twenty-eight participants were initially recruited. Two participants were excluded in the 
first session because their auditory localization performance was inadequate (see 
Section A.3.1.1). One participant chose to withdraw from the study during the second 
session. One participant was excluded after the second session because the third and 
fourth sessions could not be scheduled within the next two weeks (extended time-
periods between sessions may lead to inconsistent performance across sessions). Two 
participants were additionally excluded from data analyses post-hoc, because their 
mean confidence levels across the various probe locations were essentially flat lines 
(several conditions where the fitted meta-JND > 50°, whereas the maximum meta-JND 
for all other participants did not exceed 12.5°), thus indicating that these two 
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participants (probably) had not performed the task adequately (or improbably, that they 
were incapable of metacognitive evaluation of their location responses for all 
experimental conditions). 
Behavioral data sets from twenty-two participants were included for data analysis (eight 
males; mean age 23 years, range 19-30 years; six participants reported left-handedness 
and operated the mouse with their preferred hand). All participants were university 
students with reportedly normal hearing, (corrected to) normal vision and no history of 
neurological or psychiatric disorder. Participants provided informed consent and were 
financially compensated. The study was approved by the human research review 
committee of the University of Birmingham (approval numbers ERN_11-0470AP4 & 
ERN_15-1458P). 
A.2. Stimuli and experimental setup 
Visual stimuli were greyscale circular blobs with bivariate Gaussian amplitude envelopes 
presented for a duration of 16.7 ms in low-contrast (20 cd/m2 in its centre) on a darker 
grey background (15 cd/m2) by means of back-projection (60Hz BenQ MW529 DLP 
projector) on an opaque fine-PVC fabric projector screen (127.5 cm width x 170cm 
height). The size of the visual stimuli was defined by the 2D Gaussian’s standard 
deviation 𝜎𝑏𝑙𝑜𝑏 (symmetrical in all directions) and was individually adjusted for each 
participant (see Section A.3.1.2).  
Auditory stimuli were 16.7 ms bursts of white noise (70 dB SPL; 5 ms on/off ramp) 
presented by means of headphones (Sennheiser HD 280 Pro) with a playback frequency 
of 192 kHz. The auditory signals were convolved with standardised head-related transfer 
functions (Gardner & Martin, 1995; 
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http://sound.media.mit.edu/resources/KEMAR.html) to create illusory spatial origins 
along the azimuth.  
Audiovisual stimuli were combinations of the above-described auditory and visual 
component stimuli presented simultaneously (maximum audiovisual asynchronies < 2 
ms). Audiovisual stimuli could be presented as spatially congruent (∆𝐴𝑉 = 0°) or 
incongruent (∆𝐴𝑉 = ±𝑋°, with the visual component stimulus location shifted by 
+1
2
∆𝐴𝑉 and the auditory component stimulus shifted by −1
2
∆𝐴𝑉 relative to the reported 
audiovisual stimulus location). The audiovisual disparity sizes (𝑋°) were individually 
adjusted for each participant (see Section A.3.1.2). Stimulus presentation was controlled 
using Psychtoolbox 3.0.12 (Brainard, 1997; Kleiner, Brainard & Pelli, 2007; 
www.psychtoolbox.org) running on MATLAB R2016a (www.mathworks.com).  
Participants were seated behind a table in a dark room with their chin on a chinrest 
placed at a distance of 75 cm from the screen. Prior to the first stimulus onset 
participants fixated a central grey cross (1° diameter) with luminance equal to the centre 
of the visual stimuli (for a duration of (750 – 1250 ms, randomly jittered). Fixation was 
monitored by means of a desktop mount Eyelink 1000 eye tracker (www.sr-
research.com) that was calibrated before the start of each block of trials. Corrective 
feedback regarding fixation accuracy was provided after each block.  
A.3. Experimental procedure 
The study consisted of four 2.5 hour sessions that were performed on four separate 
days. The main experiment took place in sessions 2-4, whereas session 1 was used 
primarily for the calibration of particular stimulus settings. In the following we will 
separately describe the series of experimental parts in the first and latter three sessions. 
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A.3.1. First session:  
A.3.1.1. (Familiarization). The 2IFC task for each trial was explained to participants 
through a short presentation that stressed the importance of accurate confidence 
judgments. To enhance participants’ forced-fusion assumptions they were told that the 
auditory and visual components of the audiovisual stimuli were always presented at the 
same spatial location, “as if somebody hit the back of the screen with a metal stick 
(where the visual blobs represent the stick’s imprint during the hits), so it would be wise 
to localize these audiovisual events based on both sensory modalities”. Participants then 
completed a short familiarization series that included  𝐴, 𝑉 and 𝐴𝑉∆=0° trials (6 trials x 3 
conditions x 12 locations: ±1°, ±4°, ±7°, ±10°, ±13°, ±15°; three visual reliability levels 
were pseudo-randomized with 𝜎𝑏𝑙𝑜𝑏 either 5°, 10° or 15°). After every response 
participants were given immediate corrective feedback on their location response, i.e. a 
green/red circle was presented on the screen to indicate a correct/incorrect response 
(200 ms duration).  
A.3.1.2. (Auditory reliability measurement). This experimental part consisted of two 
smaller parts. Participants first completed a series of 𝐴 trials (20 trials x 13 locations: 0°, 
±1°, ±2°, ±3°, ±5°, ±7°, ±10°). Participants that obtained an accuracy of less than 90% for 
those forty trials on which the probe was presented at ±10° azimuth were excluded from 
further participation in the study. For each participant we fitted a cumulative Gaussian 
psychometric function to the fractions of ‘perceived right’ responses (Palamedes toolbox 
1.8.2 for Matlab;  www.palamedestoolbox.org). The maximum likelihood estimate of the 
JND parameter served to indicate the auditory spatial reliability.  
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This auditory JND was subsequently used for individually adjusting the following three 
stimulus settings: i. Thirteen individualized probe locations were defined as: 𝐽𝑁𝐷 ∗
(0, ±0.5, ±1, ±1.5, ±2, ±2.5, ±3), rounded to 0.5° under the constraint that the 13 
locations were unique. (ii) Visual stimulus sizes (𝜎𝑏𝑙𝑜𝑏) were individually adjusted for 
each participant to match the unisensory reliabilities, i.e. 𝐽𝑁𝐷𝑉 ≈ 𝐽𝑁𝐷𝐴 (see Section 
A.3.1.3). (iii) The audiovisual disparity was set equal to the auditory JND (rounded to the 
nearest 1° visual angle) because this setting has been shown (through simulations; 
Meijer & Noppeney, 2018) to provide a good balance between being able to investigate 
reliability-weighted integration (outside the scope of this report) while not violating 
participants’ forced-fusion assumptions, thus minimizing the probability that 
participants perform causal inference instead of simple multisensory integration 
(Körding, Beierholm, Ma et al., 2007; Rohe and Noppeney, 2015a).   
The second part of the ‘auditory reliability measurement’ is a refinement of the first 
part’s measurement by using the individualized JND-based locations (see point i above) 
for a second series of 𝐴 trials (20 trials x 13 individualized locations). The updated 
auditory JND, obtained from a second psychometric function fit, was used in all further 
tasks (see points i, ii, and iii above). 
A.3.1.3. (Visual reliability adjustment). This experimental part aimed to match the 
visual reliability to the auditory reliability for each participant. First we obtained the 
hypothetical probe locations that would have led to auditory accuracy levels of 68%, 
79% and 87% (from the fitted auditory psychometric function; see above). Then we used 
these three location pairs (±𝑋°) as visual probe locations at which we aimed to match 
the accuracy to aforementioned levels by increasing 𝜎𝑏𝑙𝑜𝑏 if accuracy was too high and 
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decreasing 𝜎𝑏𝑙𝑜𝑏 if accuracy was too low. For each location pair we used two adaptive 
weighted up/down staircase procedures (Kingdom and Prins, 2016), one starting at an 
artificially high 𝜎𝑏𝑙𝑜𝑏 (25°) and one starting at a very low value for 𝜎𝑏𝑙𝑜𝑏 (3°). The six 
staircases were presented interleaved. Each staircase was terminated after thirty 
reversals. For each staircase 𝜎𝑏𝑙𝑜𝑏 was computed pooled over the last 20 reversals. For 
each participant we identified which of the six staircases provided the estimate that was 
most distant from the pooled 𝜎𝑏𝑙𝑜𝑏 across all six staircases. To attenuate effects of 
potential outliers, we discarded this estimate and then computed the final pooled 𝜎𝑏𝑙𝑜𝑏 
across the remaining five staircases (i.e. √1
𝑛
∗ ∑(𝜎𝑏𝑙𝑜𝑏2), with 𝑛 = 5 staircases x 20 
reversals). This final 𝜎𝑏𝑙𝑜𝑏 estimate served as the medium visual reliability level. High 
and low visual reliability levels were created by multiplying 𝜎𝑏𝑙𝑜𝑏 with 0.75 and 1.25, 
respectively.  
A.3.1.4. (Visual reliability confirmation). To confirm that the unisensory reliabilities 
were successfully matched participants completed a series of 𝑉 trials with the 
individualized blob sizes (medium visual reliability) from the staircase procedure above 
(20 trials x 13 individualized locations). A psychometric function was then fitted to the 
visual location responses in order to obtain an estimate of the visual reliability. If the 




2 > 2 ∗ 𝐽𝑁𝐷𝐴
2, we would consider the participant to be unreliable 
with respect to their localization performance and therefore exclude him/her from the 
study at this stage (but this did not occur: unisensory reliabilities were sufficiently 




A.3.2. Second, third and fourth session: 
A.3.2.1. (Familiarization repetition). At the beginning of sessions 2-4, participants took 
part in a repetition of the familiarization run (with feedback after every trial, see Section 
A.3.1.1) to minimize variability in perceptual reliability and task performance across 
sessions (6 trials x 3 conditions x 12 individualized probe locations; one of the three 
individualized visual reliability levels was selected at random for 𝑉 and 𝐴𝑉∆=0° trials).  
A.3.2.2. (Main experiment). The main experiment was subdivided into eighteen blocks 
of trials. Six such blocks were completed in each of three sessions (2-4). Each block 
consisted of three mini-blocks, where each mini-block contained trials of one modality: 
𝐴, 𝑉 or 𝐴𝑉. The order of the mini-blocks within a block was pseudo-randomized. The 
upcoming sensory modality for each mini-block was announced on-screen immediately 
prior to its start. In 𝐴𝑉 mini-blocks, the order of congruent (𝐴𝑉∆=0°) and incongruent 
(𝐴𝑉∆=±𝑋°) trials was randomized. Furthermore, in 𝑉 and 𝐴𝑉 mini-blocks trials from the 
three visual reliability levels were also presented in random order. All 𝐴 mini-blocks 
contained 52 trials (4 trials x 13 locations), 𝑉 mini-blocks contained 78 trials (2 trials x 13 
locations x 3 reliability levels), and 𝐴𝑉 mini-blocks contained 234 trials (2 trials x 13 
locations x 3 reliability levels x 3 conditions: one congruent and two incongruent). 
Within one block (i.e. 𝐴 + 𝑉 + 𝐴𝑉 = 364 trials) there were three 20 second mini-breaks 
(after every 91 trials) wherein the participant was given the chance to relax but keep the 
chin on the chin-rest. Motivational quotes (unrelated to the current experiment) were 
shown on screen during the mini-breaks. The program continued automatically after 
each mini-break by announcing the upcoming sensory modality. In between two blocks 
of trials participants were encouraged to take longer breaks.  
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After each block of trials the mean confidence per location was shown on screen, 
separately for 𝐴, 𝑉 and 𝐴𝑉 conditions (means were computed across all three reliability 
levels and spatially incongruent AV conditions were not included). Critically, the figure 
axes did not show any values (i.e. there were no tick-labels) and the plots were scaled 
between minimum and maximum such that the confidence levels could not be 
compared across conditions. These figures served as feedback for both participant and 
experimenter. A ‘v-shape’ meant that confidence was generally higher for more 
eccentric probe locations (averaged across correct and incorrect type-1 responses). This 
pattern would be expected and participants were encouraged to introspect more in 
successive blocks if no clear v-shapes were visible.  
Importantly, only data from the main experiment was used for the analyses of 
confidence judgements (Section 2.2). However, we note that participants were also 
required to report confidence judgments (by means of mouse responses on the butterfly 
diagram, see Figure 1) in all other tasks. Although these confidence responses served no 
immediate purpose, this was done for participants to get accustomed to the response 
mechanism and to practice metacognitive reflection on their location responses. After 
finishing the auditory and visual localization tasks in session 1, see Sections A.3.1.2 and 
A.3.1.4, the program had shown similar v-shape feedback plots to encourage 
participants to introspect and to let them know that their responses were being 





Appendix B: Derivation of confidence level probabilities for ideal observers and meta-
JND model fitting practicalities 
B.1 Audiovisual location inference 
When a stimulus is presented at its true location 𝑆, a brain’s internal representation of 
that location,  𝑥, is assumed to be corrupted by Gaussian noise. For any audiovisual 
stimulus, we assume that the added noise for both sensory modalities independent. The 
generative model thus posits that internal auditory (A) and visual (V) location 
representations are separately sampled from normally-distributed sensory noise 
probability density functions (PDFs), each with its own variance and centred on the true 
stimulus location: 𝑥𝑉  ~ 𝑁(𝑥𝑉;  𝑆𝑉, 𝜎
2
𝑉) and 𝑥𝐴 ~ 𝑁(𝑥𝐴;  𝑆𝐴, 𝜎
2
𝐴). In what follows below 
we will often refer to the sensory noise-induced variance as 𝜎2𝑆, whether the trial was 











We assume that an ideal observer has “learned” the generative model and inverts it to 
obtain the best estimate of the stimulus location. Knowing internal representation 𝑥, the 
likelihood that a stimulus at location 𝑆 has caused this particular 𝑥 is given by the 
likelihood function (centred on 𝑥): 𝑃(𝑥|𝑆) = 𝑁(𝑆;  𝑥, 𝜎2𝑆). The audiovisual likelihood 
function, assuming independent sensory noise and one source location (𝑆𝐴𝑉) for both 𝑥𝐴 
and 𝑥𝑉, is the product of the two unisensory likelihood functions (Ernst & Banks, 2002):  
𝑃(𝑥𝐴𝑉|𝑆𝑉, 𝑆𝐴) = 𝑃(𝑥𝐴|𝑆𝐴)𝑃(𝑥𝑉|𝑆𝑉) = 𝑁(𝑆𝐴𝑉;  𝑥𝐴𝑉, 𝜎
2
𝐴𝑉) 
















To compute the posterior probability for 𝑆 being the stimulus location that gave rise to 
internal representation 𝑥, Bayes’ rule states that one should multiply likelihood with 
prior probability. We assume that observers hold a normally-distributed prior probability 
distribution over all locations 𝑆, with mean 𝜇𝑃 (e.g. 0° for a central bias; Kerzel, 2002) 
and variance 𝜎2𝑃: 𝑃(𝑆) =  𝑁(𝑆; 𝜇𝑃, 𝜎
2
𝑃). The posterior probability distribution is 
another Gaussian: 
𝑃(𝑆|𝑥) = 𝑁(𝑆; 𝑤𝑆𝑥 + 𝑤𝑃𝜇𝑃, 𝑤𝑆𝜎
2
𝑆) 
  Where:       𝑤𝑠 =
𝜎2𝑃
𝜎2𝑆+𝜎2𝑃
        and       𝑤𝑃 =
𝜎2𝑆
𝜎2𝑆+𝜎2𝑃
   
The best estimate for the stimulus location is the maximum (mean) of this posterior 
distribution: 
          ?̂? = arg 𝑚𝑎𝑥 𝑃(𝑆|𝑥) = 𝑤𝑆𝑥 + 𝑤𝑃𝜇𝑃 
In a two-interval forced-choice task, such as the one used in the current study, every 
trial contains two stimuli, standard and probe. Importantly, the amount of sensory noise 
for standard and probe is identical: 𝜎2𝑆,𝑠𝑡 = 𝜎
2
𝑆,𝑝𝑟. Participants make responses based 
on the estimated difference between probe and standard (we use subscripts 𝑝𝑟 and 𝑠𝑡, 
respectively): 
    ∆?̂? = ?̂?𝑝𝑟 − ?̂?𝑠𝑡 = (𝑤𝑆𝑥𝑝𝑟 + 𝑤𝑃𝜇𝑃) − (𝑤𝑆𝑥𝑠𝑡 + 𝑤𝑃𝜇𝑃) = 𝑤𝑆(𝑥𝑝𝑟 − 𝑥𝑠𝑡) =
𝑤𝑆∆𝑥 
Alternatively, we can express ∆?̂? as the maximum (mean) of the posterior probability 
distribution for stimulus disparity ∆𝑆 (= 𝑆𝑝𝑟 − 𝑆𝑠𝑡), which is equal to the normal 
difference distribution of both posteriors, 𝑃(𝑆𝑝𝑟|𝑥𝑝𝑟) and 𝑃(𝑆𝑠𝑡|𝑥𝑠𝑡): 
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    𝑃(∆𝑆|𝑥𝑠𝑡 , 𝑥𝑝𝑟) = 𝑁(∆𝑆; ∆?̂?, 2𝑤𝑆𝜎
2
𝑆)             (Eq. B.1) 
Finally, location response 𝑧 is determined by whether disparity estimate ∆?̂? is greater or 
smaller than an internal type-1 criterion that we call 𝐶1:  
             𝑃(𝑧 = "𝑟𝑖𝑔ℎ𝑡"|𝑥𝑠𝑡, 𝑥𝑝𝑟) = {
1   𝑖𝑓   ∆?̂? ≥ 𝐶1
0   𝑖𝑓   ∆?̂? < 𝐶1
            
         𝑃(𝑧 = "𝑙𝑒𝑓𝑡"|𝑥𝑠𝑡 , 𝑥𝑝𝑟) = {
1   𝑖𝑓   ∆?̂? < 𝐶1
0   𝑖𝑓   ∆?̂? ≥ 𝐶1
     (Eq. B.2) 
B.2 Accounting for biases 
We assume that participants keep their type-1 criterion constant at 𝐶1 = 0°. Any 
left/right bias is instead modelled by a bias in the generation of internal estimates 𝑥. 
This is a logical choice when one considers spatially incongruent audiovisual stimuli: i.e. 
𝑆𝑉 ≠ 𝑆𝐴 (see below).  
Assuming statistically optimal inference (as above) the PDF for the integrated signals 𝑥𝐴𝑉 
given a pair of auditory and visual stimuli locations, 𝑆𝑉 and 𝑆𝐴, is equal to the product of 
the unisensory PDFs:  









In the current study audiovisual standard stimuli are always presented in the centre of 
the screen and spatially congruent: 𝑆𝑠𝑡,𝑉 = 𝑆𝑠𝑡,𝐴 = 𝑆𝑠𝑡 = 0°. Therefore, their PDF readily 
simplifies to: 𝑃(𝑥𝑠𝑡,𝐴𝑉|𝑆𝑠𝑡) = 𝑁(𝑥𝐴𝑉;  𝑆𝑠𝑡, 𝜎
2
𝐴𝑉). However, the audiovisual probe could 




𝑆𝑝𝑟,𝐴 = 𝑆𝑝𝑟 −
1
2
∆𝐴𝑉. The PDF for 𝑥𝑝𝑟,𝐴𝑉 should thus be written as: 
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∆𝐴𝑉), 𝜎2𝐴𝑉)  
                = 𝑁(𝑥𝐴𝑉;  𝑆𝑝𝑟 + 𝐵𝑖𝑎𝑠𝑝𝑟 , 𝜎
2
𝐴𝑉) 








)     (Eq. B.3) 
Please note that we find a left- or rightward bias (i.e. |𝐵𝑖𝑎𝑠𝑝𝑟| > 0°) for the internal 
representations of a spatially incongruent (∆𝐴𝑉 > 0°) audiovisual probe’s if 𝜎2𝐴 ≠ 𝜎
2
𝑉. 
The bias for audiovisual spatially congruent (∆𝐴𝑉 = 0°) or unisensory (𝐴 or 𝑉) probes is 
assumed to be zero. Similarly, the bias for the audiovisual standard is also assumed to be 
zero: i.e. 𝐵𝑖𝑎𝑠𝑠𝑡 = 0°. 
B.3 Bayesian confidence judgements 
An ideal performer’s confidence report is given by the posterior probability of being 
correct (Drugowitsch et al., 2014, Hangya et al., 2016; Pouget et al., 2016): i.e. the 
probability that the true stimulus disparity corresponds to the response that was given. 
𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑓𝑖𝑑𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑒 =
{
𝑃(∆𝑆 ≥ 𝐶1|𝑧 = "𝑟𝑖𝑔ℎ𝑡", 𝑥𝑠𝑡, 𝑥𝑝𝑟) = ∫ 𝑃(∆𝑆|𝑧 = "𝑟𝑖𝑔ℎ𝑡", 𝑥𝑠𝑡 , 𝑥𝑝𝑟)𝑑∆𝑆
∞
𝐶1




The abovementioned 𝑃(∆𝑆|𝑧, 𝑥𝑠𝑡 , 𝑥𝑝𝑟), i.e. posterior probability over stimulus 
disparities ∆𝑆 given internal representations 𝑥𝑠𝑡, 𝑥𝑝𝑟 and response 𝑧, is equal to 
𝑃(∆𝑆|𝑥𝑠𝑡 , 𝑥𝑝𝑟) for all 𝑃(𝑧|𝑥𝑠𝑡, 𝑥𝑝𝑟) ≠ 0 because 𝑃(𝑧|𝑥𝑠𝑡 , 𝑥𝑝𝑟) and 𝑃(∆𝑆|𝑥𝑠𝑡, 𝑥𝑝𝑟) are 
conditionally independent. We conclude that an ideal performer’s confidence judgment 
is defined by the area under the curve of the posterior distribution over ∆𝑆 (Eq. B.1) on 
the responded side (“right” or “left”) of the type-1 criterion 𝐶1 (Eq. B.2):  
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Analytical solutions for these integrals are given by the (complementary) error function: 
𝑒𝑟𝑓 and 𝑒𝑟𝑓𝑐, respectively. We use the symmetry of both functions and assumption 
𝐶1 = 0° to obtain:   
  𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑓𝑖𝑑𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑒| 𝑥𝑠𝑡, 𝑥𝑝𝑟 =
1
2
[1 + erf (
|∆?̂?|
√2√2𝑤𝑆𝜎2𝑆
)]  (Eq. B.4) 
So, confidence in a Bayesian sense, i.e. the posterior probability of being correct, is 
lowest when ∆?̂? = 𝐶1 = 0° (i.e. 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑓𝑖𝑑𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑒 = 0.5) and continuously increases for both 
sides symmetrically (i.e. for left and right responses). The relationship between 
𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑓𝑖𝑑𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑒 and absolute stimulus disparity estimate |∆?̂?| is described by a cumulative 
Gaussian distribution whose slope depends on the stimulus reliability (i.e. 
1
𝜎2𝑆
) and on 
the width of the prior stimulus distribution 𝑃(𝑆) by means of the weighting term 𝑤𝑠. 
By requiring observers to select one of several confidence levels (e.g. 1-4) we implicitly 
ask them to map their probabilities of being correct onto a confidence scale with 
discrete levels. Confidence level k is chosen when the probability of being correct is 
within that level’s type-2 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑓𝑖𝑑𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑒 criteria: e.g. "𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑓𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑙 = 𝑘" if 0.7 <
𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑓𝑖𝑑𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑒 < 0.8. Given that there is a continuous and unique theoretical mapping 
between |∆?̂?| and 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑓𝑖𝑑𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑒, we can alternatively describe the type-2 criteria in units 
of |∆?̂?|. For a task that employs N confidence levels, there exist N+1 type-2 criteria 𝑪𝟐 
that group the absolute disparity estimates |∆?̂?| onto confidence levels according to:  
                   "𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑓𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑙 = 𝑘"    if      𝐶2,𝑘 ≤ |∆?̂?| ≤ 𝐶2,𝑘+1 
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  With:  𝑪𝟐 = {𝐶2,1 = 0° ≤ 𝐶2,2 … ≤ 𝐶2,𝑁 ≤ 𝐶2,𝑁+1 = ∞°}  
Please note that the first and last type-2 criteria are fixed at 𝐶2,1 = 0° and 𝐶2,𝑁+1 = ∞°, 
such that an individual’s mapping between |∆?̂?| is determined by N-1 type-2 criteria. 
B.4 Predicting probabilities of location responses 
Given the above-described inference model for statistically optimal location responses 
and confidence judgments, we can now derive the predicted probability with which an 
ideal observer would make a particular response, e.g. 𝑧 = "𝑟𝑖𝑔ℎ𝑡" and "𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑓𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑙 =
𝑘", for a certain stimulus disparity ∆𝑆 = 𝑆𝑝𝑟 − 𝑆𝑠𝑡, type-1 performance measures, 
𝐵𝑖𝑎𝑠𝑝𝑟 and 𝜎
2
𝑆, and type-2 criteria 𝑪𝟐.  
We start with the predicted probabilities for location responses 𝑃(𝑧|𝑆𝑠𝑡, 𝑆𝑝𝑟). Since the 
location responses depend entirely on the stimulus disparity estimates ∆?̂? = ?̂?𝑝𝑟 − ?̂?𝑠𝑡 
(see Eq. B.2), we will first derive the (across-trials) probability distributions for single 
stimuli estimates (i.e. ?̂?𝑠𝑡 or ?̂?𝑝𝑟).  These can be obtained by integrating out (i.e. 
marginalizing over) 𝑥:  
          𝑃(?̂?|𝑆) = ∫ 𝑃(?̂?|𝑥)𝑃(𝑥|𝑆)𝑑𝑥 
where 𝑃(𝑥|𝑆) is the sensory noise PDF centred on 𝑆 plus a potentially non-zero bias (see 
Eq. B.3), and 𝑃(?̂?|𝑥) can be expressed by means of the delta function: i.e. 𝑃(?̂?|𝑥) = 1 if 
?̂? = 𝑤𝑆𝑥 + 𝑤𝑃𝜇𝑃, and 0 otherwise. Solving the integral results in:  
 𝑃(?̂?|𝑆) = ∫ 𝛿(𝑤𝑆𝑥 + 𝑤𝑃𝜇𝑃 − ?̂?)𝑁(𝑥; 𝑆 + 𝐵𝑖𝑎𝑠𝑝𝑟 , 𝜎
2
𝑆)𝑑𝑥  




𝑆)   
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Since both 𝑃(𝑆𝑝?̂?|𝑆𝑝𝑟) and 𝑃(𝑆𝑠?̂?|𝑆𝑠𝑡) are normal distributions, their difference 
distribution 𝑃(∆?̂?|𝑆𝑠𝑡, 𝑆𝑝𝑟) will also be normally distributed:  









𝑆)   (Eq. B.5) 
Finally, the probability of a “left” or “right” response given both stimulus locations is 
computed as the partial integral of 𝑃(∆?̂?|𝑆𝑠𝑡, 𝑆𝑝𝑟) to the left or right of 𝐶1 = 0°: 




                   =
1
2


























) (Eq. B.6) 
Where we have substituted 𝐽𝑁𝐷 = √2𝜎𝑆 (for the just-noticeable difference) and 
𝑃𝑆𝐸 = −𝐵𝑖𝑎𝑠𝑝𝑟 (for the point of subjective equality). Equation B.6 is commonly known 
as the psychometric function. We note that the psychometric function is not affected by 
the prior stimulus distribution 𝑃(𝑆) because the weighting term 𝑤𝑆 drops out in the last 
step (Acuna et al., 2015).  
B.5 Predicting probabilities of confidence judgments 
The main question that we set out to answer is: Given a certain location response 𝑧 for 
true stimulus locations 𝑆𝑠𝑡 and 𝑆𝑝𝑟, what is the probability with which an ideal observer 
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would choose any of the confidence levels? In other words, we want to know 
𝑃("𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑓𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑙 = 𝑘"|𝑧, 𝑆𝑠𝑡, 𝑆𝑝𝑟).  
Since the decision for a certain confidence level depends directly on ∆?̂?, the probability 
for "𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑓𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑙 = 𝑘" is equal to the partial integral of 𝑃(∆?̂?|𝑧, 𝑆𝑠𝑡, 𝑆𝑝𝑟) over all ∆?̂? 
where 𝑃(∆?̂?|𝑧) > 0 and 𝐶2,𝑘 ≤ |∆?̂?| ≤ 𝐶2,𝑘+1. We use Bayes’ Rule to find: 
    𝑃(∆?̂?|𝑧, 𝑆𝑠𝑡, 𝑆𝑝𝑟) =
𝑃(𝑧|∆?̂?,𝑆𝑠𝑡,𝑆𝑝𝑟)∗𝑃(∆?̂?|𝑆𝑠𝑡,𝑆𝑝𝑟)
𝑃(𝑧|𝑆𝑠𝑡,𝑆𝑝𝑟)
   (Eq. B.7) 
Where two of the right-hand terms, 𝑃(∆?̂?|𝑆𝑠𝑡, 𝑆𝑝𝑟) and 𝑃(𝑧|𝑆𝑠𝑡, 𝑆𝑝𝑟) are known (see Eqs 
B.5 & B.6) and the third term can be shown to equal 𝑃(𝑧|𝑥𝑠𝑡 , 𝑥𝑝𝑟), which is also known 
(see Eq. B.2):  






= 𝑃(𝑧|∆?̂?) = 𝑃(𝑧|𝑥𝑠𝑡 , 𝑥𝑝𝑟)  
The numerator on the right-hand side of equation B.7 is the product of a step function 
and a Gaussian distribution over ∆?̂?. Division by the denominator ensures that this 
truncated Gaussian is normalized to form the required probability distribution 
𝑃(∆?̂?|𝑧, 𝑆𝑠𝑡, 𝑆𝑝𝑟). The probability for a particular confidence level k, given response 𝑧, 
can thus be computed as a partial integral of the truncated Gaussian probability 
distribution. By substituting B.5 & B.6 into Eq. B.7 we find: 
             

























































   (Eq. B.8) 
Likewise, for 𝑧 = "𝑙𝑒𝑓𝑡" responses the probability of a "𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑓𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑙 = 𝑘" judgment is: 































   (Eq. B.9) 
Equations B.8 & B.9 suggest that the prior stimulus distribution 𝑃(𝑆) exerts its influence 












𝐶2,𝑘+1. However, we note that 𝑪𝟐 criteria are defined in units of 
∆?̂? = 𝑤𝑆∆𝑥. So 
1
𝑤𝑆
𝐶2 is defined in units of ∆𝑥. We may thus conclude that the width of 
the prior stimulus distribution does not affect the across-trials probability for a certain 
confidence level. In other words: if we alternatively define a set of type-2 criteria in units 
of ∆𝑥 , 𝑪𝟐∆𝒙, which differ from 𝑪𝟐 by a factor 𝑤𝑆, i.e.  𝑪𝟐 = 𝑤𝑆𝑪𝟐∆𝒙, then we can rewrite 
equations B.8 & B.9 such that the unknown weighting term 𝑤𝑆 drops out: 




























           (Eq. B.10) 
Equation B.10 enables us to directly predict the probability with which an ideal observer 
would choose confidence level k for a certain stimulus disparity ∆𝑆 = 𝑆𝑝𝑟 − 𝑆𝑠𝑡 and 
conditional on the type-1 response (𝑧 = "𝑟𝑖𝑔ℎ𝑡" or 𝑧 = "𝑙𝑒𝑓𝑡"), type-1 performance 
measures 𝑃𝑆𝐸 and 𝐽𝑁𝐷, and type-2 criteria 𝑪𝟐∆𝒙. 




. If 𝜎2𝑃 is large, that is if the prior is weak, 𝑤𝑆 ≈ 1. For stronger priors one 
should keep in mind that the type-2 criteria 𝑪𝟐∆𝒙 were scaled by 0 < 𝑤𝑆 < 1 relative to 
the true criteria. For our purposes in the current study such scaling is not important, 
because we make comparisons of 𝑪𝟐∆𝒙 differences between conditions, not between 
different (groups of) participants.  
B.6 Practicalities of meta-JND model parameter fitting 
Our aim is to fit a meta-JND to participants’ confidence judgments. In practical terms 
this means that we predict the conditional probabilities of the confidence levels for an 
ideal observer using equation B.10 while we try to optimize the parameter values of 
𝐽𝑁𝐷 and 𝑪𝟐∆𝒙 (n.b. the 𝑃𝑆𝐸 is obtained from the type-1 psychometric function and held 
constant) to let the generated probabilities best match the empirical probabilities in the 
participant’s data (by means of maximizing the likelihood, see further below). The best 
matching value for 𝐽𝑁𝐷, fitted to the confidence judgments of participants, is what we 
call meta-JND.  
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Apart from meta-JND, other parameters to fit are the N-1 confidence bin criteria (in 
units of ∆𝑥): 𝐶2∆𝑥,2 … 𝐶2∆𝑥,𝑁 (where 𝐶2∆𝑥,1 and 𝐶2∆𝑥,𝑁+1 are fixed at 0 and ∞, 
respectively). We constrain the parameter fitting algorithm (Matlab’s ‘fmincon’ function) 
such that: 
𝑪𝟐∆𝒙 = {𝐶2∆𝑥,1 = 0 ≤ 𝐶2∆𝑥,2 … ≤ 𝐶2∆𝑥,𝑁 ≤ 𝐶2∆𝑥,𝑁+1 = ∞} 
Finally, we expect participants to occasionally erroneously select a confidence level at 
random. Therefore, we also fit one so-called type-2 lapse-rate parameter: 𝜆2. To 
compute the ideal observer’s confidence bin probabilities (conditional on type-1 
response 𝑧 and stimulus locations 𝑆𝑝𝑟, 𝑆𝑠𝑡) we insert the 𝑃𝑆𝐸, 𝐽𝑁𝐷 (i.e. the meta-JND 
that we’re fitting), and 𝑪𝟐∆𝒙 parameters into equation B.10 and then adjust the obtained 
confidence level probability for lapses by applying: 




𝑃𝑏𝑖𝑛,𝑘 is computed for each combination of confidence level 𝑘, type-1 response 𝑧 and 
stimulus locations 𝑆𝑠𝑡 and 𝑆𝑝𝑟 (given certain parameters values for 𝜆2, 𝐽𝑁𝐷 and 𝑪𝟐∆𝒙). 
The likelihood of a particular behavioral dataset (i.e. a set of confidence level responses 
conditional on 𝑧, 𝑆𝑠𝑡, 𝑆𝑝𝑟) given the model and its parameters is the product of 𝑃𝑏𝑖𝑛,𝑘 
across all trials:  











CHAPTER 6:  GENERAL DISCUSSION 
 
In this thesis I have presented: 1) An evaluation of two popular computational models 
for multisensory integration, maximum likelihood estimation (MLE) and Bayesian causal 
inference (BCI), by means of a literature review. 2) A failed attempt to replicate one of 
the most influential multisensory integration studies supporting the MLE model (Alais & 
Burr, 2004). 3) Evidence that the BCI model describes human multisensory perception 
better, even under experimental conditions that were optimized for MLE. 4) Empirical 
support for a supra-modal view on metacognition in which multisensory integration 
leads to a boost of confidence.  
In this final chapter I will elaborate on the implications of the empirical results that were 
presented in this thesis. Furthermore, I will address some outstanding questions and 
limitations of the current work with regards to multisensory integration according to BCI 
as we have proposed it in chapter 4. Finally, I will propose future research directions 
that combine metacognition and multisensory research but which we were unable to 
tackle in the current thesis.   
 
1. Implications of the current research 
The first empirical chapter (3) attempts to resolve a fifteen year old discrepancy in the 
multisensory research literature: while Alais and Burr (2004) found that human 
perceptual behavior for audiovisual spatial integration agrees well with the statistically 
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optimal strategy of maximum likelihood estimation (MLE), Battaglia, Jacobs and Aslin 
(2003) reported that human observers systematically overweighted the visual sensory 
modality relative to MLE predictions. In chapter 3 we have shown results that partially 
reproduce both of the previous works. Similar to Alais and Burr (2004), we found a 
multisensory variance reduction in line with MLE predictions, thus indicating that the 
human brain is able to integrate two sensory sources of information near-optimally and 
gain a multisensory precision improvement. However, like Battaglia et al., (2003) we also 
observed a clear visual overweighting pattern, which demonstrates that human 
observers do not exactly adhere to MLE predictions. Such a discrepant combination of 
an optimal variance reduction with simultaneous overweighting of one sensory modality 
has been reported before (e.g. Butler, Smith, Campos & Bülthoff, 2010). 
At first sight, our results thus only seemed to add more confusion to the ongoing debate 
of whether humans perform optimal sensory integration (see Rahnev & Denison, 2018). 
However, we have shown through Monte Carlo simulations (Appendix D in chapter 3) 
that an apparently optimal variance reduction is still likely to be obtained for moderate 
levels of sensory overweighting (i.e. moderate suboptimality). This simulation result 
avoids a black-and-white judgment about which of the previously reported results is 
more correct (optimal vs. suboptimal integration) and instead refocuses the debate on 
the explanatory power (or lack thereof) in the empirical data.  
Our data and supplementary simulation analyses suggest that human observers 
deviated slightly from MLE-optimal multisensory integration. The reason for us being 
able to show this small but significant deviation whereas Alais and Burr (2004) generally 
found a good agreement with MLE for their participants’ sensory weighting scheme 
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probably rests on our carefully designed experimental design with individualized settings 
and advanced analysis methods. Prior to study execution we made use of Monte Carlo 
simulations to select an audiovisual spatial disparity size that optimized the sensitivity to 
detect sensory overweighting (Appendix B in chapter 3). It is through such simulations 
and detailed preparation of the psychophysical methodology that we gain a better 
understanding about human perceptual behavior.  
The second empirical chapter (4) goes further where the first empirical chapter (3) 
stopped. Though we have mentioned some possible explanations for the deviations 
from MLE that we observed for audiovisual spatial integration in chapter 3, we set out to 
systematically check and compare those hypotheses in chapter 4. The approach was 
two-fold: the first method was based on experimental manipulations, while the second 
explanatory method was performed through Bayesian model comparison. While the first 
method did not reveal any evidence for the influence of training or motivational reward 
on multisensory integration (though we acknowledge that the 2 x 2 between subjects 
experimental design was likely underpowered), advanced model comparison techniques 
(i.e. making use of Markov-Chain Monte Carlo; Acerbi, Dokka, Angelaki & Ma, 2018) 
helped us to identify the best explanation for the deviations from MLE: Bayesian causal 
inference. This result highlights the power of hypothesis-driven research and sensitive 
analysis methods for psychophysical research.     
The finding that human observers perform Bayesian causal inference even under 
experimental conditions that were previously believed to invoke mandatory fusion does 
not only explain the empirical results in chapters 3 and 4, it could potentially also explain 
many previous reports of suboptimal (non-MLE) multisensory integration (extending 
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well outside the domain of audiovisual spatial integration; e.g. Burr, Banks & Morrone, 
2009; Butler, Smith, Campos & Bülthoff, 2010; Fetsch, Turner, DeAngelis & Angelaki, 
2009; Maiworm & Röder, 2011; Prsa, Gale & Blanke, 2012; Rosas, Wagemans, Ernst & 
Wichmann, 2005). The proposal that human observers make use of Bayesian causal 
inference is not new and enjoys wide support in the multisensory integration community 
(e.g. Beierholm, Quartz & Shams, 2009; Bosen et al., 2016; Körding, Beierholm, Ma et al., 
2007; Magnotti & Beauchamp, 2017; Magnotti, Ma & Beauchamp, 2013; McGovern, 
Roudaia, Newell & Roach, 2016; Mendonça, Mandelli & Pulkki, 2016; Natarajan, Murray, 
Shams & Zemel, 2009; Odegaard & Shams, 2016; Odegaard, Wozny & Shams, 2015, 
2017; Rohe & Noppeney, 2015a, 2015b, 2016, Sato, Toyoizumi and Aihara, 2007; de 
Winkel, Katliar & Bülthoff, 2017; Wozny, Beierholm & Shams, 2008, 2010; see section 4 
in chapter 2). However, the option of causal inference has rarely been raised as a 
potential candidate explanation for suboptimal MLE results. The ruling idea in the field 
seemed to be that there were specific experimental settings in which participants 
applied MLE-type forced integration and other experimental paradigms in which 
participants relied on causal inference. The main conclusion that should be drawn from 
Chapter 4 is that this view does not hold in practice: human observers cannot be forced 
to integrate two sensory signals. Instead, they use a probability based strategy to decide 
whether or not to integrate (i.e. causal inference) in all situations. Experimenters should 
thus be aware that full multisensory integration on every trial cannot be expected.  
The final empirical chapter (5) on metacognition may appear to have been a sudden 
change of topics (from optimal multisensory integration to metacognition), I argue 
instead that it is very much related to the preceding chapters because it builds on the 
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same computational foundation for multisensory integration: that it is a probabilistic 
mechanism that takes sensory uncertainties into account. In fact, I have argued that the 
empirical research that was presented in chapter 5 provides one of the most direct 
pieces of evidence to support such a probabilistic basis of the multisensory integration 
models that were discussed in the preceding chapters. The fact that we observed an 
unambiguous confidence boost for multisensory versus unisensory stimuli and that the 
extent of that confidence increase could be predicted by probabilistic multisensory 
integration modelling (based on Bayesian inference) is a clear confirmation of the 
fundamental ideas that underlie the most popular models for multisensory integration 
(i.e. MLE and BCI).   
Other results that were presented in chapter 5, specifically on metacognitive noise being 
equal across various reliability levels and sensory modalities, further support the view 
that metacognition is a supra-modal process (i.e. independent of the sensory modality) 
that takes place after multisensory integration has completed (De Gardelle, Le Corre & 
Mamassian, 2016; Faivre, Filevich, Solovey, Kühn & Blanke, 2018). The current study 
thus contributes to the abundance of evidence in support of a hierarchical model for 
metacognition (Bang, Shekhar & Rahnev, 2018; De Martino, Fleming, Garrett & Dolan, 
2013; Fleming et al., 2015; Jang, Wallsten & Huber, 2012; Maniscalco & Lau, 2016; 
Mueller & Weidemann, 2008; Rahnev, Nee, Riddle, Larson & D’Esposito, 2016; Van den 
Berg, Yoo & Ma, 2017).  
While the above-mentioned conclusions from the third empirical chapter (5) may not be 
very surprising (uncertainty-based models for multisensory integration were already 
widely accepted) or novel (considering other reports in the literature on metacognition) 
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the methodology that enabled us to draw these conclusions certainly was new. In order 
to determine the multisensory confidence boost unambiguously we were forced to 
develop a new modelling approach. We extended the now popular meta-d’ method by 
Maniscalco & Lau (2012), by deriving the predicted confidence ratings of a Bayesian 
ideal observer, for use in experimental paradigms that are normally used to fit 
psychometric functions. An evaluation of this modelling based approach, which we 
termed meta-JND, showed good to excellent goodness-of-fits, thereby confirming the 
method’s validity for summarizing human metacognitive behavior. Although we applied 
this novel methodology to a multisensory integration experiment, it is not specific to 
such research and can be used by researchers in all areas of metacognition (the model 
fitting scripts will be made available online at a later stage).  
 
2. Outstanding questions and limitations 
In chapters 3 and 4 I have presented behavioral data that deviated only mildly from MLE 
predictions: i.e. a significant multisensory variance reduction was still observed in nearly 
all individual participants. However, in the pilot study of chapter 3 (appendix A) the 
audiovisual variance was higher than the auditory variance for all participants. What 
would explain such a major discrepancy? The answer may lie in the correlation that was 
observed between the difference in unisensory reliabilities (𝜎𝑉 − 𝜎𝐴) and the amount of 
visual overweighting (𝑤𝐴,𝑚𝑙𝑒 − 𝑤𝐴,𝑒𝑚𝑝), see Chapter 4 (Fig. 4). In the pilot study this 
difference was rather large, because the spatial reliability of the visual stimuli had been 
heavily degraded. According to the BCI model, such high levels of sensory noise would 
cause some of the internal visual estimates (𝑥𝑉) to be very distant from the auditory 
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spatial estimates (𝑥𝐴). Additionally, since the auditory reliability was relatively high, the 
estimated likelihood for a common source of such disparate signals would be small (see 
also Rohe & Noppeney, 2015a). So, I concluded in chapter 4, integration breaks down, 
and if the observer consistently selects the visual spatial estimate (?̂?𝑉) over the auditory 
spatial estimate (?̂?𝐴) then the audiovisual variance could almost be as high as the visual 
variance. The BCI model thus also provides a reasonable explanation for such clearly 
suboptimal multisensory perception.  
However, the above explanation assumes that participants stick to the visual BCI 
estimates even though the auditory estimates are far more precise. This begs the 
question under what circumstances observers would switch to rely on their normally 
less dominant sensory modality. Studies by Jacobs and Fine (1999) and Ernst and Banks 
(2000) indicated that an observer’s choice may be influenced by recent learning 
experience or task relevance (not mutually exclusive). In the experiments that were 
presented in this thesis, participants were required to select the audiovisual stimulus 
location. The task relevance hypothesis (Ernst & Banks, 2000) suggests that if we had 
instead asked for the location of the auditory stimulus, then we should have observed 
auditory overweighting relative to MLE predictions. Likewise, the experience-based 
hypothesis (Jacobs & Fine, 1999) suggests that if we had trained participants prior to the 
pilot study (Chapter 3, appendix A) to realise that the auditory stimuli were more 
reliable than the visual stimuli, then their audiovisual variance should have been smaller 
than (or similar to) the relatively small auditory variance. These are two clear predictions 
that can easily be tested experimentally. The fact that we have not done so yet is a 
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major limitation of the here-presented thesis (but see e.g. Roach, Heron & McGraw, 
2006 for evidence that supports the task relevance hypothesis in the temporal domain).    
While the observed divergence from MLE predictions best fitted with the BCI 
explanation (i.e. a violation of the forced-fusion assumption and reliance on the 
modality that is normally most precise, see chapter 4), we cannot altogether exclude 
other factors. The model that implemented visual overweighting (relative to MLE) by 
means of a Bayesian prior on visual reliability (Battaglia et al., 2003) performed nearly as 
good when compared in a fixed-effects model comparison analysis. For some 
participants it performed substantially better than the BCI model. It is in-principle 
possible that there is heterogeneity in the population, where different observers rely on 
different perceptual strategies. Furthermore, a combination of factors might jointly 
contribute to deviations from the MLE model. For example, we have discarded the 
correlated noise model as an explanation on its own (chapter 4), but it is plausible that 
some amount of supra-modal noise does contribute to the empirically measured 
variance across trials (Mueller & Weidemann, 2008; see also the discussion on 
metacognitive noise in chapter 5).  
An attractive characteristic of the BCI explanation as we proposed it is its flexibility: 
while the Bayesian prior hypothesis would always predict overreliance on the dominant 
modality, the BCI-based proposal allows observers to rely more on other modalities if 
that would be favorable given the circumstances. In both chapter 3 and 4 we have 
observed a few participants who significantly overweighted audition rather than vision. 
Had we allowed the BCI model to individually decide whether it would select auditory or 
visual estimates for its responses, it would surely have surpassed fitting performance of 
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the Bayesian prior model by a much greater extent. The question arises again (see 
discussion above): why would some participants have overweighted audition rather than 
vision?  
 
3. Future research combining metacognition and multisensory integration 
One of the initial aims for the metacognition study (chapter 5) was to investigate 
whether overweighting patterns could be explained by observers’ confidence responses. 
We hypothesized that participants with reportedly higher confidence in either 
unisensory modality would rely more on that modality during multisensory integration, 
i.e. their weights for that modality would be increased relative to MLE predictions. 
However, discussion of this research question was omitted from chapter 5 because, as it 
turned out, this particular data set proved to be the one in which deviations from MLE 
predictions were least pronounced (although visual overweighting was still shown to be 
significant in a 3 (reliability levels) by 2 (empirical vs. MLE-predicted) repeated-measures 
ANOVA on the auditory weights: F(1) = 5.2, p = 0.025, 𝐵𝐹01 = 0.54; for statistical 
methods please see chapter 5). The data that was presented in chapter 5 thus may not 
have been ideal to test the hypothesized relationship between overconfidence and 
overweighting. Since overweighting was only modest, measurement noise may have 
obscured any existing correlation with overconfidence.  
Future research that would want to address this open question might be better off using 
a slightly larger audiovisual disparity which would likely result in more overweighting 
and a better opportunity to test the hypothesized relationship with unisensory 
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metacognitive biases. Any such analysis with confidence ratings would then build upon 
the presumed fixed mapping between type-2 criteria and posterior probability of being 
correct (independent of sensory modalities, see Section 3.4 in chapter 5). An alternative 
would be to ask participants to express a confidence interval for each localization 
response (i.e. in units of visual angle around the location estimate), instead of 
confidence judgments for a two alternative forced-choice decision. A correlation analysis 
between sensory overweighting and unisensory confidence-interval size differences, as 
opposed to type-2 criteria differences, would be straightforward because of the 
theoretical direct relation between such confidence-interval sizes and sensory 
uncertainty (i.e. it avoids mapping ‘posterior probabilities of being correct’ onto N 
confidence levels).    
While the reason why we observed only modest overweighting in chapter 5 relative to 
chapters 3 and 4 is not immediately clear, I speculate that this may be due to the 
experimental design in which we had asked participants to introspect on every response. 
Instead of defaulting to using partially-integrated visual location estimates, the explicit 
requirement for a confidence judgment may have prompted participants to evaluate 
both sensory modalities on a trial-by-trial basis. Comparison of their confidence for both 
auditory and visual partially-integrated estimates (i.e. ∆?̂?𝐴,𝐵𝐶𝐼 and ∆?̂?𝑉,𝐵𝐶𝐼) and selection 
of the most confident location response (e.g. if ∆?̂?𝐴,𝐵𝐶𝐼 suggests ‘left’, but ∆?̂?𝑉,𝐵𝐶𝐼 
suggests ‘right’, then choose ‘left’ if |∆?̂?𝐴,𝐵𝐶𝐼| > |∆?̂?𝑉,𝐵𝐶𝐼|, ‘right’ otherwise) would have 
resulted in perceptual behavior that is very similar to MLE predictions. Such confidence-
driven single-trial selection of the sensory modality after partial BCI integration would be 
an extreme example of the task-relevance based switching proposal that I have 
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discussed above (see ‘outstanding questions and limitations’). Whether human 
observers do indeed have independent metacognitive access to both partially-integrated 
estimates remains to be investigated.  
Another initial research objective that was omitted from chapter 5 because the 
experimental design proved unsuitable to address it, was to investigate whether 
uncertainty about the causal structure of the world (i.e. one common 𝐴𝑉 source or two 
independent 𝐴 and 𝑉 sources) would affect the reported confidence judgments of the 
type-1 perceptual decisions. Previously, White et al., (2014) have shown that integrated 
incongruent audiovisual speech stimuli that caused illusory McGurk percepts were 
associated with lower confidence levels than audiovisual congruent percepts of the 
same syllable. This result suggests that observers are able to evaluate their causal 
uncertainty through metacognitive processes and use it to modify their confidence 
reports on perceptual decisions (Deroy, Spence & Noppeney, 2016). For the 
metacognition study that is described in chapter 5, we had hypothesized that increased 
levels of causal uncertainty would lead to lower confidence judgments for 𝐴𝑉 spatially 
incongruent as opposed to spatially congruent conditions (i.e. an increase of the fitted 
type-2 criteria). The fact that we did not observe such a confidence difference should 
not be considered as proof that it would not have arisen had we used larger audiovisual 
disparities (i.e. if we had induced more causal uncertainty). To properly examine this 
interesting research direction in future experiments it would be advantageous to adopt 
an experimental design with various audiovisual disparity levels, as is conventional in BCI 
studies (Körding, Beierholm, Ma et al., 2007; Rohe & Noppeney, 2015a). Moreover, it 
would be helpful to ask participants for a direct indication of causal uncertainty (e.g. as a 
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confidence judgment on multisensory congruency decisions), so that these self-reported 
causal uncertainty estimates can be compared against perceptual confidence reports on 
a trial-by-trial basis.  
 
4. Concluding remarks 
The above-described discussions and suggested directions for future research build 
directly on the two central topics of this thesis: 1) that an experimenter doing 
multisensory research cannot assume observers to automatically and completely fuse 
two sensory signals because 2) such observers are engaged in a complex perceptual 
process wherein multiple sources of uncertainty interact and necessarily need to be 
evaluated in order to make successful decisions. A striking example of how the empirical 
work and theoretical background that was presented in this thesis contributes to a 
better understanding of the intricate relationship between multisensory integration and 
perceptual decisions comes from my own experience. In my first year of this PhD I 
observed that participants who displayed a major cross-modal bias in a standard 
ventriloquist effect paradigm with two locations on opposite sides of the midline (i.e. 
they nearly always located the sound on the same side as the flash), were almost one 
hundred percent correct when the same stimuli were presented in a two-interval 
forced-choice task wherein they were required to identify which of the two intervals 
contained the spatially incongruent stimuli (the other interval contained identical but 
spatially congruent stimuli). As a naïve experimenter I did not yet understand that 
observers could exhibit partial multisensory integration that may appear as forced 
fusion in insensitive experimental designs, and that these same observers would be able 
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to use metacognitive assessments of the multisensory uncertainty to successfully decide 
which of the two auditory location estimates was based on a perceptual illusion.  
I think it is reasonable to conclude that I learned a lot about the intricate interplay of 
multisensory integration, metacognition, and sensitive psychophysical methodology 
through the various research projects during my PhD as presented here in this thesis. I 
hope that this body of work enables other researchers to go through this process faster 
such that we can build forward together with the aim to better understand human 
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